Habitual Sustainability: Environmental Action Through the Lens of Habit, Ritual Practice, and Eucharist by Cranston, Joshua Dake
Habitual Sustainability 
Environmental Action Through the Lens of Habit, Ritual Practice, 
and Eucharist 
 













Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for 
the Degree of Master of Philosophy in Culture, Environment 
and Sustainability 
Centre for Development and the Environment 




- iii - 
Table of Contents 
 
Acknowledgements iv 
Introduction: Imminence, Information, and Inaction 1 
Chapter 1 – Reframing the Discourse: Habit and the Communication of 
Sustainability 
12 
Chapter 2 – The Weight of Practice: Habit Formation and Ritual 55 
Chapter 3 – Christian Rituals in a Green Age: Communicating Eucharist 93 
Reference List 130 
- iv - 
Acknowledgements 
 
This project has obliged me to welcome the criticisms, insights, and feedback of 
others, often pushing me beyond my comfort zone and into the realm of the 
academic unknown.  Indeed, it is a daunting task to render one’s self vulnerable 
through the process of writing; little did I know, however, that it could be an 
experience of blessing and grace!  I am extremely grateful to all those who have 
aided in the completion of this thesis, whether in dialogue over my topics or by 
reading and revising drafts of my chapters, particularly Michael Baker-Trapp, 
Rachel Zahniser, Matt Zahniser, Celeste Cranston, and Kent Dunnington.  
Finally, I would like to thank Martin Mueller, not only for his gracious and 
discerning supervision of this work but also, and more importantly, for the 
generous welcome he gave my wife and I as we lived in Oslo.  It is a gift to count 
him as a friend; in part, this thesis is a way of saying thank you.
 - 1 - 
Imminence, Information, and Inaction 
 
“Now if arguments were sufficient by themselves to make people decent, the 
rewards they would command would justifiably have been many and large, as 
Theognis says, and rightly bestowed. In fact, however, arguments seem to have 
enough influence to stimulate and encourage the civilized ones among the young 
people, and perhaps to make virtue take possession of a well-born character that 
truly loves what is fine; but they seem unable to turn the many toward being fine 
and good.” Aristotle (1179b5-10) 
 
“Information is not entirely inconsequential, but it is much overrated as a change 
agent.”  
Caron Chess and Branden Johnson (2007: 223)   
 
The Problem of Social Change 
In the world of contemporary environmental ethics, one is apt to encounter 
a cruel irony: the growing need for immediate change in humanity’s relation to 
the natural world has met the resounding apathy or stubborn inertia of the 
Western public.  Climate change has not inspired the assumption of sustainable 
behavior; instead, people have resisted, or simply shirked, their responsibility to 
the environmental.  Others put the stalemate differently, calling it a “persistent 
conundrum” that although “the balance of available scientific evidence conveys 
an increasing sense of urgency, society as a whole – particularly in the United 
States – does not appear to view the problem as immediate, and certainly not as 
urgent” (Moser and Dilling 2007a: 3).  Certain groups have set deadlines 
demarcating a time before which the world’s top-consuming countries must 
implement far-reaching reforms or face the reality of inflicting irreversible 
damage to the ecosystems of the earth.  Yet, many of these deadlines have passed 
with little progress for the better.  According to Intergovernmental Panel on 
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Climate Change (IPCC) co-Chair Thomas Stocker, “As a result of our past, 
present and expected future emissions of CO2, we are committed to climate 
change, and effects will persist for many centuries even if emissions of CO2 stop” 
(McDaid 2013).  Especially in the USA, the movement for sustainable change 
seems to suffer from an anemic constitution after finding itself stalled on the 
margins of political and social life.  Indeed, the pressing need for sustainable 
change has pushed some environmentalists into the frenzied role of doomsday 
prophets foretelling an apocalyptic end.  This means that the fear-mongering 
explicit in a medium like The Day After Tomorrow is nearly indistinguishable 
from reports from the “U.N.’s chief climate scientist (who) says the world is at 
‘five minutes before midnight’ when it comes to the deadline for averting severe 
climate change” (Earthweek 2013).  Yet despite all the clamor and hubbub, the 
world seems to have taken little notice, carrying on in largely the same 
(unsustainable) trajectory as before.  Cruelly, the change so desperately needed 
seems reluctant to come.  
Scientific research from past decades has demonstrated a causal link 
between humanity’s abuse of the natural world as an endless supply of natural 
resources and the myriad environmental problems that threaten to corrupt the 
ecological equilibrium.  The climatological case against modern society is 
airtight; it is generally accepted that humans have caused deleterious climate 
change.  Scientists have used many names to describe climate change, including 
“a carbon dioxide problem, an energy problem, global warming, an ‘enhanced 
greenhouse effect’” (Moser and Dilling 2007a: 5).  At base, climate change is a 
pressing and global environmental predicament.  I am not interested here in 
rehashing familiar arguments and trotting out the relevant data to prove anew the 
endangered state of the earth’s ecosystems and humanity’s culpability in the 
whole affair.  Rather, I take climate change1 as a given, a reality I assume as a 
                                                
1 The reader may have already begun to notice that I vary in my terminology, sometimes alluding to climate change, 
sometimes naming it global warming or a general environmental crisis. Yet all the while, I intend to refer to the basic 
constellation of phenomena that compose a picture of an ailing planet earth. I must own up to such terminological 
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premise in my larger project because “the crux of the climate change debate at 
this time is not conflict over science but over very different values” (McCright 
2007: 207).  Thus, the questions I ask in this thesis concern not whether climate 
change will happen (or whether it is already happening), but the bearing that 
present or imminent reality has on human behavior.  
For the past couple decades, the environmental movement has confronted 
the world with this story: your current way of life as society cannot be sustained, 
for the environment upon which it is predicated is increasingly failing as a direct 
result.  As mentioned, however, the urgency of the message coming from the 
environmentalist camp has found its match equaled only by the lack of any 
substantial response from the intended audience.  As Moser and Dilling, editors of 
the recent collection of articles Creating a Climate for Change: Communicating 
Climate Change and Facilitating Social Change contend,  
 
the evidence shows that lack of a widespread sense of urgency is not the 
result of people not knowing about the issue.  It is also not just due to not 
understanding it or a lack of information.  In fact, research has shown that 
the public is overwhelmingly aware of the problem of global warming.  
Over 90 percent of the US population has heard of it, some know the 
problem is related to energy use, and quite a high percentage can correctly 
identify impacts associated with global warming (2007a: 4). 
 
Note here that the public does not lack relevant environmental knowledge.  The 
green awareness campaign has succeeded insofar as it has made people cognizant 
of the issue.  Yet, where are the green revolutions?  Why hasn’t sustainability 
gained the unanimous sympathy and attention of our politicians, public 
intellectuals, celebrities, and athletes?  Obviously, knowledge of environmental 
                                                
vagueness precisely because my argument does not hinge on using the right scientific terminology or facts to describe 
the tumultuous changes the earth is currently undergoing. Rather, my interest lies in analyzing the reasons behind the 
discrepancy between the overwhelming and dire environmental need, whatever that may presently consist in, and the 
underwhelming societal response to that need. Subsequently, my guiding research question will inquire into the 
reason(s) why present and past efforts at communicating sustainability have failed; I will then work from this platform 
to proscribe an alternative model that can bypass this tragic irony. 
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problems has not sufficed to stimulate the kind of social change needed to redress 
climate change.  Accordingly, the problem lies in what happens to that 
knowledge, the gap between knowledge and behavior. From all appearances, it 
seems as though people simply cannot be bothered to care for something so 
distant and intangible as climate change, despite its cosmic importance.  In this 
way, the majority of the Western world displays what Aristotle called 
incontinence, the disposition to act in a way contrary to what is known to be 
good, just, and reasonable.  According to Aristotle, the “incontinent person seems 
to be the same as one who abandons it [rational calculation].  The incontinent 
person knows that his actions are base, but does them because of his feelings” 
(Aristotle and Irwin 1999: 1145b12-14, brackets added).2  
I must admit that the push to communicate sustainability3 has not fallen on 
deaf ears completely.  The last couple decades have witnessed the emergence of 
environmentally minded individuals and sub-cultures dedicated to reducing their 
environmental footprint.  Further, I do not wish to undercut grassroots, small-
scale movements by implying that they cannot bring about society-wide changes 
for the better.  Rather, I wish merely to note that the rate of sustainable change in 
the West has not been near equal to the substantial need.  Although the 
sustainability message has been heard, it has not produced the kind of effects 
                                                
2 Given the distinct nature of citing Aristotle, which universally uses the line numbering developed by Immanuel 
Bekker as standard and the fact that I only draw on Terence Irwin’s translation (2nd. ed.), I will hereafter limit my 
citations of Aristotle to the Bekker numbering.  
3 The term “communicate sustainability” is a term common to environmental academic circles that means the project 
to convince individuals of the reality of climate change and, more importantly, to get them to change their 
unsustainable behavior so that they reduce their environmental footprint.  Accordingly, “communication” in this sense 
transcends the level of dialogue and information conveyance, extending itself into the realm of moral education.  The 
ultimate goal is behavior change according to a standard of right and wrong (adopting sustainable practices and 
shedding unsustainable practices), which places this project in the realm of ethics.  Though the colloquial usage of 
“communication” does not usually encompass any hint of moral implications (which makes it a bit unexpected to talk 
about communicating sustainability while referring to behavioral change), I will continue to employ it because of its 
currency in academia.  Further warrant for its usage can be found its etymological root, for communication comes 
from the Latin verb “communicare,” from which we get the English word “common.”  Communication, therefore, 
implies making something common, the mutual sharing of a dialogue or project.  In this light, the communication of 
sustainability can be interpreted as sharing in the message of sustainability, making it common for both parties.  This 
implies that the hearing party not only receives the message, but also internalizes to the extent that they take 
ownership of it by incorporating it into their lives.  This kind of communication constitutes an ethical endeavor of 
transforming lives, and it is this deeper kind of communication to which I refer in using the term “the communication 
of sustainability.” 
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necessary to buck the trend.  For example, Al Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth held 
the public’s attention for a short period, and while it incited controversy and 
change alike, it has not proven powerful enough to turn the tide in transforming 
the degrading pattern of society’s consumption.   
Consequently, despite the quasi-apocalyptic nature of the message 
environmentalists have dutifully communicated to the world for the past couple 
decades, no adequate sustainable revolution has emerged; this leaves the 
destructive nature of society’s practices essentially intact and abandons the 
urgency of the environment’s health to the whims of individual conscience.  As 
Moser and Dilling report, “Our own experience and a review of the literature 
suggested that the practice of climate change communication had resulted in 
disappointing and even counterproductive results” (2007a: ix).  Effectively, 
society has in large part continued with business as usual operations as if nothing 
significant has changed, despite knowing better.  While the situation is not 
completely desolate, it is clear that in attempts to communicate sustainability 
something is not working as it should.  Thus, we must ask the question: Why 
hasn’t knowledge of climate change translated into environmentally responsible 
behavior?  What explains this glaring information-behavior gap?  What is going 
awry? 
This, then, is the project for this thesis in brief: in this introduction and the 
first chapter, I seek to understand why the current model in the communication of 
sustainability has failed to ignite social change and then to articulate the 
beginnings of an alternative model (centered on habit) that compensates for the 
former’s shortcomings.  The second chapter argues that habit formation belongs 
to the category of practice because it relies wholly on the logic of practice, and 
that ritual is a particularly powerful type of social practice capable of habit 
formation.   Lastly, I contend that the Eucharist, the focal ritual of Christianity 
which focuses on conformation to the Body of Christ, challenges the 
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individualism and self-centeredness at the heart of unsustainable practices, and 
thus constitutes a ritual well placed to communicate sustainability.  
 
Ignorance, Knowledge, and Behavioral Models 
A comprehensive answer to the aforementioned question (what is going 
awry?) requires the discernment of a common pattern that unifies the variegated 
efforts of those who communicate sustainability.  To be sure, there is no one 
institute, program or recognizable spokesperson that oversees what I refer to as 
the communication of sustainability.  Rather, this endeavor is composed of 
various and discrete projects to persuade the public, or some section of society, to 
effect sustainable change.  The task at hand, therefore, is to discern what universal 
trait, if any, underwrites these particulars to account for their impotence.  With 
this discernment accomplished, we will have found a model of the 
communication of sustainability paradigmatic of the various and discrete projects.  
Further philosophical analysis of this model will reveal its shortcomings.   
Despite the lack of an explicit standard within this diverse movement, what 
holds most environmental advocates together is not only their telos (producing 
positive change among the main culprits responsible for climate change) but also, 
in most cases, their method for achieving that end.  This method hides underneath 
the surface of rhetoric yet is evident to the discerning eye.  To put it bluntly, the 
implicit methodological assumption that unites and underwrites most advocacy 
efforts is that the general public simply needs more and/or better information 
concerning the state of reality.  People just need to know more about what is 
happening to the environment; public awareness campaigns are typical examples 
of this approach.  Once people have their knowledge sufficiently updated, so the 
logic goes, they will thereby do what is right for the environment, almost as if out 
of necessity.  “Many informational efforts to promote environmentally 
responsible behavior lean on an implicit theory of behavior (…) that ‘right’ 
behavior naturally follows from ‘right’ thinking” (Chess and Johnson 2007: 223).  
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This statement by Rajendra Pachauri, Chair of the IPCC, epitomizes the dominant 
model: “It is becoming increasingly clear that the spread of knowledge and 
awareness would be a critical driver of the transformation that is required to move 
human society towards a pattern of sustainable development” (Pachauri 2010).  
This concern for raising awareness via information constitutes the unifying 
methodological trait in most current efforts to communicate sustainability. 
Given the scientific nature of the climate change phenomena, it has been 
natural for scientists to assume the role of awareness advocates.  The way in 
which these early advocates understood their business primarily as a matter of 
informing people of the problem seems to have set the tone for later efforts.  
“Among many of these communicators, the tripartite conviction that (1) climate 
change is essentially a scientific issue, (2) experts understand it and others don’t, 
and (3) the purpose of communication thus is to educate the ignorant is, in short, 
still alive and well” (Moser and Dilling 2007a: 15).  Another paradigmatic 
example of this perspective is Gore’s documentary An Inconvenient Truth, in 
which he explicitly aims to present scientific findings to the public to convince 
them of climate change and discursively oblige them to change their lives.4  In the 
accompanying book, Gore writes, “I think it makes a compelling case that 
humans are the cause of most of the global warming that is taking place.”  He 
makes clear that his goal is “sharing the information I have compiled with anyone 
who would listen” (Gore 2006: 9).  This implicit methodology, however, can only 
conceive of ignorance in intellectual terms as a dearth of information, rather than 
accounting for ignorance as an embodied phenomenon, a split that divorces 
knowledge from action.  
                                                
4 Ironically, Gore is quoted as saying “I’ve been trying to tell this story for a long time and I feel as if I’ve failed to get 
the message across” (Revkin 2006). The point I am trying to make is that there is nothing wrong with the content of 
Gore’s story, but there is everything wrong with the method with which he addresses the problem. For advocates like 
Gore, their methodology blinds them to the reality that information is superfluous unless the audience has the requisite 
moral character that enable them to incorporate their knowledge into their lives. I will further explore this in the 
section below on Aristotle, a philosopher who acknowledged the surprising weakness of philosophical or scientific 
arguments when pitted against inimical desires.  
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Those who keep their faith in the merits of the intellectualist/information 
model may at this point respond, “Look, there is nothing inherently wrong with 
an intellectualist model.  The reason people have apathetically kept to their old 
behaviors is that they are not completely convinced.  If they wholeheartedly 
believed in climate change and its dangers, they would obviously reform their 
lives.”  If this were the case, the problem would not be incontinence – acting 
against one’s knowledge – but rather an underlying intellectual dearth.  Yet, 
research into climate change communication belies this objection.  As quoted 
above, over 90% of U.S. Americans affirm that there is a problem called global 
warming.  Furthermore, researchers in 2000 “demonstrated that even if 
participants have high levels of knowledge about the problem and the community 
has invested in changing their attitudes through advertising or educational 
campaigns, behavior is often unaltered” (Moser and Dilling 2007a: 11).  Put 
succinctly, “the public is aware of the term ‘global warming,’ but not energized 
by it to act” (Moser and Dilling 2007a: 15).  Thus, it fits to diagnose the problem 
with the communication of sustainability in philosophical terms as a problem of 
incontinence or, in other words, to say that the missing link lies in the space 
between head knowledge and embodied practice.  
It is plausible that this strong emphasis on information dissemination to 
raise the public’s awareness stems from the vocal presence of climate skeptics or 
deniers who either criticize or refuse to believe in anthropogenic climate change.  
Given this opposition, environmentalists may have assumed that the battle for 
social change starts and ends at the level of knowledge, refuting the claims of the 
deniers.  Success becomes measured in response to the skeptics, who have 
objected on a factual level.  With this model in place, the goal naturally becomes 
to disseminate as much information as possible, inundating society at large with 
facts, figures, statistics and ominous predictions designed to poke and prod the 
audience towards a sustainable future by way of their minds.  
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However, the goal of conveying information reveals a deeper assumption 
than just a simplistic methodology.  Instead, what is at stake is the deeper 
question of philosophical anthropology, that is to say, an underlying notion of 
human nature and action.  By making methodological claims as to the nature of 
how humans change and act, this paradigmatic model of the communication of 
sustainability takes for granted a certain construal of what it is to be a human 
being.  As theologian and cultural scholar James Smith contends, “behind every 
pedagogy is a philosophical anthropology (i.e.) a set of assumptions about the 
nature of human persons” (2009: 27).5  Education presupposes anthropology.  To 
put it differently, education is by definition education of some entity; it is, and 
must be, oriented towards those who receive the education, and thus the method 
of education must tailor itself to the nature of the educated in order to obtain 
success.   For example, it would be ill advised to teach a dog to sit by showing 
him the relevant material in a canine training book because it is not in a dog’s 
nature to read.  Rather, tailoring the pedagogical method to the object would 
require appealing to the dog’s nature, which in this case might consist of a system 
of rewards and/or punishments to induce the dog to sit.  
As indicated, the dominant paradigm in communicating sustainability 
focuses myopically on disseminating information.  Information concerns the 
mind.  The unstated argument runs as follows: Humans need to change; human 
action depends on rational calculation and informed deliberation.  Therefore, to 
effect sustainable change, one must pass out information on climate change and 
sustainable responses.  In this way, moral action seems to depend only on 
knowledge; immoral action must simply result from ignorance.  Yet, this claim 
presupposes a deeper claim about human nature.  The unavoidable conclusion of 
this dominant model in the communication of sustainability is that humans must 
be beings that primarily think and reason.  The way in which advocacy efforts, 
                                                
5 Given that the goal of communicating sustainability is ultimately the education of individuals and social systems in a 
particular manner (i.e. to live according to different standards), it makes sense to scrutinize it as a pedagogical 
endeavor.  
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like An Inconvenient Truth, target the mind confirms this conclusion.  
Consequently, this model methodologically conceives of human beings as 
primarily res cogitans (thinking things, which in Cartesian philosophy, is opposed 
to res extensa,6 spatially extended, material things) or, to put it comically, 
disembodied minds floating in a land of ideas.  A pedagogical enterprise that 
focuses solely on information automatically assumes that the head is the locus of 
human action and the mind the primary means by which humans meaningfully 
engage the world.  Though many in the environmental movement would not 
hesitate to reject this depiction of human nature, they have unintentionally 
adopted a pedagogical model that takes on this anthropological framework.  Yet, 
in aiming solely for the head with its data laden message, this model misses the 
public’s heart, making it possible for people to hear the environmental message 
without subsequently changing their lifestyles accordingly.  As I will detail 
below, action emanates from the heart, and the primary way to the heart is via the 
body precisely because humans are first and foremost bodies.  Thus, the problem 
is one of pedagogical methodology, for the method by which the endeavor is 
carried out does not match the object (i.e. those being educated) to which it is 
ultimately oriented.  
This initial sketch, however, suggests a disconnect between the mind and 
the body, as if the mind does not matter.  Some may ask, how is it possible that an 
agent can act against their reason?  Isn’t the communication of sustainability 
simply a matter of having reason conquer all?  To answer these questions leads 
naturally into the field of moral philosophy in view of the fact that they demand a 
proper theory of human action, which presupposes an account of human nature.  
Moreover, by answering these questions, one will better understand the 
aforementioned critique of head-oriented pedagogies and be able to avoid the 
pitfalls of reducing our account of human action to the extreme positions of 
                                                
6 These terms come from René Descartes’ famous Discourse on the Method (2008) in which he argues for a rigid 
dualism between thinking and extended things. 
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physical determinism or intellectualism.  To do so, we must take a significant 
detour through ancient Greece.  
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Reframing the Discourse: Habit and the Communication of Sustainability 
 
“Moral goodness is the child of habit, for we acquire the moral virtues by 
first exercising them.” 
Aristotle (quoted in Carlisle 2013: 153) 
 
“Sow an action, and you reap a habit; sow a habit and you reap a character; 
sow a character and you reap a destiny.” 
William James (quoted in MacMullan 2013: 235) 
 
Aristotle: Incontinence and Knowledge 
This very same issue of human action and knowledge created disagreement 
between two of the three most famous Athenian philosophers: Socrates (who is 
only known thanks to Plato’s writings) and Aristotle, the most accomplished 
student from Plato’s Academy.  If we can understand the root of their 
disagreement, we will become better equipped to diagnose the failure to 
communicate sustainability.  According to Socrates, humans are essentially 
rational beings, controlled by their reason (or lack thereof, i.e. ignorance).  To 
him, there are essentially two categories that pertain to human moral action, virtue 
and vice, which correspond to knowledge and ignorance respectively.  To 
Socrates, nothing can stop those who know the Good from doing the good (i.e. be 
virtuous), whereas those who do not know the Good cannot do otherwise than the 
bad (i.e. be vicious).  “The Socratic tradition (…) sees knowledge as invincible 
and wrongdoing as a kind of ignorance” (Lockwood 2013: 26). In either case, 
Socrates views reason as the hallmark of human identity.   
Accordingly, because ethics depends on the intellect, it is unthinkable for 
Socrates that a man who knows the virtuous course of action would not act 
according to his judgment and do what he knows to be virtuous.  In this scheme, 
knowledge is closely married to action, such that the former necessitates the latter 
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and the latter can only be necessarily predicated on the former.  Likewise, if an 
agent does not do the good, he must not have had the right knowledge.  In other 
words, “If at time t1 I have true belief that x is better than y, and at later time t2 I 
do y rather than x, then, in Socrates’ view, I must have changed my mind between 
t1 and t2 so that at t2 I believe that y is better than x” (Aristotle 1999: 256, 
editor’s notes).  In this way, the current communication of sustainability model 
stands in line with the Socratic understanding of human action, for both parties 
affirm in unison that knowledge of the good is sufficient to ensure virtuous action.  
Whereas Socrates makes this claim explicit, the current model of communicating 
sustainability takes it for granted.  Whether or not the proponents of this model 
realize it, they owe a large debt to Socrates as the philosophical champion of their 
methodology.  
However, the problem for both Socrates and environmental advocates 
comes in making sense of those whose action does not conform to what is good.  
Socrates can only account for vicious7 action by positing some level of ignorance.  
Yet this seems to contradict common experience, what Aristotle called 
incontinence.  Socrates not only has to dismiss accounts of incontinence, he is 
forced to conclude that they are not humanly possible.  Aristotle, on the other 
hand, attempts to carve out a more nuanced philosophy of action that can account 
for the aforementioned phenomenon of incontinence.  Though Aristotle certainly 
agrees with Socrates’ high estimation of the power of reason, he also recognizes 
that there are instances in which an individual may know what is right and still 
choose against that knowledge.  This intrapersonal conflict is best evidenced by 
the phenomenon of addiction, in which persons with addictions report knowing 
that their substance abuse was wrong and harmful to their person, but their better 
judgment is overridden.  Other examples of incontinence include overeating or 
habitual actions like biting one’s nails or cracking one’s knuckles (frowned upon 
                                                
7 In Aristotelian language, an action is vicious if it is not directed towards the human good, i.e. if it does not contribute 
to increasing the individual’s eudemonia. Virtuous actions are those that help an individual realize their happiness.  
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by mannered society as ‘bad habits’).  In most cases8, the incontinent agents know 
and accept that their actions are vicious or harmful, but their action bypasses this 
knowledge.  This implies that human action, and in turn ethics, does not rely 
solely upon knowledge.  Aristotle’s objection to the Socratic philosophy of action 
can be summarized as follows: “Information is not entirely inconsequential, but it 
is much overrated as a change agent” (Chess and Johnson 2007: 223).  Put 
simply, knowledge does not suffice to ensure virtue.  While it is necessary for the 
virtuous life, only a shallow pedagogy assumes it adequate in itself.  
To elucidate the paradoxical nature of incontinence, it is instructive to 
follow Aristotle’s example and contrast it with intemperance, the indulgence of 
one’s desire for pleasure.  From an external perspective, incontinence looks like 
mere intemperance; both the incontinent man and the intemperate man exhibit a 
lack of self-control, which results in a vicious action.  Yet, Aristotle is quick to 
make a distinction between incontinence and intemperance because he views 
intemperance as a vice, whereas he places incontinence in its own category a 
notch above vice.  The reason behind this distinction is what goes on internally 
within the moral agent.  The intemperate man has no misgivings about pursuing 
his base desires, and thus indicates that he has not made the correct, i.e. virtuous, 
decision.  The incontinent man, however, has correctly identified the good and 
even rationally approved of it, yet he acts on his desires instead of his rational 
choice.  He is “someone who because of his feelings abandons himself against 
correct reason.  They overcome him far enough so that his actions do not accord 
with correct reason, but not so far as to make him the sort of person to be 
persuaded that it is right to pursue such pleasures without restraint” (1151a21-24).  
This explains why the incontinent agent is often plagued by guilt, for he acts 
                                                
8 There are cases that Aristotle calls impetuous incontinence in which the incontinent agent is overcome by 
overwhelming passion and desire, which compel her to act wrongly. In this case, the incontinent agent’s knowledge is 
obscured and at some level inoperative, meaning that the impetuous incontinent does not act in clear contradiction of 
her better judgment. Conversely, the clear-eyed, or weak, incontinent knowingly acts against her better judgment. “For 
one type of incontinent person [i.e. the weak] does not abide by the result of his deliberation, while the volatile [i.e. 
impetuous] person is not even prone to deliberate at all” (1152a18-19). The reason behind impetuous incontinence is 
obviously passion, whereas the reasons propelling the clear-eyed incontinent are not so obvious. This seeming paradox 
will be explored shortly.  
 - 15 - 
against his own reasoning.  The intemperate man, however, acts according to his 
(poorly made) decision and thus escapes the guilt common to the incontinent 
man, though at great cost.  
The category of incontinence is key to understanding the distinction 
between Socrates and Aristotle.  Socrates’ philosophy of action does not allow for 
the recognition of real incontinence, since to do so would entail the victory of 
non-rational desires over reason.  Due to the close connection between the 
Socratic understanding of human action and the current paradigm of 
communicating sustainability, the latter fails just as the former does insofar as 
neither recognizes that reason is not necessarily king.  The reality of incontinence 
points out the Socratic shortcoming as a failure to take into account the fact that 
human rationality is an embodied affair.  At the root of this shortcoming stands a 
rigid dualism between mind and body, which presumes that the human mind is 
the only seat of intelligence: the mind, therefore, must subordinate the body.   
To Aristotle, however, the body has knowledge insofar as it can operate 
effectively9 without the oversight of conscious reason.  Body and mind, then, are 
inexorably interpenetrating.  This is not to insinuate that humans are not thinking 
beings or that thinking is of little import for ethics, but rather to situate that 
rationality in its proper place as a part of embodiment.  But the question of how 
incontinence occurs has yet to be answered, and it is in answer to this problem 
that Aristotle sketches the outlines of a philosophical anthropology that will aid 
our analysis of the movement to communicate sustainability.  
 
Aristotle and the Moral Life 
 To set the scene properly, I must reconfigure the modern conception of the 
moral life by beginning where Aristotle does with a notion of the good life.  
According to Aristotle, the universally desired and most choiceworthy part of 
                                                
9 It can operate effectively in that it orients itself towards certain ends and works to achieve them, much as an 
incontinent person does what is bad, even if it requires work and diligence, in spite of having knowledge of what is 
good.  
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human life is happiness (eudemonia), by which Aristotle refers to the kind of 
enduring happiness characterized by contentment and general flourishing.10  To 
prove his point, Aristotle catalogues the common answers to the question “what is 
the end of human life?” and he cites responses such as honor or pleasure.  These 
things, he notes, are not solely desirable in their own right, but also in respect to a 
more ultimate goal: happiness.  One does not desire pleasure because one thinks 
pleasure is merely worth having as an end in itself, but also because one thinks 
having pleasure is a necessary component in the good life (eudemonia).  As 
Aristotle puts it,  
 
happiness, more than anything else, seems complete without qualification.  
For we always choose it because of itself, never because of something else.  
Honor, pleasure, understanding and every virtue we certainly choose 
because of themselves (…) but we also choose them for the sake of 
happiness, supposing that through them we shall be happy (1097b1-5).  
 
Having come this far, Aristotle recognizes the vagueness inherent in the term 
happiness.  To clarify, Aristotle defines happiness as a life lived in accordance 
with (i.e. possession of) the virtues, which are qualities of human excellence.  He 
argues, “happiness is a certain sort of activity of the soul in accord with virtue” 
(1099b26).  To live the good life, therefore, is to live life excellently, that is, 
according to virtue.11  
                                                
10  To read into Aristotle our modern characterizations of happiness as a good feeling or state of euphoria would be to 
misunderstand him from the outset.  
11 A paramount question that arises from this overview of Aristotle is “what are the virtues?” or “which qualities or 
dispositions are virtuous?” Aristotle spends a large section of his Ethics naming and analyzing the Greek virtues, some 
of which are now known as the classical virtues: justice, fortitude, temperance, and prudence. However, it is 
instructive to note that Aristotle did not invent these virtues out of thin air; rather he relied upon the Athenian 
community and tradition to inform his catalogue of virtues. Virtues are given form and shaped by a particular 
community and their understanding of human nature and the good life; thus, they can only make sense within that 
localized context. “The question “What is true happiness?” can only be finally answered on the basis of the answer to 
another question: What is the chief end of man?” (Newbigin 1986: 26). This means that the environmental community 
must ask itself which virtues are necessary to sustain its conception of the good life, which centers on a holistic 
conception that takes into account the health of the planet’s ecosystems. Though this question ultimately lies beyond 
the purview of this project, it seems evident that certain classical virtues, especially temperance (with its relevance for 
consumption) must be included.  
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The virtues he divides into two categories: virtues of character (moral 
virtue) and virtues of thought (intellectual virtue).  This division corresponds to 
Aristotle’s partition of the human into rational and appetitive parts.  Though 
Aristotle posits a division between moral and intellectual virtue, he does not 
ultimately consider them separate, discrete categories.  “Although Aristotle 
juxtaposes habituation and teaching, the notion that the desiderative or appetitive 
elements of moral development are distinct from its cognitive elements is a view 
foreign to Aristotle’s notion of rational and non-rational desire” (Lockwood 2013: 
22).  Human nature is such that the acquisition of moral character cannot occur 
without the corresponding intellectual virtues, particularly prudence (phronesis), a 
virtue necessary for practical deliberation about which particular courses of action 
are most choiceworthy.  
  How then does one acquire the virtues?  They are neither naturally 
occurring nor unnatural or otherworldly, which means that the individual must 
endeavor to learn them.  Teaching and study are required to acquire the 
intellectual virtues, whereas moral virtues are acquired through habit (1103a15-
20).  To elucidate the connection between habit and the acquisition of moral 
virtue, Aristotle employs the metaphor of training to learn a craft or a trade.  
“Virtues, by contrast, we acquire, just as we acquire crafts, by having first 
activated them” (1103a32).  This metaphor indicates that the acquisition of moral 
virtue is an apprenticeship, and, as such, it takes practice, just as the apprentice 
learns by imitating the actions and methods of the master.  Moral virtue is thus 
built on actively reproducing the actions that those who are virtuous produce, 
thereby forming the habits integral to virtuous character.  Moral character, in turn, 
is the enduring coalition and constellation of the right kind of habits.12  This is 
why Aristotle says,  
 
                                                
12 A more in-depth discussion of habit formation will take place in the following chapter.  
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we become builders, for instance, by building, and we become harpists by 
playing the harp.  Similarly, then, we become just by doing just actions, 
temperate by doing temperate actions, brave by doing brave actions (…) a 
state [of character] results from [the repetition of] similar activities” 
(1103a34-1103b21, brackets in original).  
 
Ultimately, this goes beyond merely doing what the virtuous person does, 
as it also entails doing what the virtuous person does in the same manner and 
situations as the virtuous person.  Thus, “the just and temperate person is not the 
one who [merely] does these actions, but the one who also does them in the way 
in which just or temperate people do them” (1105b9-10, brackets in original). To 
construe virtue in this manner, however, leaves Aristotle with a paradox.  In order 
to be virtuous, one must produce virtuous actions, but one can only produce 
virtuous actions from a virtuous state of being.  Thus, it is impossible to become 
virtuous if one is not already virtuous.  This adverse implication means that 
Aristotle’s notion of moral habituation “self-defeatingly assume(s) the existence 
of the state that is supposed to result from the habituation” (Aristotle and Irwin 
1999: 195, editor’s notes).  
Recognizing this inherent problem, Aristotle clarifies his account of 
habituation with a precise distinction between virtuous actions and virtuous 
character.  Here he diverges from his analogy with the crafts, because a craftsman 
need only learn to copy the actions of production and this alone suffices for 
knowledge of the craft.  The quality of the craftsman is determined by the quality 
of the product.  Moral action, however, is not content with outward display; 
unlike craftsmanship, virtuous action is not sufficient as an indicator of virtue.  
Rather, Aristotle stipulates three internal factors that must obtain in a virtuous 
person.  “First, he must know [that he is doing virtuous actions]; second, he must 
decide on them, and decide on them for themselves; and third, he must also do 
them from a firm and unchanging state” (1105a32-35, brackets in original).  This 
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narrows the qualifications for virtue, demanding not only virtuous action, but also 
the corresponding internal conditions: knowledge, intrinsic decision, and a stable 
state of character.  This external-internal distinction allows Aristotle to dismiss 
the above objection by specifying, “we must first engage in the right kinds of 
actions before we can develop the right kinds of desires and affections” (London 
2001: 579).  Though the outward display of kindness does not ensure a kind 
character, it trains the insides by building the foundation for kind affections 
(thoughts and feelings).  This permits Aristotle to maintain, “a person comes to be 
just from doing just actions and temperate from doing temperate actions; for no 
one has the least prospect of becoming good from failing to do them” (1105b10-
13).  Accordingly, the acquisition of moral virtue has two distinct, though often 
intermingled steps: first, the learning of the right habits of action and thought (the 
external); second, the resulting development of the right affections (the internal) 




Despite the emphasis on the internal conditions for virtue, it may appear to 
some that Aristotle’s interest in character formation veils what at the core is a 
project of conditioning.  They interpret Aristotle as an advocate for training 
humans into automatons who cannot err by fitting them into character molds that 
strip them of their individuality and agency.  Yet, Aristotle did not subscribe to 
behaviorism.  This misunderstanding is somewhat understandable given the 
nature of habit: it often precludes the need for conscious choice and intentional 
will because the know-how for the habituated activity is “sublimated or taken care 
of by the unconscious” with time and practice (Smith 2009: 81).  Indeed, part of 
the benefit of habitation is that it reduces the need for the mind to dwell on every 
single action, thereby freeing the mind to deliberate over new, more complex 
situations.  
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Nevertheless, to regard habits and moral character as a form of 
behaviorism lauded by the ancients misses the point.  Though habits do at certain 
points bypass the mind or register subconsciously, virtue necessarily implicates 
the mind.  Though they may be subconscious or precognitive, habits are not non-
cognitive.  Likewise, Aristotle is not solely concerned with external actions, but 
also with one’s internal state.  Aristotle’s distinction between virtues of thought 
and virtues of character is, in this sense, merely heuristic, for he does not believe 
it is possible to exercise moral virtue without intellectual virtue. 
 
Ultimately, Aristotle’s notion of ethos (Gk. habit) avoids both Socratic 
intellectualism that views becoming good as a kind of teaching or 
acquisition or knowledge and shallow behaviorism that views humans as 
creatures of simply negative or positive conditioning (Lockwood 2013: 
23).  
 
In proceeding, it will be important not to collapse the concept of habit either to 
rote memorization inscribed on the external body or to view it as a wholly internal 
affair.  Habit lies between these two polarities as a genuine middle ground.  
 
Moral Development in Aristotle  
The model of moral development mentioned earlier, whereby practiced 
states of the body result in corresponding states of mind and affection, requires 
further explanation.  To do so, we must turn again to the Nicomachean Ethics to 
note an interesting condition Aristotle stipulates for his audience.  
According to Aristotle, evaluative moral reasoning and abstracted 
reflection, the kind in which he is engaged in the Ethics, will not benefit 
everyone.  In fact, his targeted audience is individuals who have had a good 
upbringing and who already possess some of the moral habits foundational to the 
life of virtue.  Specifically, he deems most young people and incontinent people 
to be particularly unfit for any kind of significant moral inquiry.  “This is why a 
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youth is not a suitable student of political science; for he lacks experience of the 
actions of life, which are the subject and premises of our arguments” (1095a2-
3).13  It will not do to explain away this interesting caveat as a product of a latent 
elitism in Aristotle’s thought.  He is not interested in exclusion for exclusion’s 
sake.  Rather, Aristotle here recognizes the limits of his pedagogical method (the 
Ethics is thought to be compiled lecture notes); he realizes that his teaching 
cannot change those who lack the requisite moral experience (read: habits).  After 
all, since “the end [of political science] is action, not knowledge” what use is 
moral reckoning and logical rigor to a man who has learned only to obey his 
passions? (1095a4-5, brackets in original).  Thus, Aristotle acknowledges that 
moral reasoning and logical argument are a secondary component of the moral 
life. 
In this way, the young person and the incontinent person share common 
ground, for logical argument can sway neither of them.  Their problem lies not in 
a lack of knowledge, but rather in their lack of the requisite habits essential to 
appropriate and fully utilize moral knowledge.  Accordingly, Aristotle’s peculiar 
condition concerning the hearers of his lectures aligns with the overarching 
argument already laid out in this thesis.  Following Aristotle, I have argued that 
primary ethical attention be given to the agent’s embodied knowledge, i.e. moral 
habits, before moving on to supplement that most basic level with the right 
information.  On this point, it is worth quoting Aristotle at length from a relevant 
passage on moral education.14 
 
Now if arguments were in themselves enough to make men good, they 
would justly, as Theognis says, have won very great rewards, and such 
rewards should have been provided; but as things are, while they seem to 
have power to encourage and stimulate the generous-minded among our 
                                                
13 Aristotle conceives of ethics as formally a matter of political science, because he believes that the human good can 
only be attained politically (from Gk. polis), that is within a communal or corporate setting.  
14 The following translation comes from Burnyeat (1980: 75).  
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youth, and to make a character which is well-bred, and a true lover of what 
is noble, ready to be possessed by virtue, they are not able to encourage the 
many to nobility and goodness.  For these do not by nature obey the sense 
of shame, but only fear, and do not abstain from bad acts because of their 
baseness but through fear of punishment; living by passion they pursue the 
pleasures appropriate to their character and the means to them, and avoid 
the opposite pains, and have not even a conception of what is noble and 
truly pleasant, since they have never tasted it.  What argument would 
remould such people?  It is hard, if not impossible, to remove by argument 
the traits that have long since been incorporated in the character […]  
Now some think that we are made good by nature, others by 
habituation, others by teaching.  Nature’s part evidently does not depend 
on us, but as a result of some divine causes is present in those who are 
truly fortunate; while argument and teaching, we may suspect, are not 
powerful with all men, but the soul of the student must first have been 
cultivated, by means of habits, for noble joy and noble hatred, like earth 
which is to nourish the seed.  For he who lives as passion directs will not 
hear argument that dissuades him, nor understand it if he does; and how 
can we persuade one in such a state to change his ways?  And in general 
passion seems to yield not to argument but to force.  The character, then, 
must somehow be there already with a kinship to virtue, loving what is 
noble and hating what is base” (1179b4-31).15  
 
 What some have here interpreted as Aristotle’s insufferable aristocratic 
prejudice actually points more to a crucial ethical insight: one cannot instruct 
others into moral character.  Character formation depends in large part on a good 
upbringing and a good upbringing means habitually cultivating the dispositions to 
                                                
15 Taken from Burnyeat (1980: 75) who draws upon a different translation than that of T.H. Irwin. 
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feel in a certain way.16  Aristotle is not excluding “the many” from ethical 
discourse, but rather noting that their lack of extant predispositions to desire what 
is virtuous and avoid that which is base already effectively excludes them from 
ethical discourse.  At the least, it precludes any possibility that they will 
appropriate any of the newly acquired knowledge.  Without the requisite habits, 
no amount of lectures on ethics or disseminated information will benefit them.  
To use Aristotle’s metaphor, students are like the earth, which must be prepared, 
fertilized, and tilled before planting the seeds of knowledge if the seeds are to 
sprout, grow and make a good harvest. If the farmer (teacher) sows his seeds 
among thorny, rocky, or unplowed soil (i.e. habitually vicious or incontinent 
individuals), the harvest will be scant indeed.  The preparatory work ensures that 
what is sown will come to fruition.  
This metaphor provides, in rough form, an Aristotelian model of moral 
education, which proceeds according to two primary stages.  The first step is to 
learn the right habits.  This activation of the external actions of virtue (i.e. coming 
to learn (in an physical and experiential way) the particulars of life) thus trains the 
individual to desire the good and abhor the bad.  This stage makes little appeal to 
the intellect, for the primary task is not persuasion but cultivation.  Like an 
apprentice to a craftsman, a budding moral agent first learns by producing actions 
similar to those performed by an individual of high moral stature.  In doing so, the 
apprentice develops a habitual knowledge of how to act appropriately so as to 
ensure a fine product.  Also like an apprentice, the moral student learns to take 
pleasure in a fine product (virtuous action) and comes to desire those products 
that accord with this standard.  Through this process, one cultivates and is 
inculcated with the requisite habits upon which the second stage of moral 
                                                
16 The importance of feeling will later be underscored by Aristotle’s attention to desire. Virtuous individuals desire 
what is virtuous; they feel properly towards virtue, meaning that they take pleasure in a virtuous action because it is 
virtuous. To flesh this out, because habit formation involves learning to feel enjoyment in certain things, it requires 
and subsequently incorporates all elements of embodiment; at the very least, this implies that the bodily senses of 
touch, taste, sight, smell, and hearing are wrapped up, stimulated by, and implicated in the process of acquiring new 
habits.   
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development – moral knowledge and reasoning – is built.  These habits are 
dispositions and tendencies to act excellently; as such, they constitute a kind of 
bodily knowledge, or know-how, that allow the habituated individual to function 
as a craftsman, though yet without the more theoretical knowledge of a true 
craftsman (the logic and processes behind how and why certain things or actions 
work as they do).  As Burnyeat writes,  
 
You need a good upbringing not simply in order that you may have 
someone around to tell you what is noble and just – you do need that […] 
but you need also to be guided in your conduct so that by doing the things 
you are told are noble and just you will discover that what you have been 
told is true.  What you may begin by taking on trust you can come to know 
[experientially] for yourself.  This is not yet to know why it is true, but it is 
to have learned that it is true in the sense of having made the judgment 
your own, second nature [habitual] to you […]  Nor is it yet to have 
acquired any of the virtues, for which practical wisdom is required […]  
But it is to have made a beginning (1980: 74). 
 
 This beginning point, as Aristotle points out, is invaluable for the rest of moral 
development, as without the proper habits, further knowledge will have little 
benefit.  Though properly habituated individuals are not yet virtuous, they have 
the requisite foundation.  This accords with what Aristotle calls the “that,” that is, 
a preliminary, experiential knowledge of which actions are virtuous, which he 
contrasts with the “because,” an understanding of why such actions accord with 
the virtues.  
 
This is the reason why one should have been well brought up in good 
habits if one is going to listen adequately to lectures about things noble and 
just […]  For the beginning (starting point) is “the that,” and if this is 
 - 25 - 
sufficiently apparent to a person, he will not in addition have a need for 
“the because” (1095b5-9).17  
 
It is not, however, a stopping point, for no one would call a person truly 
good who merely produced the right external actions but did so with malicious 
intent, or out of a bitter heart.  To recall Aristotle’s three conditions for virtue that 
distinguish it from craft, the habitual man fulfills only one of the three: he acts 
from a stable state, but he does not yet choose to act virtuously for virtue’s sake 
and he does not yet fully know why he does what he does.  Specifically, to 
acquire the virtues, “he must decide on them [virtuous actions] and decide on 
them for themselves” (1105a34).  To make such a choice requires the “because,” 
which is a different kind of knowledge than what the apprentice possesses, an 
intellectual appreciation for why certain actions are virtuous.  “If he [Aristotle] is 
setting out “the because” of virtuous actions, he is explaining […] how they fit 
into a scheme of the good life, […] not attempting the task […] of recommending 
virtue even to those who despise it” (Burnyeat 1980: 81).  Acquisition of the 
“because” constitutes the second and final stage of moral development.  This is 
the stage where individuals come to appreciate intellectually the goodness and 
virtue towards which their desires predisposed them.  This corresponds to the 
distinction previously made between formation (the “that”) and information (the 
“because”) precisely because the former pair are experientially and habitually 
based, whereas the latter pair are both head-oriented, pertaining solely to the 
intellect.18  
The lifelong project of moral education, according to Aristotle, thus 
proceeds along this somewhat sequential trajectory.  First, I acquire habits, which 
involves learning to desire the right objects and gaining practical knowledge of 
                                                
17 This is Burnyeat’s (1980:71) translation, which I find more suggestive than T.H. Irwin’s translation. Irwin adds 
bracketed statements in an attempt to render the “that” and the “because” more clear. “For we begin from the [belief] 
that [something is true]; if this is apparent to us, we can begin without also [knowing] why [it is true]. Someone who is 
well brought up has the beginnings, or can easily acquire them” (1095b5-9). 
18 This section on the educational distinction between knowing that certain actions are virtuous and knowing why 
those actions are virtuous draws much of its inspiration from Burnyeat 1980: 71-76.  
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the particulars, i.e. how to do or produce certain things.  Second, I fill in the 
particular, experiential knowledge with discursive knowledge based on moral 
reflection.  The latter stage depends on the former, just as the former leads 
naturally to the latter.  Likewise, the former does not discard the intellect 
altogether, but rather bypasses it at first to ground the individual with proper 
habits which enable information to take hold.  By attending to the body and habits 
first, Aristotle recognizes that “states of the body ‘give rise’ to states of mind,” 
thereby appreciating the interpenetration of body and mind (Smith 2013: 94).  
This does not necessarily imply that no information-oriented learning goes on 
during the first stage, or that the mind plays no part in habit formation.  The mind 
is indeed involved in habit formation, because the body implicates the mind.  
However, it is not involved on the abstracted level of moral reflection; the process 
of casuistic reasoning and intellective knowledge of general principles is 
secondary.   
 
From all this it follows not only that for a long time moral development 
must be a less than fully rational process but also, what is less often 
acknowledged, that a mature morality must in large part continue to be 
what it originally was, a matter of responses deriving from sources other 
than reflective reason (Burnyeat 1980: 80).  
 
The model is not a strict and rigid itinerary, for it is meant to highlight the chief 
importance of habit.  There may indeed be moments of crossover, where aspects 
of the second stage happen in the first stage, and vice versa.  
This outline of a model allows me to respond more fully to an objection 
brought up in the preceding section, that any ethic that first attends to habits also 
thereby eschews the mind, which renders it merely a project of conditioning and 
automating human persons.  In response, I earlier stressed that any ethic that 
purports to be Aristotelian cannot neglect the foundational importance of practical 
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wisdom (an intellectual virtue) for the exercise of all other virtues.  To complete 
this response, it becomes evident here that a primary concentration on habit 
formation is not, as some would believe, non-cognitive or anti-intellectual, but 
rather pre-cognitive and pre-intellectual.   
 
Aristotle owes to Plato […] the idea that these motivating evaluative 
responses are unreasoned – they develop before reason and are not at that 
stage grounded in a general view of the place of the virtues in the good life 
– and because they are unreasoned, other kinds of training must be devised 
to direct them on to the right kinds of object: chiefly, guided practice and 
habituation (Burnyeat 1980: 79).   
 
Moral education does not always, or even first, need to train the mind; the mind 
will concomitantly be shaped and conformed as the body becomes habitually 
ingrained through the performance of certain practices.  This is a necessary step 
along the path towards virtue.  To make the final move in moral development 
from habit to virtue, one must complete and complement one’s pre-cognitive 
habits with resources from the intellect.  
 
Habit as the Structure of Desire 
 As is evident, Aristotelian ethics concerns first and foremost a teleological 
account of virtue, predicated upon constancy of character and its constitutive 
habits.  Aristotle also recognizes that desire19 must be taken into account.  For 
Aristotle, a virtuous man is not at war with his desires; rather, he is virtuous to the 
extent that his desires and his actions exist in harmony.  “Aristotle’s moral theory 
must be seen as a theory not only of how to act well but also of how to feel well; 
for the moral virtues […] enable a person to exhibit the right kinds of emotions as 
well as the right kinds of actions” (Kosman 1980: 105).  It is the continent man 
who is at war with his desires; unlike the incontinent man, the virtuous man does 
                                                
19 When Aristotle speaks of desire, he is referring to an individual’s desire for pleasure and corresponding desire to 
avoid pains.   
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not need to choose his conscience over his desires because he desires what is right 
and good.  Consequently, right desire separates the continent man from the 
virtuous one, for though they both perform virtuous actions, the actions of the 
virtuous man accord with his desires.  
Some may wonder, is it a random fluke that some have the right desires to 
align with their virtue?  Are some unfortunate – though otherwise virtue seeking – 
few condemned to conflict with their desires forever by a stroke of cosmic fate?  
No.  For Aristotle, this cannot be the case precisely because the object (or 
directionality) of one’s desire is not a static, naturally inborn phenomenon, but 
rather something within that remains ever susceptible to the plying of habituation.  
Humans can train their desires, changing their likes and dislikes through an 
extended process of habituation.  In short, habit orients and shapes desire.  The 
virtuous man is precisely the one who has come to desire what is good – though 
this did not necessarily come naturally to him – by practicing what is good.  
One’s actions influence the form and directionality of one’s desires.  The 
malleability of desire is readily evidenced by numerous examples from daily life, 
like the ability to change food preferences with sustained practice.  For example, 
two years ago, I decided that I wanted to like beets, and by trying to eat them in 
moderation over a period of time, I truly came to enjoy them.  Well-known 
psychological phenomena like the Stockholm syndrome, in which victims come 
to trust, like or love their captors after being kidnapped or held hostage, witness to 
the pliable nature of desire. 
Character formation coincides with desire formation in the Aristotelian 
project of moral education precisely because both center on habit.  Habit endows 
the individual with the skills to achieve virtue, all the while shaping the individual 
into the kind of person who enjoys and desire virtue.  Unfortunately, habit does 
the same thing with vice; by habit, it is possible for people to get better at being 
bad, all the while coming more and more to take perverted pleasure in what is 
bad.  Thus, habit is not in itself a good, but must be oriented to good ends. To 
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return again to the problem of incontinence, this robust understanding of habit 
makes sense of how people can act against their better judgment.  Whereas 
Socrates views the struggle for moral action to take place between omnipotent 
knowledge and finicky desire, “for Aristotle, there is a third principle – habit – 
that mediates between these two principles, incorporating them into each other” 
(Dunnington 2011: 53).  Through habit, humans form a second nature in which 
desire and knowledge commingle such that one’s desires shape one’s knowledge 
and vice versa.  Incontinence is not merely the enigma of knowledge versus 
desire, but instead represents the clash of two different types of knowledge, head 
knowledge pitted against ensconced knowledge of the body.  In a conflict 
between the mental affirmation of the good and the embodied knowledge of the 
heart, it is not surprising that what has been habitually ingrained into the agent 
over time most often wins.  “The cognitive and propositional is easily reduced 
and marginalized as just more ‘blah-blah-blah’ when our hearts and imaginations 
are captured by a more compelling picture of the good life” (Smith 2009: 53-54).  
It takes a concerted, and often creative, exertion of reason and willpower to 
overcome those habits that have cemented certain practices in our lives. 
In light of the pervasive power of habit, the paradoxical nature of 
incontinence begins to fade.  The incontinent man is one convinced of the 
wrongness of his actions, yet immobilized underneath the conservative and 
staying power of habit.  His incontinent actions attest to the strength of habit, 
while his guilt reflects the weakness of merely knowing better.  “He has habits 
that give his pathe [affections or passions] undue dominance in the determination 
of his actions” (Rorty 1980: 279, brackets added).  Merely forcing the incontinent 
man to acknowledge the error of his ways cannot thus occasion right action.  This 
he may well already know.  Thus, “Aristotle differs from Socrates in his diagnosis 
of the causes of the akrates’ [incontinent’s] condition, viewing it as resting on 
badly formed habits concerning pleasures.  Such failures have an intellectual 
dimension without necessarily being caused by an intellectual error” (Rorty 1980: 
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281, brackets added).  Accordingly, the path to right action first entails coming to 
terms with one’s incontinence insofar as it rests on habit and habituated patterns 
of behavior.  Having recognized one’s negative habits for what they are, the agent 
can proceed to counterattack indirectly by cultivating positive habits that stand in 
opposition to those under question.  Consequently, habit formation and counter 
formation, which implicate both desire and knowledge in an interconnected 
bundle, stand at the fulcrum of change.  As Smith puts it, because “research 
indicates that only about 5 percent of our daily activity is the product of 
conscious, intentional actions that we ‘choose,’ one can see that there’s a lot at 
stake in the formation of our automatic unconscious” (2009: 81).  Therefore, any 
honest philosophy of human action must account for the conservative nature of 
habits20 and their immense sway over individual agency.   
To recapitulate the argument propounded thus far: the environmental 
movement has experienced a dogged inefficacy in its inability to persuade the 
world at large to take responsibility for climate change and act accordingly (by 
consuming less, recycling, etc.).  This is due largely to the pedagogical method by 
which it proceeds, assuming its task to be the dissemination of facts and figures 
so that people know better.  Put differently, the public’s ideas and beliefs are 
diagnosed as the root of the problem, which implies that the spread of more and 
better information suffices to effect positive change.  This assumption hinges on a 
simplistic anthropological conception of knowledge (i.e. the powers of the mind) 
as the primary, if not sole, catalyst for human action.  Likewise, it presupposes 
that the human mind directly controls action, that morality starts and ends with 
head knowledge, and that the body has little say in behavior regulation besides 
carrying out the orders from “on high.”  In comparing Aristotle’s conception of 
the moral life with that of Socrates, I seek to nuance this account of human action 
by placing it within the bounds of an Aristotelian framework of moral philosophy.  
                                                
20 William James famously referred to habit as the “enormous fly-wheel of society, its most precious conservative 
agent” (James 2012: 109).  
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In particular, I contend that the phenomenon of incontinence and Aristotle’s 
understanding of its cause (habit) sheds light on the problem modern 
environmentalism faces in its struggle to recommend sustainable change.  I have 
followed others in arguing, “factual information is usually not sufficient to 
motivate behavior” (Chess and Johnson 2007: 228).21  In doing so, I hint at an 
alternative conception of human nature, one that can account for a nuanced 
philosophy of human action.  This reconfigured framework strongly suggests that 
the reason behind society’s recalcitrance towards effecting positive environmental 
change is not a lack of information, but a lack of virtuous habit formation.  Put 
differently, society does not lack moral habits per se; it merely lacks the right 
habits, i.e. habits oriented towards a sustainable future.  In their place, people 
have subconsciously adopted immoral habits of wanton consumption, thereby 
perpetuating climate change by means of habit.  In effect, I have diagnosed “the 
ecological crisis as a crisis of character” while reconfiguring what we understand 
by “character” by placing in the context of Aristotle’s moral philosophy (Berry 
1977: 17).  It is not enough to affirm that the majority “of our consumption is 
shaped by habits, norms, and routines” without also plumbing the philosophical 
depth of such a claim (Michaelis 2007: 253).  To understand how to counter 
                                                
21 At first sight, Moser and Dilling’s collection Creating a Climate for Change (from which Chess and Johnson’s 
article comes) seems to stand in line with my general critique of communicating sustainability. They recognize the 
past failures of environmental advocacy, stating that the “fundamental claim of this book is that better information 
dissemination, more knowledge, or more effective communication alone will not necessarily lead to desirable social 
changes” (2007: 11a). In moving on from this point to develop innovative communication strategies for social change, 
however, the various authors in the collection cannot help but fall back into an exclusively mind-oriented project. So, 
instead of general information dissemination, they advocate for tailoring one’s information to specific audiences and 
relying on already trusted interlocutors to champion the environmental cause. Though these strategies would likely 
increase their success rate relative to past efforts, they do not escape the paradox of incontinence that vexes any 
philosophy of action that zones in on the mind and neglects the moral significance of embodiment. Moser and Dilling 
rightly see that successful advocacy also means addressing the barriers to social change, but they seem unable to 
conceive of the reality that such barriers are not commensurate with the mind; such barriers are more fundamentally 
inscribed into the body through the power of habit. Thus, when Moser and Dilling write, “At a more fundamental 
level, however, climate change communication must reach into deeper and more persistent beliefs, concerns, social 
norms, aspirations, and underlying values to generate motivation” it is profoundly telling that they omit any reference 
to the body or habits, focusing instead on cognitive phenomena and mental models (2007b: 502). In this light, it makes 
sense why the scant references to habit in the whole book refer only “habits of thought” (Bateson 2007: 287, and 
Moser and Dilling 2007b: 504). Consequently, though they seek to map out innovative strategies into new territory, 
the collection of articles ends up putting a facelift on an old and tired model by searching merely for more effective 
ways of informing people. Statements such as “Our task is to educate gently, but with facts, and to tell stories…” are 
thus paradigmatic, rather than exceptional (Bingham 2007: 164). Environmental advocates, therefore, have yet to 
come to terms with the philosophic and pragmatic importance of habit and its relevance for their respective projects. 
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unsustainable habits, I must first flesh out a more holistic philosophical 
anthropology and proceed methodologically upwards from this firm foundation.    
 
Aristotle and Rationalism 
An effective model of communicating sustainability must presuppose an 
alternative philosophical anthropology that resists the temptation to reduce human 
beings to minds.  More specifically, environmental advocates need a holistic 
theory that can account for the phenomenon of habit.  In light of the analysis 
above, one can discern the outlines of an Aristotelian philosophical anthropology: 
a human being is a creature in search of happiness, which can only be found in 
the active and consistent exercise of virtue.  Virtue flows naturally from a 
character state predicated on the formation of the right habits that both direct and 
shape one’s knowledge and desire.  Human beings, therefore, are characterized 
not by their discursive rationality, but primarily by their habits, which constitute 
an embodiment of both knowledge and desire.  Individuals, then, are more than 
mere rational agents (as the dominant head-oriented model of communicating 
sustainability would have us believe); theirs is an embodied rationality, reason 
embedded in and tempered by the habits that give shape and direction to one’s 
affections.  
However, to articulate a truly alternative philosophical anthropology, some 
may object that it is necessary to diverge from the Aristotelian tradition.  
Although this interpretation of Aristotle emphasizes the role of desires and habit 
in the moral life, he also seems to evidence a latent rationalism, epitomized by his 
distinction between humans and other-than-human nature by dint of reason, 
which he took to be the unique and principal capacity of humans.  Indeed, in 
Aristotle’s hierarchy of natural life, plants are at the bottom, characterized only by 
their ability to grow and be fed; animals are next, as they not only share the 
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function of living, but also of sensing and perceiving.22  Humans are at the apex 
precisely because they not only live and sense, but they also reason (1098a1-6).  
“Moreover, we take the human function to be a certain kind of life, and take this 
life to be activity and actions of the soul that involve reason; hence the function 
of the excellent man is to do this (contemplate) well and finely” (1098a13-15).  In 
answer to the question “what are human beings?” then, it seems as though 
Aristotle cannot help but respond “thinkers.”  One environmental philosopher 
avers that the “idea that we are primarily emotional rather than rational animals” 
(which he attributes to Hume) contradicts the most basic premise in Aristotle’s 
thought (Jamieson 2007: 482).23  By emphasizing humanity’s capacity for reason, 
some may worry that an Aristotelian anthropology could easily fall into the same 
rationalist trap in which the current model of communicating sustainability has 
been mired.  
To charge Aristotle with latent rationalism is a hefty accusation that seizes 
upon the high status he gives reason in relation to the rest of the natural world.  
The main problem environmentalists have with Aristotle lies rooted in their 
judgment that he restricts reason to humankind and consequently belittles more-
than-human nature by contrasting it with the human.  However, it is instructive to 
notice that humans are, to Aristotle, rational animals.  To many, this merely 
equates to the mundane claim that humans are rational beings.  But, it is telling 
that Aristotle uses the words rational animal, which indicates that he views 
human beings as a certain kind of animal and their rationality as a part of that 
animality.  Rationality, for Aristotle, is not something distinct and set apart from 
animality, but rather an extension of that animality, a qualifier of the kind of 
animals that humans are.  What makes humans unique, in Aristotle’s 
understanding, is the kind of rationality they possess, though, again, it belongs to 
the general category of animal rationality.  Likewise, Aristotle attributed practical 
                                                
22 Aristotle lays out this tripartite hierarchy in De Anima.  
23 Whether or not such a claim is true of Aristotle, much less Hume, it is evident that Jamieson considers Aristotle to 
be the apex, even the champion, of rationalistic philosophy.  
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wisdom (the skill to make decisions and choose between particular options) to 
other kinds of animals because of their ability to plan for and predict the short-
term future.  Thus, Alasdair MacIntyre concludes,  
 
Aristotle’s account of human beings as distinctively rational has 
sometimes been interpreted as though he meant that rationality was not 
itself an animal property, but rather a property that separates humans from 
their animality.  Aristotle did not of course make this mistake (1999: 5). 
 
MacIntyre criticizes those commentators on Aristotle who have perpetuated a 
rationalistic reading of Aristotle.  “They have underestimated the importance of 
the fact that our bodies are animal bodies with the identity and continuities of 
animal bodies and […] it is true of us that we do not merely have, but are our 
bodies” (1999: 6).  
Thus, while one may find fault with Aristotle for denying proper status to 
women and slaves (who were at his time generally not regarded as citizens or 
fully human), one cannot object to his philosophical anthropology simply because 
he situates humankind as reasoning animals.  Those who have done so base their 
judgments on a misinterpretation.  Note too that Aristotle does not take rationality 
to be the totality of human existence, but rather takes into account the strength of 
desires and emotions (in the form of habits) alongside the faculty of reason.  
Aristotle certainly thought highly of reason, and may have even considered it the 
best part of the human being for its role in directing action to the right ends.  
Reason, however, works to temper and shape one’s desires; likewise, what one 
desires shapes what and how one reasons (Smith 2009: 70).  Thus, while reason is 
necessary for a life of virtue, it does not stand alone; to Aristotle, reason and 
desire exist in dialectic interconnection.  
Accordingly, the problem with rationalistic anthropologies is not their 
extension of rationality to humans, but their subsequent glorification of that 
rationality to the extent that it constitutes the totality (or hallmark) of being 
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human.  Aristotle does not fall into the rationalist camp because “to Aristotle, 
reason alone cannot move a man to act without desire, nor can desire have an 
effect on the world of space–time without being formed by reason” (Hauerwas 
1994: 47).  For these reasons, we can accept Aristotle’s moral philosophy while 
leaving behind the masculine-centric baggage typical of his day that is latent in 
his understanding of humankind.  Furthermore, we can accept Aristotle’s implicit 
philosophical anthropology without lapsing into an undue rationalism.  
 
Human Nature: Bodies, Desire, and Love 
Though Aristotle has the resources to construct a robust philosophy of 
human action, his primary concern in his ethical treatises is not with philosophical 
anthropology.  Thus, to flesh out our Aristotelian sketch of human nature, it is 
necessary to turn to another source.  Similar to Aristotle, James K. A. Smith 
contends that no true philosophical anthropology can neglect the body and that a 
realistic account of human nature must begin with desire.  A “desiring’ model of 
the human person begins from our nature as intentional beings who first and 
foremost [and ultimately] intend the world in the mode of love (…) which takes 
the structure of desire or longing” (Smith 2009: 50, brackets in original).  To 
bolster his claim, Smith turns to phenomenology, which seeks to understand 
human beings as they exist in the world. I will here enumerate Smith’s argument, 
eventually arriving at the conclusion that humans are bodies in a bodily world, 
drawn by desire to certain ends and oriented to those ends by means of habit.  
This foray will complement Aristotle’s portrayal of the moral life by articulating 
the primacy of embodiment and the strategic function of habit.   
Humans exist only in some place or another; humans cannot exist 
nowhere.  In other words, life is contingent, it could be otherwise; though I exist, 
I could also not exist and I could also exist in drastically different circumstances. 
We experience life only within the parameters of this place here or that place 
there without determining for ourselves where we start, and often, where we end 
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up.  In fact, humans seem to be thrown into the world given that we do not get to 
decide where or when we are born.24  To live is to find one’s self somewhere and 
to proceed from that seemingly arbitrary starting point.  Thus, existence is 
bounded and shaped by place.  Likewise, consciousness does not exist in a 
vacuum.  The rationalistic philosophical anthropology assumed that humans could 
simply think, as if thinking were a faculty we could exercise without reference to 
anything else.  Hence Descartes’ famous “I think, therefore I am” assertion.  Yet, 
it is impossible to think without thinking of something; consciousness cannot be 
divorced from its referent.  To correct Descartes with this phenomenological 
insight would require the insertion of a tiny preposition:  “I am thinking of [fill in 
the blank], therefore I am.”  Consciousness is always already oriented towards the 
world.  This ‘being-for’ or ‘being-towards’ constitutes the intentionality of human 
nature.  
Intertwined with our existential thrownness, we humans encounter the 
world in a tactile, pre-reflective way, using our bodies first to feel our way about 
the world before turning to reflect on our lived experience (Smith 2009: 50).  We 
engage the world first as feelers, which is to say as bodies.  Affection precedes 
cognition.  This flies in direct contradiction to the “human as thinker” model as it 
stipulates that we are not primarily oriented to the world as minds, but as 
incarnate beings.  Before we learn to think and conceptualize the world, we touch 
it, bump into it or smell the lingering odors nearby. We are sensuous beings 
embedded in a materially dense world.  In fact, learning to think and reflect 
comes only after, and is built upon, such experiential learning.  This is why 
Aristotle’s appellation “rational animals” fits, for rationality presupposes 
embodiment.  “One might say that in our everyday, mundane being-in-the-world, 
we don’t lead with our head, so to speak; we lead out with our heart and our 
hands” (Smith 2009: 47).  Children readily evidence this claim; their development 
                                                
24 Smith here is drawing loosely on Heidegger and his existential concepts that center on what he called being-in-the-
world, including thrownness, which refers to the way in which humans experience and live in the world as something 
not of their making or choosing, but as a place into which they are thrown.  
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as humans depends on exploring the world into which they are thrown.  As 
parents well know, often this means accumulating injuries, like scrapes, scratches 
or burns as a child endeavors to learn firsthand about the nature of world 
including its pavement, thorns, and stovetops.  This existential method of learning 
does not stop after childhood, though adults have hopefully learned the habits 
necessary to thrive, rather than simply survive in their interactions as beings-in-
the-world.  To take our human nature seriously, therefore, compels us to 
recognize the primacy of embodiment. 
Lastly, the embodied and intentional nature of human beings leads 
naturally to an inclusion of the phenomenon of desire.  As we feel our way about 
the world, we find in ourselves particular desires out of which action springs.  We 
engage the world not simply as neutral, static bodies, but rather as bodies that 
intend the world in a certain way according to our urges and longings for this or 
that.  We desire to satiate our hunger, we take pleasure in the warmth of the sun, 
or we find pain in physical injury.  The medieval scholastic Thomas Aquinas goes 
so far as to state, “Rational concupiscence [desire] is infinite” (Dunnington 2011: 
146, brackets in original).  These longings lead naturally to the phenomenon of 
love, for as we desire, we learn to love those things that fulfill our desires.  Desire 
gives form to and propels love.  As Aristotle says, “each type of person finds 
pleasure in whatever he is called a lover of” (1099a8).  
Desire constitutes the foundation of human identity for it is our most basic, 
irreducible mode of engaging with the world as bodies.  Human desire 
encompasses a wide range of objects, but Smith here is referring to ultimate 
loves, or “that to which we ultimately pledge allegiance; or (…) what we 
worship” (Smith 2009: 51).  Though desire often concerns proximate goods, like 
the sudden craving for Thai food, the thrill of bicycling or the enjoyment of 
leisure time, these proximate goods exist within the framework of the desire for 
ultimate goods.  Human beings are in the end defined by their ultimate loves.  
These ultimate loves, which span from God to nation states to wealth, give sense 
 - 38 - 
and order to proximate desires because they are “that to which we are 
fundamentally oriented, what ultimately governs our vision of the good life, (and) 
what shapes and molds our being-in-the-world” (Smith 2009: 51).  Human action 
is fundamentally teleological, meaning that it aims towards an end.  In 
Aristotelian language, that telos must be happiness (eudemonia), but the form that 
happiness takes differs from person to person as individuals operate according to 
varying pictures of human flourishing.  Desire functions to orient the agent to her 
vision of the good life.  
In short, the fundamental essence of human existence is desire exactly 
because our paramount loves constitute the fabric of our identity as beings-in-the-
world.  As the object of love in turn shapes the lover, humans cannot help but be 
defined by their loves.  What we love shapes who we are and the kind of people 
we are becoming.  “What distinguishes us [as individuals, but also as peoples] is 
not whether we love, but what we love” (Smith 2009: 52). 
Following Smith through the intricacies of embodiment, we have arrived 
where we left off with Aristotle: desire.  Further, like Aristotle, Smith conjoins 
habit and desire, stipulating that desire does not function alone, but only in and 
through habit.   Habit manifests desire; it directs desire to its intended end, 
functioning as the fulcrum of change.  As Dunnington notes, “habits are 
fundamentally strategies of desire” (2011: 61).25  However, though habits operate 
strategically, this does not mean they are always, or even often, intentioned or 
willfully directed actions.  Instead, habits allow agents to pursue their vision of 
the good life in a precognitive manner, that is, without having to think constantly 
about how to direct their actions to the desired ends.  In this way, habits perform a 
vital psychological function.  As Thomas Aquinas noticed, the human capacity 
                                                
25 Yet, this only tells half of the story, for habits do not simply direct desire, they also shape desire according to the 
telos inscribed into the nature of the habit. For example, I practice the violin in order to pursue my love for classical 
music, but by so doing, I am simultaneously shaped into the kind of person who loves classical music even more than 
I did at the outset. Habits play off the malleable nature of desire and subtly bend desire this way or that.  Habits exist 
in a dialectic harmony with desire.  Environmentally speaking, the societal practices that perpetuate climate change 
form in us habits that not only constitute an outlet for our desire for more stuff or more power, but they also contribute 
to turning us into the kind of the people who come to desire to wreak havoc on the earth’s ecosystems.   
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for deliberative reasoning is limited and exhaustible; we humans do not have the 
resources to reason and do moral calculus infinitely (Dunnington 2011: 60-63).  
Every decision requires an intentional and focused operation of the intellect to 
weigh the options, consider the context, and follow through with the choice.  The 
deliberative will can only exert its powers in concerted efforts, and is therefore 
subject to exhaustion.  Habit alleviates the problem of the limited ability of the 
reasoned will by automating moral decisions and moving them below the level of 
the conscious.  Habits do not require a conscious exertion of the intellect to be 
activated, meaning that they operate “without effort and often without any explicit 
consciousness of what is being done” (Dunnington 2011: 62).  If I had to engage 
my higher thinking powers to navigate all the tedious tasks of the day, like getting 
out of bed, brushing my teeth, making my oatmeal, or getting to work, I would 
have very little reasoning power left to survive the rest of the day.  As William 
James put it, the immense psychological importance of habit consists in its 
inherent ability to free the intellect “to advance to really interesting fields of 
action” by “diminish(ing) conscious attention given to acts” (James 2012: 103-
106).  Given the limited powers of the deliberative will, it comes as little surprise 
to find that habituated actions govern the majority of the moral life.26  According 
to Smith’s personal anecdote,  
 
If I am convinced by Michael Pollan [an environmentally-minded food 
writer] but still have the default disposition to pull into the drive-through at 
McDonald’s, the solution is not to be constantly thinking – that approach is 
unsustainable and thus, ultimately, inadequate.  It’s not a matter of 
thinking trumping dispositions; it’s a matter of acquiring new habits 
(Smith 2013: 9).  
 
This explains why James (and Smith and Aristotle for that matter) puts such a 
priority on proper habit formation as a part of the moral life: to “make habit (…) 
                                                
26 As noted above, recent cognitive psychology contends that rational, deliberative choice accounts for only about 5% 
of one’s daily activity; the rest is handed over largely to the sway of habit (Smith 2009: 81). 
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our ally and not our enemy” facilitates the acquisition of virtue (James 2012: 
110). 
In turn, habits are shaped by practices, physical actions repeated to the 
extent that they capture the heart because “the way to our hearts is through our 
bodies” (Smith 2009: 58).  Practices form habits but do not primarily operate on a 
cognitive level; they work their influence in a bodily, pre-theoretical way by 
privileging a certain way of seeing and intending the world distilled in habits.27  
Habits, then, do not so much concern discursive knowledge, but an embodied 
know-how, an almost intuitive sense for a skill or action that is directed towards a 
particular end.  
 
Two Pedagogic Models 
This model composed of elements from Aristotle and Smith offers an 
alternative philosophical anthropology to the one commonly assumed by those 
who wish to communicate sustainability to the public.  The former model 
constitutes a pedagogy based on communicating information to individuals, 
presupposing that humans basically orient themselves to the world through their 
minds as reasoners.  To impel people to change their actions and assume moral 
responsibility for the environment, then, merely requires an affirmation of the 
right information.  In this scheme, humans figure only as “static containers for 
ideas or beliefs” (Smith 2009: 47).  This concept turns out to be both 
reductionistic and dualistic by 1) reducing humans to their minds, and 2) 
sustaining a false dichotomy between the mind and the body.  Ironically, most 
environmentalists eschew this kind of rationalistic dualism largely because it is 
commonly used as a stepping-stone to the further distinction between humanity 
and nature; yet their pedagogical method for inciting change unwittingly 
perpetuates it.  Even those well-meaning environmentalists who look to foreign 
religions and cultures for environmentally helpful systems of belief or worldviews 
                                                
27 This connection between habits and practices will be further elucidated in the following chapter.  
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ultimately commit the same fault insofar as they neglect to attend to the 
precognitive habits that underlie (and often bypass) belief.  If environmental 
advocates solely address the intellect while leaving habits to the conscripting 
practices of the marketplace, they cannot hope for success precisely because 
humans possess (or possibly, are possessed by?) embodied knowledge.  
The alternative model, based on Aristotle’s philosophy of action and 
Smith’s philosophical anthropology, redresses these errors by pinpointing the 
center of the human being as the whole body, rather than just the head, thereby 
taking habit into account as the enacted form of desire.  According to this model, 
the crux of any moral pedagogy must center on formation of desire by means of 
habit, rather than information of the mind.  To overcome incontinence, one must 
align habit with reason by participating in formative practices – though such 
formation does sometimes include information (Smith 2009: 22-25).  Rational 
persuasion can only constitute at best half of the project of moral education 
because to ignore the body, the primary locus of desire, disregards the rogue 
habits that can persist without the supervision of the reason.  
Indeed, this seems to describe the state of contemporary environmentalism.  
Whether or not the effort to communicate sustainability has rationally convinced 
individuals to effect sustainable change, it has obviously not penetrated deep 
enough to the level of habits because most individuals’ destructive habits are still 
operative.  Because of their philosophical anthropology, environmental advocates 
have not dug deep enough to find the locus of action.  The persistence of these 
damaging habits is not surprising given that habits are by definition resistant to 
facile change.  A rationalistic model of communicating sustainability can, at best, 
accomplish on a large scale a guilty conscience and an immutable incontinence.  
This model’s failure lies precisely in its neglect of habit. 
The former model assumed that the main challenge in the communication 
of sustainability was to inform people’s minds so that they could force their 
bodies into different patterns.  Their interpretation of pedagogy concerned a 
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struggle between mind and body, just as Socrates conceived of the moral life as 
the conquest of reason over desire.  As shown, however, this strategy is only 
partially effective, usually only with people who were already predisposed to 
agree with the proposed platform.  Further, the environmental advocacy battle is 
not as simplistic as a battle between the reasoning mind and the begrudging body.  
Rather, it is better understood as occurring between two mutually exclusive 
models and outlets of desire that implicate the body, and by extension the mind.  
To construe the situation in this manner is to acknowledge that the body has a 
kind of knowledge; or, more specifically, that habits, originally willed at some 
level by the agent to some end, inscribe knowledge into the flesh.  This is 
embodied knowledge. Accordingly, “we are confronted, not with reason 
struggling against appetite or emotion, but rather with free-floating reason 
struggling against reason as rooted in the habits” (Dunnington 2011: 81).  To 
diagnose the problem of inaction as an issue of incontinent habits is the first step 
towards constructing an effective model to communicate sustainability.  
The second step is to identify the culpable habits that work insidiously to 
perpetuate climate change.  Seen from the viewpoint of habit, there are no value-
free practices in life.  “All habits and practices are ultimately trying to make us 
into a certain kind of person […] no habit or practice is neutral” (Smith 2009: 83).  
The practices that characterize modern life carry within themselves latent, though 
nonetheless potent, visions of the good life; unfortunately, this vision of the good 
life (usually construed as infinite consumption or unhindered choice) has proven 
to be environmentally unsustainable and unjust.  These practices do not leave 
Western individuals unscathed.  Rather, they constitute a ubiquitous habituation 
(a subtle education of desire) as they train individuals to act automatically in 
certain environmentally destructive ways and take for granted unsustainable 
patterns of life.  
To counter these entrenched habits, we must first see the effort to 
communicate sustainability as a modality of education, trafficking in “a 
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constellation of practices, rituals, and routines that inculcates a particular vision 
of the good life by inscribing or infusing that vision into the heart (the gut) by 
means of material, embodied practices” (Smith 2009: 26).  Thus, 
environmentalists are right to concentrate their efforts for change on daily and 
mundane practices like grocery shopping and buying organic/local food, though 
they may not realize that they are confronting habits per se.  This approach 
concurs with William James’ assessment that “We are spinning our fates, good or 
evil, and never to be undone.  Every smallest stroke of virtue or of vice leaves its 
never so little scar” (James 2012: 114).28  Not only does grocery shopping 
implicate systems of food production, it also insidiously inculcates certain habits 
of thought and action.   Such practices implicate desire, so that now it seems 
normal that one should be able to eat tomatoes (or other seasonally specific crops) 
whenever desired, no matter the time of year.  These peculiarly modern habits 
stem from the formative practices of a Western, consumer-driven life.  
It is thus evident that the formation of moral habits happens continuously. 
Westerners are not immune to the persistent plying and temptations of practices 
that veil environmental ruin, nor are they immune to the subconscious 
concretization of those practices into automated habits.  Accordingly, the battle 
for sustainable social change must delve deeper than the level of head knowledge 
to attend carefully to the habituated and unsustainable embodied knowledge of 
Western life.  Though it may be cliché, it holds true that old habits die hard.  Die 
they must, nevertheless, if Western society is to assume responsibility for 
sustainable change.  
                                                
28 Though this statement generally accords with the views expressed above linked with Aristotle, James here conflates 
the nature of habits with that of instincts by his insistence that habits (or a habituated character) are  “never to be 
undone.” What distinguishes habits from instincts is precisely that they can be changed and conformed to reason, 
whereas instincts are permanent or at least only susceptible to change in the form of extreme behavioral conditioning 
with severe punishment and reinforcement. Though the reasoned will may not exercise absolute and direct authority 
over one’s habits, habits are responsive to reason in that reason can, by means of patient strategy and indirect 
intervention, transform them.  
On the other hand, habits are distinct from dispositions precisely because although habits can be changed, that change 
requires “much effort, creativity and ingenuity to quit” (Dunnington 2011: 66). The category of disposition, then, 
names those states of being that are more easily changed. Dispositions, therefore, do not possess the more lasting 
quality of habits, just as habits do not possess the permanent quality of instincts.  
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Habit, Determinism, and Free Will 
Thus far, I have highlighted how environmental inaction stems from moral 
incontinence, habit plays a focal role in philosophy of action, and consequently 
how we need to reframe the communication of sustainability as a project of moral 
formation.  This section seeks to formulate a working definition of habit that 
accounts for its philosophical complexity in order to understand better how habits 
are formed and how they function.  I shall proceed methodologically to the nature 
of habit by examining common theoretical dualisms that habit helps obviate.  
By now, it should be clear that to categorize entrenched unsustainable 
behavior as (incontinent) moral habits is to say something much more profound 
than the common sense rendering of habit.  According to common sense, habits 
are actions repeated by an agent and for which that agent has a proclivity.  
Philosophically speaking, however, habits occupy a distinct space that goes 
deeper than the pedestrian definition.  If Aristotle is right, then in “responding 
humanly to a particular situation, a person does more than shape that situation; he 
shapes himself.  He reinforces or weakens a habitual orientation that accords (or 
is at odds) with the requirements of human life and so sets up the conditions of his 
future moral career” (quoted in Hauerwas 1994: 8).  To identify the habitual 
nature of the Western world’s unsustainable lifestyle is, therefore, first and 
foremost to recognize that the lack of sustainability lies firmly entrenched within 
our moral character.  As Dunnington contends, “a habit is like a disposition in that 
it can be changed.  But a habit is unlike a disposition in that it cannot be changed 
without great effort” (2011: 65).  Habits are, by their very status as “second 
nature,” hard to break, which explains why facile attempts at communicating 
sustainability via information have failed to bring about the kind of change 
needed.  We have learned to be who we are today by living according to the very 
habits that have brought about destructive climate change.  
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Furthermore, to affirm that unsustainable practices are incontinent habits is 
also to make a distinction between head knowledge and heart, or embedded, 
knowledge.  As will be shown below, doing so complicates the ordinary 
philosophical distinction between voluntarism and determinism, while also 
necessitating a more nuanced conception of free will.  
The roots of habit run to such a depth that it is possible, even 
commonplace, for people to act against their reasoned head knowledge.  Put 
simply, habits enable conflict between one’s knowledge (or will or rational 
choice) and one’s actions.  Accordingly, it seems as though habit resembles 
determinism contra voluntarism in that it does not necessarily enlist rational 
deliberation to countenance its action.  Conversely, habit also resembles 
voluntarism contra determinism in that it is connected to the reason and will at 
some level, albeit in an indirect and tenuous fashion.29   
Furthermore, no one would say that a man is not responsible for his habits, 
no matter how deeply ingrained they may be.  Although the habits may not now 
issue from his reasoning will, their presence within the agent signify that at some 
point in time the will and reason were involved in pursuing the action that turned 
into habit.  For example, I bite my nails habitually to the extent that it annoys me; 
even my immediate will to stop biting my nails is not successful in producing 
change.  However, I am still accountable for that habit.  Although a habit may 
appear automatic or fly under the conscious will’s radar, it would be improper to 
conclude that a man is not responsible for a habit as if he had no say in cultivating 
it.  Aristotle certainly does not assume that because the incontinent agent does not 
always intentionally will his erring activities he is therefore excused from moral 
responsibility.  
Yet it is precisely this matter of culpability that distinguishes determinism 
from voluntarism; for if an action is determined, a man can in no way be held 
                                                
29 This discussion follows the contour of a similar exposition into the mediating nature of habit found in Dunnington 
2011: 63-72.  
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responsible since his agency did not figure into the equation.  Determinism 
operates without regard for the agent’s will.  Accordingly, because habits do not 
preclude culpability, they are voluntary dispositions, albeit voluntary in a 
different way.  To put it differently, habituated agents act voluntarily, though they 
are strongly predisposed to certain actions.  Consequently, habit does not easily fit 
into the aforementioned dualism between determinism and voluntarism.  It is 
neither determined nor voluntary in the typical sense because it incorporates 
aspects of both categories.   
Due to the middle ground that habit occupies, it becomes difficult to 
distinguish that which is voluntary from that which is involuntary.  Voluntary 
action is usually based on a deliberate, reasoned choice of the will; or, as William 
James puts it, a “strictly voluntary act has to be guided by idea, perception, and 
volition, throughout its whole course” (James 2013: 237).30  It would seem, 
therefore, that habits occupy the realm of the involuntary since the agent does not 
actively actualize them.  However, this judgment presupposes a strangely modern 
version of free will, which, following medieval scholar Miner, we can term the 
“freedom of indifference” (2013:81-84).  According to this vision, true freedom 
consists in the ability of the arbitrary will to choose from among a range of 
possibilities without being influenced by anything.  To be free, then, seems 
merely to consist in having a lot of possible courses of action without any 
constraints on the autonomous will.  Aristotle and Aquinas, on the other hand, 
have an entirely different vision of freedom in mind when discussing habits.  For 
them, the freedom of indifferent choosing is a cruel gift indeed, for it merely 
denotes a freedom to err and the likelihood of choosing options that conflict with 
                                                
30 Given this depiction of voluntariness, it is clear that James’ account of habit often flirts with a deterministic 
reductionism. Habituated action, in James’ thought, is formed by repetition of like action, which creates grooves in the 
brain that facilitate and influence the pattern and direction of later like action. Habits, thus, are triggered by sensational 
or perceptive stimulation, causing the formed pattern of behavior to assert and actualize itself by following the brain’s 
well-grooved discharge paths, regardless of the agent’s reason or will. Assuming this to be true, it is not clear how 
James can justifiably make a distinction between habituation and conditioning; in truth, his account of habit seems to 
conflate the two. If, as Dunnington reports, James intended his emphasis on the “force of habit” to function as a 
corrective to those theories that gave inordinate power to the free will, this helps explain the seeming tendency to see 
habit as an effect of precognitive and unconscious conditioning (Dunnington 2011: 69).  
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the agent’s telos.  What good is freedom if it is another name for the propensity to 
screw up consistently?  Instead, the ancients view true freedom as “freedom for 
excellence,” the freedom to choose the good consistently and the ability to realize 
the good life.  This includes “the freedom to perform acts that are possible only 
for those in whom the power is perfected (…) A person who ‘has Latin’ has the 
power of freedom to express herself in Latin, quite unlike the person who has no 
Latin or is merely ‘disposed’ to Latin” (Miner 2013:82).  This example makes 
clear the compatibility between habits and freedom: habits are the necessary 
building blocks that coalesce to enable the freedom for excellence.  To return to 
the question of voluntary versus involuntary action, the construal of habits as 
involuntary relies on the conception of freedom as indifference because it seems 
as though the force of habit delimits and constricts one’s choice.  If however, the 
freedom of indifference constitutes a sorry counterfeit when compared to the 
freedom to act excellently, then voluntary action is not necessarily “coterminous 
with the sphere of the autonomously willed,” (Dunnington 2011: 72).  
Habit thus confounds the ordinary distinction between involuntary and 
voluntary because it can bypass the deliberative will and simultaneously 
constitute an expression of true individual freedom.  Thus, habit explains how 
many unsustainable actions and practices can emanate from the depths of one’s 
character though they may stand in contradiction to the avowed purposes of the 
rational will.  Though it may seem involuntary, the agent who habitually pollutes, 
litters or consumes gluttonously is still accountable for his transgressions. “He has 
acquired through practice a relatively long-lasting disposition to respond, in ways 
he approves of, to feelings of fear and confidence aroused by surrounding 
circumstances” (Freeland 1982: 21). In this way, actions that originate from habit 
and character are freely willed, though the will may not have an overt say in the 
immediate matter.  
A further boon gained by a robust conception of habit is that it confers a 
continuous notion of selfhood.  In contrast, many approaches to ethics unwittingly 
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imply that the self is a disjointed entity made up of discrete decisions and 
sporadic time slices, as a direct consequence of their failure to take into account 
the nature and ubiquity of habits in the moral life.  The modern neglect of habit in 
ethics has led naturally to the proliferation of “decisionism” whereby ethics is 
done by conceptualizing and attempting to solve increasingly difficult (and far-
fetched) ethical dilemmas.  “What do you think you should do if…?”  To do 
ethics in this manner takes certain quandaries, like the trolley problem31, to 
function as the litmus test for the moral theories under consideration.  This 
unsuitably condenses ethics to the time slice that occupies the space between a 
situation and a decision, rather to the whole of life.  While the moral life does 
indeed include decision-making, such an approach absolutizes the role of 
ratiocination in ethics while simultaneously downplaying the prominence of 
moral habits and prior character. It also restricts the realm of ethics to 
controversial topics, like war, killing, or abortion, blinding itself to the very way 
in which ethics pervades life.  The ethicist consumed with contentious dilemmas 
misses the point that ethics also, and more importantly, concerns eating, walking, 
biking, and conversing.  The habits formed in these daily practices are more 
normative for one’s moral character than the ability to discuss the relative merits 
of utilitarian versus deontological ethics with respect to a contrived situation.  As 
the ethicist Stanley Hauerwas contends,  
 
                                                
31 In this classic moral quandary with myriad permutations, one must imagine a situation in which a trolley full of at 
least a couple people, say 5, are hurtling towards the edge of a cliff or some other form of imminent demise. The only 
means to save them is to divert the trolley track, whereby it would hit and kill an innocent bystander. Given these two 
options (the death of the trolley-bound few versus the death of a single passersby), one must attempt to make a 
decision.  
These kinds of dilemmas are used to test both philosophical systems (like utilitarianism or Kantian ethics) as 
well as people’s intuitions. Some philosophers use these dilemmas as intuition plumbing to show that humans 
intuitively accept certain situations while eschewing others. This ethical methodology fails to take into account that 
intuitions are not given, stable entities; in reality, one’s intuitions cleave to one’s character, for they are formed and 
molded concomitantly according to the nature of one’s character. One can imagine that Spartans or the Huns 
possessed intuitions that would stand in stark contrast to those held by 17th century Native Americans. To plumb 
intuitions, therefore, as a ways of doing ethics seems primarily useful as a test of character (which involves how one 
has been raised, habituated, and culturally conditioned according to one’s society, family, etc.) not as an indicator of 
what must be universally right.  
 - 49 - 
Morality is not primarily concerned with quandaries or hard decision; nor 
is the moral self simply the collection of such decisions.  As persons of 
moral character we do not confront situations as mud puddles into which 
we have to step; rather the kind of ‘situations’ we confront and how we 
understand them are a function of the kind of people we are (quoted in 
Wells 1998: 17). 
 
Ethics without character turns moral agency into an endless, yet 
discontinuous stream of disjointed ethical dilemmas.  Likewise, the self becomes 
limited to the time-slices of each moral decision in which it must rework the 
moral calculus necessary to confront each situation.  This treats the self as an 
ahistorical entity, as if it must recreate itself anew to respond to every ethical 
choice.  As William James insightfully noted, “There is no more miserable human 
being than one in whom nothing is habitual but indecision” (James 2012: 110).  
Consequently, to forego an emphasis on character strips the self of any possibility 
for duration and moral development.  Yet, thankfully this depiction does not 
adequately represent the reality of moral choice and its compounding effects on 
character.  Because “character is not so much the qualification but the form of our 
agency,” recognizing the ubiquity and necessity of moral habits enables a holistic 
depiction of the self (Hauerwas 1994: xx).  Habit formation, a lifelong endeavor, 
implies that moral agency is predicated upon an enduring self, a self that develops 
and learns over time.  Therefore, to reconfigure environmental advocacy as a 
matter of habit formation and character resists the modern impulse towards 
“decisionism” and its inherent reductionisms.  
Accordingly, the philosophical concept of habit sheds light on a variety of 
factors that relate to the communication of sustainability.  Habit explains why 
certain behaviors or patterns of action have lasting quality and are not susceptible 
to the barrage of information.  Taking into account the priority of habit in 
pedagogy also suggests an insight into why some people have responded to the 
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call for sustainability while others have not.  Those responsive ones may have 
habits of thought and practice that do not need much alteration in order to fit with 
the sustainability agenda.32  Those recalcitrant and unresponsive ones likely have 
formed deep-rooted habits of thought and practice that stand in direct opposition 
to the sustainable agenda.  Due to the conservative nature of habits, it is not 
surprising that many with destructive habits, like those surrounding consumption, 
have remained entrenched in their ways; this is merely the basic function of habit.  
Furthermore, the concept of habit reconfigures the traditional modern notion of 
freedom, subsequently making clear how individuals can still be held accountable 
for patterned actions that do not issue directly from the deliberative will.  Lastly, 
habit leads to an emphasis on character, which adds duration and development to 
the concept of self.  Eschewing a stunted picture of selfhood, habit implies that 
moral decisions are not made in a vacuum, but rather compound to form people 
according to the vision of the good life embedded in the habit. 
With these distinctions and nuances properly understood, we can formulate 
a working definition of habit.  A habit is a learned, lasting and often subconscious 
predisposition to act voluntarily and excellently in certain a way, which thereby 
orients one’s character (and desire) towards the telos inscribed in that action.  If I 
habitually sing choral music, I have learned how to sing well (how to hold a tune, 
harmonize, use vibrato, etc.); I probably have come to desire a life filled music, 
i.e. to integrate music into my vision of the good life.  I may also find myself 
singing without meaning to, as if the song welled up inside me and burst out 
though I did not notice.  It is important to note that “excellently” in this definition 
does not imply that habits are by necessity oriented towards positive ends.  It is 
entirely possible to act excellently in a vicious way.  For example, there are 
bumbling, ineffective burglars as well as first-rate, effective burglars; the latter 
                                                
32 This is meant as a suggestion, a speculative explanation that will not fit every case. Another explanation for why 
some have taken to the green movement whereas others have not is that the former group of people may have fallen in 
love with the ethos of that movement, whereas others are more enamored with and captivated by the vision of the 
good life implicit in non-green movements. Although our desires for a certain vision of the good life relates to the 
issue of habit, it can also involve more contingent matters like who our friends/family are or where we grew up.  
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are excellent according to their skill and success, whereas the former lack both.  
However, both are equally vicious; in fact, the excellent burglar may even be 
more vicious precisely because his excellence allows him to burglarize all the 
more.  Thus, to say that habits dispose the agent to act excellently (that is, with 
skill and precision) is to make a descriptive statement, rather than an evaluative 
one.  
In applying this definition to the realm of environmentally responsible 
behavior, it is evident how routine unsustainable practices like overconsumption 
fit naturally into the category of habit.  Generally, overconsumption is a learned 
way of shopping that has a relative longevity; it issues from the will, though after 
a while it may not do so overtly as it becomes a subconscious way of garnering 
goods with precision and efficiency.  Lastly, overconsumption changes 
individuals and their desires by orienting them to the particular vision of the good 
life inscribed into the very nature of the action; namely, overconsumption trains 
people to desire more, always more stuff, and to think that the good life consists 
in possessing an infinite supply of goods.  In this way, the insidious habit of 
overconsumption inscribes individuals into environmentally harmful patterns of 
acting and desiring.  
 
Historical Precedent  
To call attention away from information dissemination and towards the 
habits of life that cause environmental destruction necessarily alters the methods 
used in the communication of sustainability.  This approach stands in line with 
what some have called ‘political meliorism,’ which dates back to the American 
pragmatist tradition (whose spokesmen, primarily William James and John 
Dewey obsessed over the primacy of habit) and the ensuing 19th-20th century 
social movements that stemmed from their philosophies.  The meliorist project 
tried to effect change by practicing the desired change not in some vague, utopian 
hope, but in the belief that “moralizing and appeals to pity will fail to correct 
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these habits, since only concrete action that starts the process of cementing new 
habits in their place will effectively address our habitual responses” (MacMullan 
2013: 246).  Prominent among the meliorist reformers were Jane Addams and W. 
E. B. DuBois.  Addams worked to assimilate immigrants into American society, 
while also working for peace and an end to patriarchy.  Addams believed that the 
nation’s tendency towards making war constituted a habit steeped in patriarchy 
that could only be overcome by new political machinations that included women. 
Thus, as a women’s rights activist she worked to overthrow the habits of 
patriarchy through the institution of counter practices that envisioned an equitable 
mode of society.  DuBois famously worked against racism, all the while 
recognizing that  
 
in the fight against race prejudice, we are not facing simply the rational 
conscious determination of white folk to oppress us, we were facing age-
long complexes sunk now largely to unconscious habit and irrational urge, 
which demanded on our part not only the patience to wait, but the power to 
entrench ourselves for a long siege against the strongholds of color caste 
(from his Dusk of Dawn, quoted in MacMullan 2013: 247).  
 
DuBois’ insights into the habituated character of racism in the United States 
correlate with the aforementioned diagnosis in regard to the communication of 
sustainability.  In effect, DuBois echoes what we have already heard from 
Aristotle and Smith.  Because Western society’s subconscious habits are 
complicit in environmental vice, the spread of information and teaching of 
environmentally sound moral theorems, however rhetorically conveyed, will (and 
have!) only achieve surface level success.  Given the present (unsustainable) state 
of the world and the lack of any radical sustainable reforms on a grand scale, the 
rationalistic model indeed seems to have faltered.  The proof of the pudding, as 
they say, is in the eating.  The movement to communicate sustainability would do 
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well to take lessons from the meliorist diagnosis of the roadblocks that impede 
social change.  
 
Completing the Reconfiguration: Interrogating Our Habits 
In summary, by drawing upon Smith’s model of human nature based on 
desire while taking into account the nature of habits as desire’s direction, I have 
endeavored to construct a framework for the communication of sustainability that 
compensates for the shortsightedness of the former paradigm.  Given that the 
communication of sustainability is formally a pedagogical endeavor, it must 
orient its pedagogical methods to the nature of its audience.  Put simply, humans 
are more than their heads; they are embodied, desirous beings whose habits guide 
their everyday moral decisions and structure their desires.33  Accordingly, habit 
formation must replace information proliferation as the primary task at hand.  
“The moral question is not, therefore, “How can I (as a willing mind) fight my 
bad habits?”  The question is instead, “How can I (as a collection of habits) 
develop the most intelligent habits possible?” (MacMullan 2013: 244).  The fate 
of the environment depends on who we are, namely what kind of people we are, 
rather than simply addresses what we know or do.  Obviously, this is not to say 
that knowledge, beliefs, and actions are unimportant.  However, all are derivative 
of the agent’s character, and their form depends on the nature of that character.  
This is why Aristotle asserts,  
 
                                                
33 Many environmentalists rightly recognize that desire is a huge environmental concern, for desire propels the wheels 
of climate change. Yet, they miss that desire does not, indeed cannot, operate by itself; rather it is directed to its ends 
by means of habit.  Habit structures and gives form to desire, allowing it to realize its ends.  To change one’s desires 
without instituting new habits to orient those desires and replace the previous habits constitutes a neglect of the 
fulcrum of social and personal change.  It does not suffice to force or otherwise compel the general public to desire 
different ends (i.e. different visions of the good life) without also instilling new habits to initiate, give form to, and 
cement them.  Yet, people assume that we can merely switch out one vision of the good life for another, more 
sustainable option and that will be enough to orient the individual moral agent towards that end. Yet, the habits in 
place structuring former desires conflict and can often win out over the newly transplanted vision because habit is a 
conservative structure with staying power not easily changed by cognitive effort or mental processes. Habits reside in 
the space between mind and body, which means it is not enough merely to desire different things; we must practice 
our way into a new ordering of those desires. We must flesh out those desires by taking on new habits that give shape 
to the greener visions of the good life. Thus, it is vital that while reconfiguring the general answer to the question 
“what is the good life?” environmentalists must also ask the methodological question “how does one realize this new 
vision of the good life?” or “how does one move from one’s present condition to the good life?” 
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decision requires understanding and thought, and also a state of character; 
for acting well or badly requires both thought and character.  Thought by 
itself moves nothing (…)  This is why decision is either understanding 
combined with desire or desire combined with thought (1139a34-b5).  
 
If this is the case, the conclusion is inevitable: to confront climate change 
adequately, we must change who we are.  We must return to the preliminary stage 
of moral development and reeducate our desires by learning the right kind of 
habits in order to form an environmentally virtuous character.  This necessitates a 
twofold emphasis: first, to name the subtle, yet sinister presence and function of 
current unsustainable habits, and thereby begin to break their power, in short, we 
must interrogate our habits and scrutinize them in light of the pressing reality of 
climate change.  Second, we must cultivate the habits necessary to sustain an 
environmentally virtuous self.  For virtue prevails even when confronted with the 
subtle temptation of vice and only virtue will suffice to sustain lasting behavioral 
change.  I leave it to others to attempt a more detailed analysis of which habits 
perpetuate climate change.  Instead, this chapter has concerned itself with laying 
groundwork by reconfiguring the communication of sustainability as the 
pedagogy of habits.  It is to the second area of emphasis – how one cultivates a 
habit – which I now turn. 
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The Weight of Practice: Habit Formation and Ritual 
 
“And hence also ‘obeying a rule’ is a practice.”  
Ludwig Wittgenstein (2001: §202) 
 
“Indeed the reason why habit is also difficult to change is that it is like 
nature; as Eunenus says, ‘Habit, I say, is longtime training, my friend, and in the 
end training is nature for human beings.” 
Aristotle (1152a32-35) 
 
To recapitulate the argument made thus far, I have focused in depth on 
situating the communication of sustainability as an endeavor in moral pedagogy 
best understood in terms of an Aristotelian philosophy of action.  It has become 
evident that the crucial issue in moral education is habit formation precisely 
because moral character depends upon the requisite habits that direct one’s 
desires and thoughts towards virtuous action.  Moral knowledge, on the level of 
general principles – the “because” – does little good to an individual bereft of the 
habits necessary to translate that knowledge into action.  In moral pedagogy, 
formation precedes information (Smith 2009: 22-25).  The recognition of the 
importance of habit for environmental ethics, however, implied a further, more 
pragmatic question: “How does one cultivate the needed habits of environmental 
virtue?”  To answer this question and put to rest any lingering doubts about the 
deficiencies of the intellectualist model of communicating sustainability, this 
chapter has a twofold purpose.  First, I will unpack the nature of habits by 
concentrating specifically on how humans form habits.  Ultimately, I argue that 
habit formation is best understood as a practice.  Second, I will connect the dots 
between habit and ritual, by exploring ritual process as a type of practice 
particularly well suited as a potent means of habit formation.  
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Although a direct continuation of the line of reasoning evident in chapter 
1, this chapter constitutes a break in tone and direction from the preceding 
chapter.  Whereas the previous chapter deconstructed the communication of 
sustainability and reframed it in terms of habit, this chapter by necessity takes a 
more constructive tack.  The task is to explore one creative means of habit 
formation that does not become quickly mired in the reductionist shortcomings of 
former pedagogic attempts to communicate sustainability.34  Accordingly, this 
chapter tentatively proposes ritual as a means of environmental pedagogy, a 
suggestion meant to pique environmental interest in areas of study hitherto 
unexplored for their environmentally relevant resources.  
 How do I cultivate the habits of environmental virtue, those dispositions 
necessary to uphold the moral character capable of environmental stewardship in 
the midst of an environmentally destructive society?35  This is the question that 
presently demands an answer.  To begin, it is imperative to note that a proper 
theory of habit formation depends in large part on a fitting philosophical 
anthropology. To understand how habits are formed assumes that one knows what 
kind of being is under question.  This harkens back to Smith’s maxim – “behind 
every pedagogy is a philosophical anthropology” (Smith 2009: 27).  In the 
previous chapter, I contended that human existence is a corporeal existence, out 
of which rationality springs; to live then is to live as a body in a physical 
landscape embedded amongst other bodies.  As will be fleshed out further, the 
                                                
34 As Aristotle reminds us, habit formation begins with particular vigor and vim in childhood, a decisive time when 
one learns certain manners of relating to the world and others.  That which is learned in one’s upbringing is not easily 
shed or changed, which renders parenting and childrearing a hugely important ethical task.  This calls for a renewed 
environmental interest in the pedagogy of childrearing.  However, since it would be well beyond my expertise and 
purview, I do not intend to write a chapter on parenting issues.  I shall focus instead on a specific means of habit 
formation not constricted to any particular stage of life (e.g. childhood or adolescence), but relevant to all those who 
need to form new habits and reform old habits alike.  For while habits die hard, they differ from instinct precisely 
because they are changeable.  “An instinct does not imply the power to refrain from the instinctual action, whereas a 
habit does imply this power” (Dunnington 2011: 64).  
35 I earlier contrasted habit with disposition, as if the two were mutually contradictory.  This is not the whole story.  
All habits are dispositions, but not all dispositions are habits.  If I have the habit of kindness, I am disposed to act in 
kindness towards others.  However, if I have a disposition towards kindness, I may be inclined to act in kindness 
towards others, but that inclination is not nearly strong or lasting enough to label it properly as a habit.  Habit, thus, is 
a larger category that encompasses disposition but is not exhausted or depleted by it.  While they are not identical, 
they do overlap.  
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body – both physical and social embodiment – hold the key to understanding 
habit formation insofar as they are key elements in the dynamics of practice.  In 
what follows, I shall unpack these three themes (embodiment, sociality, and 
practice) in an attempt to formulate a theory of habit formation true to the 
contours of human experience.  
 
The Irreducible Sociality of Human Being 
 To begin, we must first place habit formation into its proper social context.  
Individuals do not live in a vacuum but rather exist in cultures and subcultures, 
rubbing shoulders with other humans day to day and sharing with them the 
minutia of life.  However, in its unhealthy obsession with individualism, the West 
wants to resist the communal nature of human existence and prefers instead to 
depict society as the coming together of preexisting, discrete individuals who 
willingly create a social contract in order to live a peaceful life, though with as 
little interference from others as possible.  Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean 
Jacques Rousseau pioneered this kind of individualistic thinking in political 
philosophy by assuming that humans in the state of nature – the “very study of the 
original man, of his real wants, and the fundamental principles of his duty” 
(Rousseau 1998) – must have existed as separate and isolated units.36  Modern 
political philosophers, notably John Rawls and Robert Nozick have carried this 
imaginative method of political philosophy into the modern age with similar 
individualistic conclusions.  The basic assumption operative in ‘state of nature’ 
philosophizing is that to understand true human nature, one must strip away all 
the societal constraints and peculiarities that humans have accrued, deconstructing 
the contingencies and irrelevancies that civilized humans have assumed in order 
to understand humankind in its purest state.  However, we must avoid thinking of 
                                                
36 Hobbes famously described life in the state of nature as “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” in his Leviathan. 
The term “noble savage,” used to describe humans in their natural condition, has wrongly been attributed to Rousseau. 
Though Rousseau freely used the word “savage” to describe native peoples, the term “noble Savage” comes from The 
Conquest of Granada (1672), a play by John Dryden, a British 17th century poet (Miner 1972: 106). 
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state of nature philosophy as a historical enterprise, an attempted history of 
humanity and civilization.  Hobbes, Locke, or any others engaged in this kind of 
project care little if their conceptions of the state of nature ever existed on the face 
of the earth.  Rather, it is an idealization, a thought experiment designed to isolate 
the distinction between nature and culture.  In this sense, it constitutes a 
mythological project that, as John Locke puts it, attempts to ascertain “what estate 
all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their 
actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the 
bounds of the law of Nature, without asking leave or depending upon the will of 
any other man” (quoted in Cavanaugh 2002: 17). 
By no means have philosophers agreed as to what the state of the stripped 
down, uncivilized human would be; disagreement has generally centered on 
whether the state of nature was violent or peaceful.  For example, Rousseau 
criticized Hobbes for projecting the characteristics of civilized people (as violent 
and aggressive sorts) back into the state of nature.  Hobbes, according to 
Rousseau, could not escape his own conception and experience of his 
contemporaries when positing the natural state of humankind.  In consequence, 
Hobbes fails to conceptualize adequately what humanity is like without the 
trappings of civilization.  I take Rousseau to be spot on in his criticism of Hobbes; 
one cannot conceive of a human in its natural state without somehow drawing on 
one’s contemporary experience of human nature.  Yet, Rousseau disregards the 
totalizing quality of his criticism of Hobbes.  In other words, his critique not only 
articulates the shortcomings specific to Hobbes’ project, but also applies to any 
project that seeks to recover the original state of nature.  Ironically, Rousseau also 
engages in the state of nature thought experiment, as if he could theorize about 
the pure state of nature without having his personal experience taint his 
anthropological suppositions.  Surely, however, it is impossible to conceive of 
men and women in the so-called state of nature without projecting some of one’s 
own contemporary social norms, values, and context into the thought experiment.   
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Thus, the root of Rousseau and Hobbes’ disagreement does not come 
directly from their theories of the natural state of humankind, but more basically it 
stems from their different understandings and experience of humans in their 
respective time periods.  Hobbes’ pessimism regarding the inherent goodness of 
humanity probably branches from his experience of national turmoil in England 
during the civil wars of the early 17th century, whereas Rousseau’s steady 
optimism may have resulted from his peaceful life in Switzerland in the 18th 
century.  Both, however, were children of the Renaissance as they agreed on one 
implicit premise: the individual is ontologically primary.  Accordingly, “When 
Rousseau says that humanity was born free, he primarily means free from one 
another (…) Hobbes, Rousseau, and Locke all agree that the state of nature is one 
of individuality” (Cavanaugh 2002: 17).  The governing assumption of these 
Enlightenment philosophers relies on a distinction between culture and nature – 
presupposing that culture is not natural – which makes itself plain in the 
commonly held belief that individuality is more natural than political society.  
Consequently, these thinkers could not shed their methodological 
individualism and conceive of the possibility that some form of political society is 
proper to humanity’s natural estate.  Even should one endeavor to envision a 
mythological separation between humanity and society, it is unthinkable that 
humans would not naturally exist in some kind of social groups, living not 
isolated and alone, but amongst others.  As one commentator on Hobbes admits 
the “bonds of affection, sexual affinity, and friendship – as well as clan 
membership and shared religious belief – may further decrease the accuracy of 
any purely individualistic model of the state of nature” (Lloyd and Sreedhar 
2013).  In effect, they asserted without warrant that humanity could exist without 
any social ties.  Thus, it seems that the philosophical concept of a ‘state of nature’ 
amounts to fanciful speculation about basic human origins and the conclusions 
reached therein usually bear an uncanny resemblance to the presuppositions 
needed to support the author’s larger philosophical project.  
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Interestingly, Thomas Aquinas was one of the first to use the phrase “state 
of nature” but he did not consider it to be an asocial or pre-social state of being. 
Rather, he viewed the political community as the state of nature.  As a good 
Aristotelian, Aquinas could only conceive of the human as a political being (i.e. 
one in a polis) (Bevir 2010: 61).  In other words, culture is natural.  Moreover, it 
does not require the dubious support of an imagined state of nature to appreciate 
the innate sociality of humankind.  The present state of reality, with society being 
the rule and complete solitude the exception, offers little warrant to suppose 
otherwise. Furthermore, horrendous cases occasionally make the headlines where 
individuals have been deprived of human contact for most their lives.  In such 
accounts, many important features of human existence, like the ability to 
communicate meaningfully, are notably absent.  The lack of social interaction 
severely stunts human development.  Such case studies reveal that human identity 
and abilities are constructed in the interaction and interplay between humans.  We 
owe a great debt to our family, friends and neighbors because we need each other 
to create identity and meaning in life.37   
Charles Taylor has gone to great lengths to refute atomistic political 
philosophies, which, like the political philosophers of the Enlightenment, view 
everything in political society as decomposable to the individual level.  The 
“originating figure is probably Hobbes” and the main tenet, “The events and 
states which are the subject of study in society are ultimately made up of the 
events and states of component individuals” (Taylor 1995: 129).  As mentioned 
above, these “methodological individualists” justify their atomistic sympathies by 
pointing out that society is merely a collection of individuals; a society only 
thinks and operates to the extent that its component parts think and operate (1995: 
                                                
37 John Locke believed that humans are born into this world as “tabula rasa” (blank slates, upon which their identity is 
constructed according to their relationships and experience in the world.  Interestingly enough, he somehow managed 
to justify the juxtaposition of this belief to the belief that humans, in their natural state, exist as individuals first and 
foremost and that society is derivative of the conglomeration of individuals qua individuals.  Yet, how could there be 
individuals qua individuals (the building blocks of society) if individual identity is predicated upon co-existence with 
other human beings? 
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130).  In response, Taylor seizes on the nature of language to reveal the inherent 
flaws in this approach.  Drawing on Wittgenstein, Taylor reminds us that 
language operates according to established rules of validity, much like a game, 
and that a word can only convey meaning when set against “the background of a 
whole language” (1995: 132).  Linguistic use, as well as the quasi-linguistic 
ability to have coherent thoughts, always presupposes a background of meaning, a 
“culture” that sets the parameters, rules, and definition of the language game.  
Individuals, therefore, can only speak and think meaningfully insofar as they are 
embedded in a collective that gives those utterances and thoughts the requisite 
context.  As Taylor concludes, “this background is not an event, nor can it be 
located in individuals” (1995: 134); rather it is an internally coherent web.  
Methodological individualism separates the individual from the very milieu that 
makes its existence intelligible.  Accordingly, the collective nature of language 
acquisition and use further confirms the irreducibly social nature of human 
beings.  
In general, environmental philosophy has affirmed the sociality of human 
life.  It has correctly perceived that the libertarian individualism at the heart of 
modern philosophy is inextricably entangled in modernity’s anthropocentric 
worldview; to combat the latter requires, to some extent, taking on the former.   
Atomism, after all, refers only to human individualism.  David Abram, an eco-
philosopher steeped in the phenomenological tradition, confidently starts his book 
Spell of the Sensuous with the assertion, “Humans are tuned for relationship” 
(1996: ix).  He thereby pushes back against centuries of philosophical consensus 
that the individual is the most basic ontological reality.  Abram and others hold 
firmly to the social nature of humanity due to their commitment to enlarging the 
moral sphere to include animals.  They argue that human interaction does not 
delineate the fullness of human identity; rather, to be human is to be always 
already operative in a more-than-human world.  One’s identity encompasses 
myriad influences that incorporate yet ultimately transcend the human realm to 
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include pets, wild animals, forests, parks, gardens, etc.  “We are human only in 
contact, and conviviality, with what is not human” (Abram et al. 2006).  Abram’s 
anthropology deserves serious critical attention, for it poses a substantial critique 
of both individualism and anthropocentrism by maintaining that the human self 
can only exist insofar as it is a self-in-relation to all beings in the world.   
Likewise, moral habits are not formed in isolation by an individual qua 
individual.  Instead, moral habits exist in the space between one’s larger social 
milieu and the individual, mediating between the two as a form of social practice. 
A child learns habits primarily through watching and imitating others.  Parents 
and siblings exert influence by social modeling, teaching the infant by 
performance even when the parent is not explicitly aware that she acts as a role 
model.  To recall Aristotle’s metaphor, habit formation is much like learning a 
craft, in the sense that it is predicated upon social relationships and involves 
apprenticeship to a person or group – ideally people skillful and knowledgeable in 
the discipline.  Or, to use Taylor’s example, habit formation works according to 
the same logic as language acquisition, for to learn a language presupposes that 
one is in a social group that both models language use and, more decisively, 
provides the context to sustain the meanings assigned to each utterance. Thus, 
moral habits tailor themselves to the nature of the human; this makes them 
inherently social, taken on as if acculturated, and passed along as corporate 
phenomena akin to a tradition.  
This is what Pierre Bourdieu refers to when he speaks of habitus, 
 
systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures 
predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles 
which generate and organize practices and representations that can be 
objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing conscious 
aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary to attain 
them (quoted in Smith 2013: 81).  
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This complex definition points primarily to the way in which habits transcend the 
individual (habit as structure, external force), yet also implicate the individual in 
certain practices constitutive of the social body (habit as structuring, internal 
force).  Habit formation occurs in community (or more precisely, communities) 
because habits are shared phenomena; they are always already bigger than the 
individual (Smith 2013: 81).  Just as Aristotle conceived of the moral life as an 
issue of political science, so too is habit a political matter, not so much in the 
sense of weighing in on controversial topics like health care or abortion (as in the 
US), but rather in the sense that habit concerns the polis, the lives and interactions 
of people who co-exist in close proximity.   
Consequently, when I form a new habit, it happens in the midst – and 
because – of the multiple social bodies outlets that comprise modern life (e.g. 
school, work, church, sports teams, etc.).  To some extent, each group has 
incorporated me into its particular way of seeing and constituting the world 
through the habits ingrained in me by way of their respective practices.  Likewise, 
the habitus, the conglomeration of habits I currently have, does not come ex 
nihilo; “it is acquired, and therefore has a history; it carries an entire past with it” 
(Smith 2013: 83).  My habits neither start nor end with me.  Though it is acquired 
from the social bodies that lay claim to one’s life, this does not imply that to 
acquire a habitus is a deterministic process whereby each agent is condemned to 
assume and repeat mechanically the received patterns of actions.  Rather, the 
habituated agent is disposed to see and understand the world in certain ways, 
taking for granted the particular manners of constituting the world implanted in 
the habitus.  The acquisition of a habitus, therefore, is less like accepting a rigid 
script for one’s conduct, and more like receiving the general rules for the game, 
which do not necessarily dictate specific actions, but nonetheless influence, 
constrain, and subtly direct how one plays the game.  This is the first sense of the 
corporality of habit formation: humans form habits socially as they are 
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incorporated in various social groups given that habits are overarching 
dispositions of a social body realized in practice.    
  
The Irreducible Embodiment of Human Being 
The second sense of the corporality of habit formation refers to the bodily 
nature of human existence.  The philosophical anthropology previously 
articulated stressed the centrality of desire for human nature.  Such a move 
stemmed from a deeper concern to appreciate in fullness the human body and the 
way in which human existence is bounded by, experienced in, and commensurate 
with one’s bodily nature.  The intellectualist model implicit in most efforts to 
communicate sustainability assumes that “intelligence is centered in “mind” (…) 
as if being “smarter” is sufficient to transform our being-in-the-world” (Smith 
2013: 55).  In doing so, it relegates the body to the status of an addendum to 
human nature, a hollow superfluity with little bearing on the important aspects of 
life.  At this point, it is customary to castigate Descartes for he is usually the 
culprit and the progenitor blamed for this philosophical move.  Indeed, he 
considered the body a fickle and unreliable source of knowledge and thus deemed 
it unsuitable for philosophical attention. He was also known as a particularly avid 
vivisectionist who urged his companions to disregard the wails of the dissected 
animals as the mere whinings of an automated machine.   
Yet philosophy’s disinterest in the body may be rooted further back in its 
long history, and can also be found in ancient Greece.  Platonic philosophy also 
contained a dualism between matter, to which the body belongs, and the realm of 
ideas, to which the human soul belongs.  Plato believed in a world of Ideas, a 
non-material realm, yet more real than the material world, in which the pure ideas 
(or forms) of material things reside.  Thus, for all the particular chairs in the 
world there is more fundamentally the pure Idea of Chair, the universal Idea in 
which all the particulars participate and from which they gain the properties that 
makes them a chair.  Thus, a chair is only a chair insofar as it is formed to the 
 - 65 - 
Idea of Chair.  Critically, however, Plato disagreed with Aristotle over whether 
the universal Ideas existed independently of the particulars.  Plato thought that 
even if all the particular chairs in the world ceased to exist, the Idea of Chair 
would persist.  Aristotle, on the other hand, thought that the existence of a 
universal Idea was predicated upon the existence of the corresponding particulars.  
This subtle disagreement between Aristotle and Plato made a world of difference.  
It explains why Aristotle studied biology and other matters of this world as a 
natural extension of his philosophical study, whereas Plato confined his 
philosophical interest to the realm of Ideas because he believed that universals 
alone allowed for true knowledge.  Aristotle resembles an empiricist in his study 
of nature, whereas Plato distrusted the ever-changing physical world.  Plato’s 
dualism renders experiential, practical knowledge gained in the world secondary 
to knowledge of the Form.   
Hence, the roots of the mind-body dichotomy run deep in the pedigree of 
Western philosophy; dualism is a hard habit to kick.  Some, however, have 
resisted the seduction of this tidy distinction between mind and matter, 
contending instead that humans do not merely have bodies; “we are our bodies – 
while also more than our bodies” (Smith 2013: 56).  Moreover, they reinterpret 
human rationality less as that which sets humanity apart, and more as something 
ensconced firmly in our animality (MacIntyre 1999: 49).38 These corrective 
insights are substantially indebted to Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s project in the 
Phenomenology of Perception, the main thrust of which is to take the body 
seriously as a theoretical starting point, the most basic datum of human existence.  
As Merleau-Ponty noted, “the body expresses total existence, not because it is an 
external accompaniment to that existence, but because existence realizes itself in 
the body” (quoted in Smith 2013: 66).  In fact, it is precisely the 
phenomenological oddity of habit that provoked Merleau-Ponty to revisit the 
                                                
38 To view rationality as an animalistic property dovetails nicely with the understanding of the body as a locus of 
intelligence that we gained from analyzing habit in the previous chapter.   
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classical (dualistic) conception of embodied existence and attempt to take into 
account the primacy of incarnation (Smith 2013: 58).  Habit, to Merleau-Ponty, 
“is knowledge in the hands, which is forthcoming only when bodily effort is 
made, and cannot be formulated in detachment from that effort” (quoted in Smith 
2013: 58).  Aristotle too insisted on the vitality of the connection between body 
and habit for, as Dunnington remarks, Aristotle theorized that “knowledge is 
often habit,” but it is a kind of “heart knowledge” or an “embodied knowledge” 
(2011: 52-3).  Habits, then, lie within the purview of the body.39  Although mental 
habits do exist and the realm of habits is not commensurate with the motor-
physical, many do not exist as mental states alone, but as attached to some form 
of physical motion or activity.40  
These two insights – human nature as communal and bodily – lay much of 
the groundwork for a theory of habit formation.41  To cultivate a habit, then, 
involves the engagement of the body in a distinct and socially shared activity that 
either constitutes the habit or accompanies the habit indirectly.  We find habit, 
therefore, at the confluence of communal practice and embodiment.  “Not 
surprisingly, my incorporation into a social body is effected through the social 
body co-opting my body.  The dynamics of initiation are kinaesthetic [sic]” 
                                                
39 This is not to say that habits are solely a mode of bodily orientation because, as Merleau-Ponty writes, “every habit 
is both motor and perceptual, because it lies, as we have said, between explicit perception and actual movement” 
(quoted in Smith 2013: 57).  Habits, in a very deep sense, involve not only a way of orienting one’s self bodily to the 
world, but also a distinct way of seeing the world.  The reference to vision is not a mere stand-in for the physical 
acting of seeing, but rather the process of physically seeing, conceptualizing, and understanding in a pre-cognitive way 
before the translation of that “vision” to language.  Habit, as mentioned earlier, occupies a distinct middle ground that 
intercedes between mind and body, or perception and conception, not confined to or defined solely by either pole of 
the pairs.  
40 The Christian ethicist Stanley Hauerwas writes in his memoirs, “My writing is exploratory because I have no idea 
what I believe until I force myself to say it.  For me, writing turns out to be my way of believing” (136). The claim 
that he does not often know what he thinks until he writes should not be taken whimsically as mere fluff or a form of 
self-handicapping.  It is more likely that the habit of writing stimulates and aids his thought process to such an extent 
that thinking unaccompanied by writing is robbed of its impetus and the activity suffers in productivity.  Anecdotes 
such as these readily evidence the interconnection between thinking and acting to the extent that it reveals the large 
indebtedness of the “mind” to the body. Such a view is probably not surprising for those who have diligently resisted 
the classical but pernicious dualisms of Western thought, particularly the split between mind and body. For an 
interesting and light-hearted review of the extreme and quirky habits on which great thinkers, artists, and writers alike 
have relied in (and for) their literary/artistic careers, see Currey 2013.  
41 While I want to leave a small space open for the possibility of cultivating habits by mental processes disconnected 
from any bodily activation, it does seem to be the case that the body is a more direct and efficient means of habit 
formation precisely because it is the major seat of human intelligence. 
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(Smith 2013: 94).  Habits of thought may spiral out of a habituated body.42 As 
Smith, drawing on Merleau-Ponty, contends, “states of the body ‘give rise’ to 
states of mind” (2013: 94).  To put it differently, emotion in large part depends 
upon motion.  Since we experience the world only through and as bodies, it 
follows that we must enlist the body when to form habits.  To ground habits in the 
body ensures the relative permanence characteristic of habits due to the ease and 
enthusiasm with which the body takes to scripted patterns of actions.  This 
explains why Merleau-Ponty describes “the acquisition of habit as a 
rearrangement and renewal of the corporeal schema” (quoted in Smith 2013: 57).  
   
Incorporating the Social Body: Habit Formation as Practice 
While embodiment and social incorporation constitute necessary 
conditions, they are not entirely sufficient to ensure the durable “knowledge in the 
hands” that habit comprises.  Many social actions engage the body without giving 
way to habit.  Why do some become habit and others do not?  The missing link to 
habit formation, I suggest, is practice, a repeated and patterned movement of 
bodies in a socially defined time and space.  In other words, a practice repeats the 
same actions again and again in a certain socially defined setting to attain a 
certain skill, and that repetition entrenches that specific action or set of actions 
firmly into the bodily know-how of the agent.  “Frequency of past behavior” 
according to psychologists Ouellette and Wood, “then reflects habit strength and 
has a direct effect on future performance” (1998: 54).  Thus, the themes of 
physical body and social body that weigh so heavily into habit formation are 
complemented by practice.  This links the social, bodily, and repetitive nature of 
habit formation, for all three dynamics have a place in this understanding of 
practice.  As Bourdieu notes, the habitus “is constituted in practice and is always 
                                                
42  For example we moderns have gorged ourselves on supermarket shopping (a physically conscripting activity) and 
have consequently come to expect the earth to comply with the a-seasonal demands of the supermarket (an intellective 
habit).   People are thrown into this world where modern mass consumption constitutes the norm; in subsuming such 
practices, they gradually come to habituate not only their bodies to enjoy and expect certain amenities, but also their 
minds.   
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oriented toward practical functions” (quoted in Smith 2013: 81-82).  In essence, 
habit formation demands practice.  The maxims “practice makes perfect” or 
“practice makes permanent” are imprecise; in reality, practice makes habitual, 
which is to say that it facilitates the acquisition and relative permanence of a 
certain skill.  As cognitive psychologist Timothy Wilson counsels, “to establish a 
desirable pattern of habitual, nonconscious responses, the best advice is to 
practice, practice, practice” (2002: 216).   
We can draw on Aristotle to make the same point.  An individual forms 
habits as apprentices learn crafts, “by having first activated them” (1103a32), for 
“a state [of character] results from [the repetition of] similar activities” (1103b21, 
brackets in original).  T.H. Irwin, in his translation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics, explicitly defines habits as “patterns of action, acquired by training” (324, 
italics added).  As noted above, craftsmanship begets itself by means of 
apprenticeship, which is an irreducible social reality.  Furthermore, key to 
Aristotle’s account of moral habituation is the repeated bodily activity of an 
agent, which explains why he draws an analogy between the moral life and 
physically conscripting skills like musicianship and construction (1103a35).  To 
practice, therefore, is to acquire.  Habit results from the reproduction of morally 
excellent deeds as learned from the virtuous; it is, in other words, a practice.   
 
Bodies in Motion 
Having articulated this conception of habit formation as practice, I will 
employ two examples to elucidate this point further: the disciplines of soccer and 
philosophy.  Sports, such as soccer (what the rest of the world more aptly calls 
football), dancing, or even golf, rely on training to produce good athletes.  To 
train as an athlete involves impressing into the body specific ways of moving that 
coalesce into habit.  A soccer player learns to be a good soccer player by learning 
the habits common to good soccer players.  For soccer, like most other sports, is 
not always, or even primarily, about being able to think clearly in the game, but 
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rather about the cultivation of certain habits that allow the athlete to be able to 
react and improvise skillfully in the game as if out of instinct.  This explains why 
Smith contends that to have a habit is “to know more than you think” (2013: 89).  
Soccer of course involves tactics and other theoretical knowledge; however, all of 
that would be rendered meaningless without the skills instilled through habit.  An 
ardent observer of soccer could learn to recognize what constitutes good soccer; 
without the physical training, however, his body could not put into practice what 
his mind directs him to do.   
We can extend this anecdotal analogy a bit further to connect the physical 
body to the social.  After all, soccer is by its nature a corporate sport; unlike ping-
pong, tennis, or track, soccer concerns both the individual skills cultivated by the 
respective players on the team (like ball control, trapping and passing ability) but 
also, and more critically, the skill of the team in its ability to play as a cohesive 
whole.  A good team demands more than clever players; it also demands a shared 
understanding of the overall purpose, style, and tendencies of the team.  A form 
of soccer does arise when eleven strangers are placed on the same team, but their 
collaborative movements will inevitably go out of sync.43  Passes will go awry 
and misunderstandings will abound given that the group does not know itself as a 
team; it does not have the requisite practice of interacting constructively as a 
unified collection of diverse individuals.  Thus, it is not uncommon for good 
players to transfer to different teams where surprisingly they do not, indeed 
cannot, perform up to their former standards.  These “flops” evidence that the 
team context often weighs as much as the player himself; in fact, the skills of a 
player in a certain sense belong to the team, for they are localized skills 
inculcated by the social as well as the body. Accordingly, to play soccer well 
                                                
43 I am tempted to use this fact as an explanation of why the MLS All-Star team (composed of the best players in the 
American soccer league) undoubtedly always loses to visiting European teams.  Simply put, they are generally skillful 
players who have little to no experience playing with each other, going up against some of the better teams that 
England, Spain, or Germany have produced.  Though some may say that the Americans may not have a chance to 
begin with, to strip good players from their team contexts and force them together in an amalgamated whole certainly 
cannot help their prospects!  That said, I recognize the gulf in quality between the mediocrity of American soccer and 
the talented, rigorous culture characteristic of the European soccer world.  
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requires the cultivation of the right habits via the physical and social body 
effected in practice.  The continued success of certain club teams in today’s age, 
namely Barcelona and most recently Bayern Munich, depends just as much on the 
fluid, cohesive, almost aesthetic quality in their distinctive style of play as it does 
on the skills of the individuals within the group.  In short, a skillful soccer player 
is made in the repeated interaction between the body and the social.   
In this scenario, it makes intuitive sense that the agent in question trains 
his/her body to endow it with the skills necessary to play the corporate sport, 
because the activity in question obviously implicates the body embedded in a 
group.  However, this also proves to be the case in another, less obvious example.  
 Philosophers are often chastised as armchair thinkers, smart individuals 
who remain stationary in their work and obstinately passive in the world at large.  
These thinkers seem that they could do without their bodies, as if the discipline 
only implicated the mind.  Accompanying this charge is an implicit, pervasive 
understanding of theoretical disciplines as fields that pertain only to the mind and 
do not involve the body.  Yet, this unduly undervalues the manner in which all 
thinkers must work to train their bodies in order for the mind to function properly.  
In fact, many philosophers have been known to prescribe themselves a daily 
regimen of walking as an integral part of their academic life.  In Heidelberg, 
Germany, for example, there is a quaint old path called Philosopher’s Way, by no 
means an easy hike, that meanders through the hillside; it derives its name from 
the generations of German philosophers at the university who frequented the trail, 
using bodily movement to work out their complex philosophical systems or 
insights.44  Thus, the practices of thinking and writing enlist the body.  This 
                                                
44 There is a long heritage of philosophers known for their habit of ambulation.  Socrates of course deserves mention, 
for he liked to take long walks under the Athenian colonnades, all the while discoursing with his companions 
according to his method of elenchus. Aristotle also was said to be quite the walking man, for tradition knows him as a 
peripatetic (one given to walking) philosopher, and after his death his followers also assumed the name “Peripatetics.”  
One could create a sizeable list if forced to enumerate all the great thinkers prone to ambulate regularly, including 
Heidegger, Arne Naess, and Charles Darwin.  Lastly, I must quote Henry David Thoreau who, in his essay Walking, 
wrote “I think that I cannot preserve my health and spirits unless I spend four hours a day at least – and it is commonly 
more than that – sauntering through the woods and over the hills and fields absolutely free from all worldly 
engagements” (1862: Part 1, section 6).  
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should not surprise those who have eschewed an absolute dichotomy between 
mind and body.  “Now [though] it is accepted that Descartes was wrong on two 
fronts – the mind is not separate from the body, and consciousness and the mind 
are not the same thing” (Wilson 2002: 45).  The physical side of doing philosophy 
manifests itself in a variety of ways, from smaller habits such as scratching one’s 
head, biting one’s nails, drumming one’s fingers, twirling a pencil continuously, 
or stroking one’s facial hair, to larger movements, like pacing, going for walks, or 
twitching one’s leg.  Even the ability to sit for a long time staring at a computer 
screen or reading a book is a learned skill drilled into the body. 
Like soccer, philosophy also demands the context of a social body.  The 
social nature of philosophy becomes evident in the reality that good thinkers are 
made and educated, not born.  This is why good teachers beget other good 
philosophers, as is the case with Socrates-Plato-Aristotle-Alexander the Great, or 
Husserl-Heidegger-Gadamer, for to some extent philosophy demands 
apprenticeship.  In this sense, philosophy needs the university to sustain itself, for 
the academic environment provides the social lifeblood upon which philosophy 
survives. Furthermore, philosophers not only thrive in an immediate, tangible 
social context, but they are always already embedded in a social context by dint 
of their field of study and discourse, engaged in dialogue with either a thinker 
long dead, a contemporary, or colleague.  Even those known for their hermitic 
tendencies do not truly cultivate their philosophical habits of thought and practice 
in isolation, but in the interaction with other texts, lectures, or even nature in 
some cases.   
These examples point suggestively to the causal relationship between 
practice and habit.  This insight corresponds to a recent philosophical trend, 
particularly among thinkers on the European continent who has moved away from 
an intellectualist bent and sought to reconfigure the classic issue of the relation 
between mind and body.  According to Charles Taylor, “The crucial difference is 
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that these philosophers set the primary locus of the agent’s understanding in 
practice” (1995: 170).   
 
Habit in Practice 
These three aspects  – sociality, physicality, and repetition, understood 
together as practice – constitute the major components that play into a theory of 
habit formation.  At base, this theory of habit formation works with how the 
individual interacts with the world as a social, embodied being by way of 
practice.  As Smith rightly notes, habit formation largely resembles the process of 
becoming a native (2013: 92-93).  A native takes the right things for granted and 
native habits are those that allow the agent to navigate the local world with ease.  
A native learns first by practice what it is necessary to survive and thrive in a 
certain community, and only subsequently complements this practical know-how 
with the intellectual links.  If this is so, forming the habits of a native concerns 
acculturation, the drawn out procedure of joining a people group.  Thus, to form a 
habit requires the repeated engagement of the body in a socially current action or 
way of being-in-the-world practiced and thereby implicitly accepted by a certain 
social body.  Put differently, I acquire a habit when I, as a body, participate time 
and again in an action, pattern of action, or disposition practiced by others.   
Habits work this way precisely because they match the rhythms and 
oddities of human nature: our bodies work well with repetition, for it is the 
repetition of certain actions that sustain life.  Just as we must eat every day 
throughout the day to sustain our bodies, and just as we must study ad nauseam 
our notes and texts well in advance to prepare for a test, so too does the moral life 
take practice.  We are incarnate beings who know the world primarily through our 
bodies and relate to the world as bodies living and breathing amongst other 
bodies.  As such, we are subject to the influence and prescriptions of other 
humans, particularly those humans who have gathered together as bodies to form 
a social body.  The influence that emanates from such social bodies often passes 
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beneath our rational/conscious awareness by centering on repeatedly engaging the 
body in definitive and distinct motions.  As Bourdieu insightfully notes in his 
Logic of Practice,  
 
One could endlessly enumerate the values given body, made body, by the 
hidden persuasion of an implicit pedagogy which can instill a whole 
cosmology, through injunctions as insignificant as ‘sit up straight’ or 
‘don’t hold your knife in your left hand,’ and inscribe the most 
fundamental principles of the arbitrary content of a culture in seemingly 
innocuous details of bearing or physical and verbal manners, so putting 
them beyond the reach of consciousness and explicit statement (quoted in 
Smith 2013: 96). 
 
This precognitive training is exactly what Aristotle pinpointed as the first and 
most formative stage of moral development.  Commands such as “sit up straight,” 
“shop for lowest prices,” or “eat meat every day” thus function formatively below 
the level of ratiocination while nonetheless profoundly shaping the character of 
modern individuals.  To appreciate Bourdieu’s assessment means to realize that 
the purview of ethics is not restricted to those moments of obvious moral 
dilemmas, or to controversial topics like war.  Ethics concerns the whole of life – 
the ways in which we shop, how we heat our house, how we commute to work, 
and our hobbies – precisely because all these seemingly innocent practices form 
us into the kind of people who take them for granted, the kind of people who 
cannot conceive of a world structured differently where people only bike to work 
or use mass transit systems.  The problem is not that we moderns have habits 
inculcated in us by means of our bodies and social circles; this is part of what it 
means to be human.  Rather, we have latched onto the wrong habits, thereby 
sustaining ourselves unthinkingly by unsustainable practices that have lead us 
past the threshold of global climate change.   
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Given this, it makes sense that totalitarian regimes all across the political 
spectrum resort to mass demonstrations, salutes, and other bodily activities 
designed to inscribe in the public a certain disposition, usually that of submission 
or exclusive unity, as a means of gathering support and legitimating their 
government.  William James noted that the army takes advantage of the logic of 
practice as they seek to fashion “a man completely over again, as to most of the 
possibilities of his conduct” (James 2012: 108).  Though evident in the extremes 
of politics, this phenomenon is by no means restricted to totalitarian regimes.  In 
the US, one way this occurs is through the civic rituals surrounding the flag and 
national anthem. During this rite, the citizen is expected to stand up, face the 
billowing flag, place her right hand over her heart, and either keep quiet in 
obeisance to the national anthem or sing along with gusto.   
This practice is in no place more prevalent than in the public school 
systems, where each day begins with paying homage to the flag by standing and 
reciting what is called the pledge of allegiance. These prescribed and socially 
hegemonic movements that accompany the visceral expression of the nation’s 
song amount to a civic ritual that aims first at the citizen’s heart by way of the 
body.  In a seemingly innocuous move, the meaning-laden ritual of the national 
anthem works to instill certain nationalistic habits of practice and thought by 
utilizing the three aforementioned components of habit formation.  In a telling 
statement, Bourdieu asserts, “The cunning of pedagogic reason lies precisely in 
the fact that it manages to extort what is essential while seeming to demand the 
insignificant” (quoted in Smith 2013: 97).  The goal is not to persuade the citizen 
to support the government but to garner her de facto, implicit approval by 
insidiously scripting the movements of her body.  To use Bourdieu’s terminology, 
“The body politic implants in me a habitus by immersing me in an array of 
tangible movements and routines that effectively ‘deposit’ an orientation within” 
(quoted in Smith 2013: 95).  With regard to environmentally responsible 
behavior, it is evident not only that habit impacts consumption, but also that 
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modern consumption (among other culprits of climate change) breeds habit by 
employing social influence, bodily engagement, and repetition to the benefit of 
the major corporations and industries.    
 
The Genealogy of Ritual 
 Thus far, I have argued that to understand how modern people behave in 
relation to climate change, we must first understand the nature of habit.  The 
conservative power of habit explains why people are resistant to assume 
environmentally responsible behavior, even when that behavior accords with their 
knowledge.  This gap between information, attitudes, and/or values and behavior 
indicates that the problem is one of insufficient moral formation, captured by 
Aristotle’s category of incontinence.  To construe the issue in this way reveals the 
centrality of character to the ethical life; character, in turn, is built on one’s habits.  
As I have argued in this chapter, habits privilege the body, both the social and the 
physical, and operate according to the logic of practice; that is, a habit is formed 
insofar as it is activated physically, socially and repeatedly.   Practices form 
habits.  I should stress that I do not regard this provisional theory of habit 
formation as comprehensive, for I believe the mind can often instigate the 
assumption of certain habits (of thought or practice).  The interpenetration of 
mind and body allows for each to exert mutual influence over the other, although 
the body’s influence is insidiously present, often underestimated by the mind.45  
Instead, this framework has sought to provide an articulation of the most basic 
and necessary factors at play in habit formation.  For though the mind can involve 
itself in the cultivation of habits, it is not entirely necessary, since the body also 
constitutes a repository of knowledge.46  Further, it is likely that any influence the 
mind can exert over habit formation must incorporate corporeal elements.  
                                                
45 Yet, even this linguistic turn (to speak of mutual influence) does not do justice to the holistic reality of human 
existence, in which mind and body exist not as discrete though cooperative and connected entities, but as entirely 
interdependent.  
46 This makes sense given that a habit is pre- or sub-cognitive, but not necessarily non-cognitive.  There is always 
some connection, however tenuous, between one’s cognition and one’s habits.  
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Accordingly, I have not relegated the mind to pure marginality and insignificance, 
but sought to situate it as a faculty of embodied rational animals embedded in a 
social world of practice.  
As hinted at above, a pervasive and powerful form of habit formation is 
ritual.  As will be argued below, ritual is a type of social practice, and is 
accordingly pertinent to the realm of habit.  Nation states, religious bodies, civic 
organizations, and family units alike make use of rituals in their social life.  
However, to understand the potent connection between habit and ritual, it is 
necessary first to answer the most basic question: what is a ritual?  As one scholar 
dryly notes, there is “the widest possible disagreement as to how the word ritual 
should be understood” (Bell 1992: i).  
Before providing a positive account of ritual, I must first attempt to dispel 
a common, yet spurious presumption that threatens to paralyze this project from 
the outset.  Moderns and post-moderns alike tend to view rituals as outdated, 
primitive systems of practice connecting tribal peoples to their supposed deities, 
or as manifestations of superstitions.  From the contemporary vantage point, they 
seem curious relics of a bygone, pre-modern age that allowed primitive people to 
feel more in control of their oft-tumultuous lives threatened by myriad factors.  
Yet, this presumption wrongly assumes that because moderns have ceased 
sacrificing animals or performing other rites similar in form, that ritual activities 
have disappeared altogether.  According to Catholic liturgist Godfried Cardinal 
Danneels,  
 
Ritual is an unavoidably anthropological datum. Every significant human 
reality is surrounded and protected by ritual: birth, marriage, love, death. 
Every transition is adorned and embellished with ritual. Every time we 
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encounter something that transcends the human person we ‘humanize’ it 
with ritual (2003: 20).47 
 
Rituals take diverse forms, sacred or profane, civil or military, national or 
provincial.  Moderns have not escaped rituals; instead, they merely have stopped 
talking about ritualized activities explicitly as rituals per se.  Indeed, many 
modern practices are ritualized in the sense that they are set apart from daily life 
and conscript the participant’s bodies in socially defined practices.  Whether 
recognized or not, Western societies already has default, implicit rituals 
embedded within it.  In the United States, for example, it is common to witness 
ritual-laden events such as the infamous Black Friday of consumer shopping 
mania, the practices surrounding both playing and attending baseball (or other 
sporting) games, marriage practices (even those not on the wedding day, like 
bachelor/bachelorette parties) and holidays (like Halloween).  Unfortunately, 
these society-wide rituals often conscript individuals into certain subconscious 
activities centered on mass consumption, which is, as is well acknowledged, 
environmentally unsustainable.   
Consequently, the issue that education-minded environmentalists must face 
is not so much rediscovering the power of rituals as if it were lost and long 
forgotten, but rather recovering rituals from their unsustainable defaults and 
redeeming them for the purpose of forming environmentally virtuous habits.  To 
put it differently, rituals provide a valuable means of access to practices that have 
the normative power to transform the malformed habits endemic to the West.  
 All this, however, merely begs the former question: what is a ritual?  For 
we can only assess whether rituals still live on and have some sort of social power 
if we have a firm grasp on the definition of ritual. However, this is easier said 
than done, as the history of ritual studies evidences.  Since its nascence, ritual 
                                                
47 Though Danneels exaggerates the universality of ritual by assuming that ritual always corresponds to distinct 
existential moments, the sentiment elicited in the quote gets at the deeper point that ritual is not a dead, pre-modern 
phenomena, but a living, life-giving diverse practice common to people across nations and cultures.  
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scholarship has defined ritual in various ways.  Emile Durkheim understood ritual 
to be the practical manifestation of religion because it functions to set apart the 
sacred from the profane (Bell 2009: 24).  To Durkheim and his followers, ritual 
manifests the psychological projections of individuals and their religious beliefs 
about God or gods.  Functionalists like Arnold van Gennep cared less about the 
psychological origins of ritual and concerned themselves more with the social 
function(s) that ritual plays.  The functionalist framework has yielded varying 
interpretations of the roles and purposes of ritual, the most prominent of which 
takes ritual to create group unity and exercise social control.  Another significant 
approach to ritual studies is based on the belief that ritual possesses a 
communicative function.  Concerned with ritual as a quasi-linguistic 
phenomenon, these scholars view ritual as performance, a means of symbolic 
action whereby that which is enacted expresses the interior beliefs of the social 
group. In his work The Ritual Process, Victor Turner approvingly quoted Monica 
Wilson who, in her analysis of Nyakusa ritual and symbolism, wrote, “Rituals 
reveal values at their deepest level (…) I see in the study of ritual the key to an 
understanding of the essential constitution of human societies” (Turner 1977: 6).  
Closely aligned with semiology, this clustered association of theoretical models 
sees ritual as a secondary phenomenon, since it articulates in tangible movements 
that which is interior and primary.  Ritual activity is thus a symbolic derivation.  
Culturalists, like Clifford Geertz, take this semiological model as ammunition for 
their argument that ritual is not simply the expression of cosmological beliefs, but 
also the symbolized expression of social tensions (Bell 2009: 66-7).   
This brief foray into the history of ritual studies and the various 
interpretative models does not pretend to be comprehensive.  The purpose, 
instead, is to highlight how all these definitions all bear a tacit methodological 
similarity: from Emile Durkheim to Victor Turner, ritual scholarship has on the 
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whole opted for a deductive method of ritual studies.48  A deductive method of 
ritual studies starts by pinpointing a single trait or function possessed by a certain 
ritual, or group of rituals, that the researcher takes to be paradigmatic.  The 
research then arbitrarily makes this the center for their understanding of ritual in 
general, thereby ensuring that they limit their field of study by constructing 
“ritual” according to their parochial categories.  Thus, “talk about ritual may 
reveal more about the speakers than about the bespoken” (Bell 2009: xi).  
Consequently, the researcher is left with a well-defined phenomenon to study, and 
conveniently dismisses as irrelevant all ritual-like phenomena that do not fit into 
the deduced category.  These theorists “proceed by formulating the universal 
qualities of an autonomous phenomenon. They maintain (…) that there is 
something we can generally call ritual and whenever or wherever it occurs it has 
certain distinctive features” (Bell 1992: 69).  In doing so, they reduce the diverse 
array of ritual expression to that which can be universalized.  Furthermore, these 
models tend to analyze ritual as an object of study in isolation from its cultural 
context, as if it were an inert phenomenon detachable from other social activities.  
This stems from the desire to situate ritual “as a distinct category of behavior” and 
results in “the tendency to cast activity, ritual or otherwise, as an object and thus 
as the completed or ‘dead,’ execution of a system” (Bell 1992: 72).  
Reacting against the deficiencies of this approach which seeks to 
differentiate ritual from all other forms of social practice, some have responded 
by widening the category of ritual to the extent that nearly every human act 
counts as ritual.  These theories usually prefer the ritual-as-communicative model 
and contend that since ritual serves an expressive-linguistic function, it must be a 
part of every aspect of social life.  While this method mitigates some of the 
problems that follow those who seek to demarcate a limited category of ritual, it 
comes at a cost.  As Catherine Bell contends, “it is a short step from the 
                                                
48 This critique and the following exposition of ritual owe much to Catherine Bell, whose work undergirds and informs 
this history of ritual studies.  
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proposition that everything is ritual to the practical reality that nothing is ritual” 
(1992: 73).  With a watered-down concept of ritual, that which makes ritual 
interesting and distinct is lost at sea among even the most mundane of social 
activities.  The study of ritual per se morphs into the gargantuan study of 
everything else.  Moreover, generalizing the scope and application of ritual leads 
to the counter-intuitive conclusion that rule-bound actions like using one’s turning 
signal while driving, walking on the sidewalk, or even using the toilet are rituals.  
While they may have ritual-like qualities, namely regularity and repetition, to 
draw such mundane practices under the category of ritual collapses any theory of 
ritual into trivialities.  Thus, the history of ritual studies begs the question: how 
can we study ritual as distinct phenomena without also jettisoning the social 
context that preserves its meaning? 
 
Ritual and Practice 
A relatively new method of ritual studies has emerged in the past three or 
four decades, a veritable paradigm shift in the field, that sidesteps the 
aforementioned problems by taking ritual to be a form of social practice.  
Indebted to Bourdieu, whose Logic of Practice undertook to understand the 
dynamics and peculiar logic of practice as practice without reducing that logic to 
the more common logic of reason, Catherine Bell articulated this approach in her 
seminal work Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice (1992).  In what follows, I will lay 
out Bell’s framework of a theory of ritual practice that avoids the temptation to 
formulate a comprehensive and detailed definition of ritual and instead 
inductively analyzes the many ways by which ritual, a social practice among 
other social practices, distinguishes itself from other social practices.  Bell’s 
method studies how and why certain activities attain the status of ritual, which is 
to investigate the means by which a ritual practice maintains a “privileged 
distinction” between itself and other social practices (1992: 90). She assumes that 
ritual is a distinct social behavior and goes on to study it as a strategic activity 
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since it somehow makes itself different from common modes of activity. 
Accordingly, rituals do not so much correspond to already established, discrete 
categories of sacred and profane as Durkheim asserted; rather, they construct that 
which is sacred and that which is profane in the very act of ritualization.  
Because of this tack, Bell prefers to speak of “ritualization” over the 
elusive category of “ritual,” for to use the term ritualization implies a study of 
ritual as an activity, the act of making something ritual.  This model disallows one 
universally common characteristic or feature of acting ritually and proceeds to 
examine ritual as a practice, that is “what people do and how they do it; it 
involves less preliminary commitment to some overarching notion of ritual in 
general’ (Bell 2009: 82).  This frees the scholar to consider ritual as a socially 
potent activity whereby authority, responsibility, beliefs, even the 
individual/social group are not so much symbolized, enacted or expressed (such a 
performative-symbolic understanding strips ritual of any primary efficacy and 
effectively reduces activity to a subsidiary of thought) but constructed and 
reinforced in the very rhythms and practiced movements of the ritualized activity.  
To understand ritual as social practice, Bell undertakes to draw together 
those strategies frequently and commonly put into practice by ritual agents to 
generate a distinction between ritual and other activity.  By necessity, this must be 
a limited depiction of ritualization, for it eschews any notion of intrinsic features 
of ritual and attempts to honor the fact that strategic ritualization finds its 
meaning only when bound in a specific cultural context within which it 
distinguishes itself from other common activities (Bell 1992: 93).  For example, 
though repetition is often thought to be a universal characteristic of ritual, there 
are rituals that delineate themselves from other practices not by repetition, but by 
infrequency.  The Jewish celebration of Passover, which commemorates salvation 
from slavery in Egypt, takes place only once a year and this infrequency serves to 
highlight the specialness of the occasion.  Lack of constant repetition does not 
necessarily detract from significance, and can sometimes heighten it.  Traits like 
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repetition or fixity, therefore, are not necessary to act ritually, though many 
people groups across time and space frequently utilize such traits as strategies of 
ritualization. 
 
Ritual, Bodies, and Blindness 
How, then, do people commonly distinguish ritual action from other 
action?  Bell identifies the active involvement of the body as a main and oft used 
strategy of ritualization (Bell 2009: 81).  The body is central to ritual precisely 
because ritual is generally an activity that entails a form of spatial and/or temporal 
movement.  Rituals do not so much provide an arena for theoretical engagement 
or intellectual discussion as they primarily concern ritualized bodies moving 
about in ritualized space.  As James Smith puts it, “ritual is the way we (learn to) 
believe with our bodies” (2013: 92).  Thus, acting ritually “is a particularly mute 
form of activity. It is designed to do what it does without bringing what it is doing 
across the threshold of discourse or systematic thinking” (Bell 1992: 93).  
Circularity characterizes the dynamics of ritual.  The particular way in 
which bodies learn by ritual constitutes an interiorization of the value-laden 
dynamics and motions at play in the ritual.  Yet, though ritual actors experience 
these dynamics as something other and outside of themselves, they do not 
recognize that their participation in the ritual helps construct the dynamics at 
work in the ritual.  Through their movements, ritual actors shape the very ritual 
environment that in turn shapes them (Bell 1992: 98).  Ritual thus can alter one’s 
understanding of reality by conscripting one’s body to participate in the ritualized 
construction of that ritualized reality.  As Bell says, ritual practice instills a native 
“sense of the ritual” that comes “to be embedded in the very perceptions and 
dispositions of the body and hence are known only in practice as the way things 
are done” (1992: 107).  Bell’s “sense of ritual” (also called ritual mastery) is an 
embodied knowing, an understanding that can bypass the awareness of the 
rational mind.  This is the same kind of knowledge – what Merleau-Ponty 
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described as “knowledge in the hands” – that inheres in habit (quoted in Smith 
2013: 58).49  Ritual process creates ritual bodies – a combination of the physical 
and social body – that produce ritual-like practices precisely because a “sense of 
the ritual” seeps deep into one’s dispositions and permeates all other areas of life 
(Bell 1992: 98).  
Given its circularity, ritual, it seems, operates best in a certain type of 
secrecy.  Bell calls this the “intrinsic ‘blindness’ of practice (…) a strategic 
‘misrecognition’ of the relationship of one’s ends and means” (1992: 108).  
Foucault’s dictum captures well the misrecognition inherent in ritual practice: 
“People know what they do; they frequently know why they do what they do; but 
what they don’t know is what what they do does” (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982: 
187).  In other words, ritual is a practice that does not acknowledge the fact that 
what it is doing is a practice; ritual smuggles itself (as a practice) in under the 
guise of normality.  Accordingly, ritual conceals itself as a practice by means of 
practice and in doing so “manages to extort what is essential while seeming to 
demand the insignificant” (quoted in Smith 2013: 97).  Ironically, to call attention 
to ritual as a practice undercuts its normativity, because the ritual and the habits 
inculcated cease to be seen as natural, and are instead acknowledged as 
contingent.  If ritual is to function well – that is, to shape ritual bodies – it must 
involve a misrecognition of the dynamics at play, an assumption of the ritually 
created world as reality.  “Some type of ambiguity or blindness in ritualization is 
linked to its distinctive efficacy” (Bell 1992: 109).  Ritual and practice, then, are 
not simply indistinguishable; rather, ritual is a type of practice that does not 
openly purport to be a practice, and instead operates in ritualized world that 
reconfigures reality.  It is a social practice of a privileged kind, one whose 
normativity is realized because its reality is normalized.    
                                                
49 In another place, Bell calls ritual mastery “a strategic form of socialization” (1992: 98), which harkens back to 
Bourdieu’s understanding of habit formation as a matter of incorporation and assimilation into a social body.  
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The structured environment of ritual is characterized by liminality; it is a 
time out of time and a space differentiated from other spaces.  Victor Turner 
defines a liminal space as a “threshold realm of otherness,” “betwixt and between 
the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and ceremonial” 
(1977: 95).  This inherent inbetween-ness of ritual practice allows for the 
germination of new possibilities and fertile connections that would have been 
otherwise stifled.  Ritual provides a unique space that temporarily displaces 
“normal life” and offers an alternative conception of reality as realized in 
practice.  Because it constructs a liminal space, participants have the opportunity 
to learn new habits in a ritual without having to vie with the cumbersome weight 
of former habits that constrain “normal life.”  Within its liminality, ritualization 
extols its own virtues while simultaneously relativizing the virtues and norms 
typical of the world outside the ritual.  
Accordingly, ritualization is teleologically aimed at the production of a 
ritual body; it accomplishes this through bodily practice in a socially defined 
liminal space, all the while veiling the contingency of its practice so that it comes 
to assume the normative status of reality.  Ritual purposes to create a ritualized 
agent, “an actor with a form of ritual mastery, who embodies flexible sets of 
cultural schemes and can deploy them effectively in multiple situations so as to 
restructure those situations in practical ways” (Bell 2009: 81).  Theories of ritual 
that emphasize their symbolic-communicative function miss out on this 
fundamental potency of ritual, for they can only conceive of ritual as a means of 
expression, rather than as an actual means of production.  For example, the ritual 
practice of kneeling does not so much express an interior attitude of submission 
as it does create a kneeling agent, one used to submission (Bell 1992: 100).  The 
force of ritual is not so much communicative as it is generative; “it primarily acts 
to restructure bodies in the very doing of the acts themselves” (Bell 1992: 100).  
Accordingly, ritual practice does not limit its concern to the realm of values or 
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knowledge, but holistically envelops such concerns in its ultimate telos of the 
creation of a new person (Bell 1992: 110).  
 
Ritual Power  
Implicit in this discussion of what ritual does and how it does what it does 
is the underlying dynamic of power.  Ritual displays its power in the production 
of ritual agents, especially in their assumption of the ritual’s configuration of 
reality, but there is ample theoretical disagreement as to how ritual power 
functions.  Some theories interpret the power of ritual to be a brute, heavy-handed 
means of social control, a conservative agent that preserves the status quo; other 
scholars, primarily those of the symbolic-communicative persuasion, confer to 
ritual the power to instill knowledge or an ideology in participants, which looks 
eerily like brainwashing.  While it is clear that ritual and power are inevitably 
connected, the nature of that connection is under question.  As mentioned earlier, 
ritual as practice operates below the conscious level of ratiocination.  
Accordingly, since the nexus of ritual power lies in the conscription of bodies, it 
cannot be concerned with communicating specific messages or instilling 
knowledge.  That would be too simplistic an understanding of practice, for it falls 
into the intellectualist trap of reducing the function of ritual to the derived 
expression of a more primary reality.   
Instead, as a distinct type of social practice, ritual exercises a flexible and 
instable form of power since it aims at the human heart by way of the body rather 
than by way of the mind.  Because ritual conscripts the body, it only demands the 
actor’s “external consent,” (the doing of certain actions) which leaves ample 
space for individual freedom (Bell 1992: 221).  Ritual participants who fulfill the 
minimum requirement of bodily assent do not have their mental processes 
dominated by some ritual hegemony; instead, they are free within certain bounds 
to form their own interpretations of the meaning implicit in ritual acts.  Thus, 
rituals do not require the preexistence of a dogmatic (mental) consensus to exert 
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their authority, nor do they explicitly result in a system of shared beliefs (Bell 
1992: 186-187).  Institutional bodies like the Roman Catholic Church have 
historically recognized the inherent instability of rituals, which is why they 
combine ritual participation with catechism, i.e. discursive teaching about the 
symbols used and their proper meaning.50  The explicit instruction given in 
catechesis ensures that Christians are not left to themselves to interpret church 
practices, and instead they learn the traditional meaning and significance of 
certain rituals.  The practices themselves do not have this power, so to guarantee 
agreement about their meaning Christianity has combined them with catechesis.  
Rituals inevitably incorporate “a fair degree of internal resistance” for the 
movements enacted do not so much convey a clear message as they do subtly 
form a disposition that privileges a certain sense of reality (Bell 1992: 221).  The 
use of power, therefore, is diffuse, limited, and dialectic, for it both empowers 
ritual actors to constitute the world in certain ways and simultaneously allows for 
a variety of interior responses to the practice – what Bell calls “negotiated 
involvement.”  To take another example from the Roman Catholic Church, 
though Catholics across the world honor the ecclesial leadership of the pope, 
many take issue with the papal stance on contraception.  They do not, however, 
view their subversion of the papal doctrine to be in any way anti- or un-Catholic.  
“Catholicism is a consent to papal power and a resistance to it at the same time” 
(Bell 1992: 214).  Their ability to resist on such matters is not an exception to the 
otherwise coercive power of Catholic rituals; it is rather a corollary of the flexible 
nature of ritual authority, a testament to the peculiar way ritual both restrains and 
liberates.  
Though one cannot participate in a ritual and escape without a singe so to 
speak, the power exerted does not primarily belong to the level of discursive 
knowledge and first and foremost imparts an embedded knowledge, what Bell has 
called a “sense of the ritual” that endures even when removed from the ritual 
                                                
50 This insight will be important for the discussion of the Christian Eucharist in the following chapter. 
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environment.  In other words, rituals “enable the person to deploy schemes that 
can manipulate the social order on some level and appropriate its categories for a 
semicoherent vision of personal identity and action” (Bell 1992: 216).  This does 
not resemble a top-down process of information, whereby the ritual actors receive 
new discursive knowledge; instead, it resembles a nuanced process of formation, 
the molding of a person with new eyes to envision the world and its possibilities.  
In slightly different terms, rituals inculcate an inarticulate habitual comportment 
to the world that is effected through bodies enmeshed in a social constructed 
ritual space and subsequently carried beyond the corridors of ritual practice into 
other social situations.  Rituals implicate the individual in a social body with its 
constitutive practices.  This process works as a type of pedagogy or training, 
which concentrates first on the body and indirectly influences one’s conscious 
mental processes.51  The result, as mentioned above, is a ritual body, a person 
equipped with the habits inherent in the practice, one whose vision of reality, 
possibility, and normality is no longer confined by the arbitrary constructions of 
society at large.  
 
A Recapitulation 
I have now articulated the connection between habit and ritual, thanks to 
the interpretive lens of Smith (through whom we became acquainted with 
Merleau-Ponty and Bourdieu) and the insights of Bell.  Ritual turns out to be a 
visceral and atypical social practice that cultivates habits by exercising the body 
to achieve what Bell calls a “sense of the ritual,” that pre-cognitive know-how 
predisposed to see the world according to the dynamic logic of the ritual (Bell 
1992: 98-107).  Because it operates according to the logic of practice, ritual 
functions as a breeding ground for habits. 
                                                
51 Like Bourdieu, Bell’s framework of ritual practice takes into account that “practice can give rise to thoughts, 
cognitive categories, and modes of perception” (1992: 217). 
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With this in mind, we are better equipped to understand not only the nature 
of the task to communicate sustainability properly but also the essence of the 
problem inherent in sustainable change efforts.  The social practices inherent in 
modern life, like those surrounding food consumption, transportation, and 
domestic heating/cooling, have hijacked the modern self by co-opting the body 
into habits that perpetuate climate change.  Since the life of the mind depends in 
large part on the life of the body, the incorporation of the physical body into the 
unsustainable social body paradigmatic of modernity further works to constrain 
our intellectual ability to respond constructively.  As Bell, drawing on Bourdieu, 
wisely reminds us, “one might retain one’s limited and negotiated involvement in 
the activities of the ritual, but bowing or singing in unison imperceptibly schools 
the social body in the pleasures of and schemes for acting in accordance with 
assumptions that remain far from conscious or articulate” (1992: 215).  Our 
bodies have been so thoroughly trained in practice that even environmentally 
beneficial information does little good to ameliorate our behavior.  Our 
incontinence is inscribed deep within, beneath the purview of the mind by 
practice.  Bourdieu rightly notes, “What is ‘learned by the body’ is not something 
that one has, like knowledge that can be brandished, but something that one is” 
(quoted in Smith 2013: 98).  We have not worked our way towards climate 
change by knowledge (or the lack thereof) so much as we have got there by 
practice.   
The remedy, I propose, must likewise utilize the dynamics of practice, 
though it must be of a privileged kind – ritual – if it is to have a chance to 
overcome the insidious practices that have already taken hold.  As Bell has 
argued, ritualized activity is a complex social practice that centers on bodies and 
trains them to understand the world according to the liminal environment 
constructed in its activity.  Ritual practices under the guise of normality, 
projecting its constructed environment as reality “through a series of physical 
movements (…), thereby producing an arena which, by its molding of the actors, 
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both validates and extends the schemes they are internalizing” (Bell 1992: 109-
110).  In short, by habituating the body ritual shapes character.    
 
Going Forward: Invention vs. Study  
Up until this point, I have purposefully deferred addressing a question that 
readers may find poised on the tip of their tongues.  That insistent query asks: 
“okay, so what do you suggest? Which practical solutions can you offer, i.e. what 
rituals should be put into practice?”  Even if they are convinced by my 
overarching argument – 1) to effect sustainable change is principally a problem of 
incontinent habits and malformed character, 2) habits are formed in practice and, 
3) ritual practice constitutes a particularly normative tonic for unsustainable 
malformation – they may still hold serious reservations.  Another important 
question from a slightly different angle asks, “what are the environment virtues?” 
for it is no use to speak of habits without any notion of the ultimate telos to which 
they are meant to contribute. Even those sympathetic to my construal of the 
communication of sustainability and the anthropology laid out above (which 
involves epistemological claims about the formation of understanding in practice) 
may still retain a certain skepticism regarding the practical outcomes of this thesis 
precisely because it is not a quick and easy fix.  To recommend a daily dose of 
ritual practice to combat climate change does not easily lend itself to ready made 
solutions, and the urgency of climate change seems to demand a “magic bullet.”  
Nor does this thesis seem amenable to universalization; advocates of 
sustainability tend to desire a solution that can be communicated to all people 
everywhere, regardless of their particularities.  Yet, a method of ritualizing the 
communication of sustainability must by necessity be localized and tailored to the 
cultural context of its “audience.” Accordingly, it is difficult to imagine what this 
thesis would entail since it requires doing the creative work of reimagining social 
practice, building community (more on this to come), and thinking ritually, which 
is more artistic than discursive.   
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I do not want to dismiss as offhand this pragmatic question since it is 
obviously merited.  The next logical step in this discussion is to translate this 
theory about practice into tangible practice, or at least into pragmatic suggestions 
about practice.  The inclination, therefore, is to begin to recommend ritual 
practice x or y or z, as if from the standpoint of an unengaged theoretician I know 
what specific practices are needed.  However, I must avail myself of one proviso, 
for, in a certain sense, my skills and interests have led me to concentrate on 
summoning the proper theoretical support to provide a new lens through which 
we can more appropriately tackle sustainable change.  Accordingly, I have 
conceived of my task to be the writing of a prolegomena, the necessary foreword 
that sets the stage for the more interesting developments to come.  I add this 
qualification precisely because I believe that ritual is the natural outpouring of a 
community that shares certain assumptions about the good life, a polis.  One can 
no more prescribe a certain ritual to a social group than one can change the 
public’s mind by spewing facts all over them.  Ritualization is not the work of an 
individual, largely because the individual is a foreign entity to the ritual process.  
Rather, ritual addresses, incorporates, and in a certain sense gives definition to a 
social body and it is precisely its social quality that makes ritual so compelling 
and liminal.  Thus, the pragmatic question posed above constitutes an unrealistic 
temptation, the expectation that with a prescribed ritual, environmental advocates 
could fashion a community out of thin air and transform them according to the 
logic of the ritual.  Yet, “Ritualization cannot turn a group of individuals into a 
community if they have no other relationships or interests in common, nor can it 
turn the exercise of pure physical compulsion into participatory communality” 
(Bell 1992: 222).  
What the pragmatic question fails to take into account is that there are 
communities and groups of people who already make good use of the logic of 
practice, even to combat climate change.  The insights of esoteric French 
philosophers are not so arcane as to be used in only a few “enlightened” circles.  
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Rather, what thinkers like Merleau-Ponty and Aristotle have attempted to do is 
encapsulate the nuances and dynamics of lived experience.  Their framework is 
only insightful insofar as it names the wisdom inherent in social life.   
To recognize this is to find that the pragmatic question demanded above 
has been slightly altered.  Rather than muster up a foolhardy attempt to formulate 
new rituals, the way to proceed constructively is to look at varying social bodies 
around the world that resist the insidious mindset of modernity (with all its forces 
that perpetuate climate change) and inquire into what ritual practices sustain their 
nonconformist habits of thought and action.  Take, for example, the proliferation 
of “hippy” social/environmental activists who were known in 1960’s America for 
practices like chaining themselves to atomic weapons, trees, or river areas as a 
ritualized mode of resistance.  Such practices brought people together and 
galvanized the movement by creating pockets of ritualized space where new 
habits of life could be envisioned and formed.  
Thus, I am much more interested in pinpointing the ritualization practices 
already utilized to good effect than in improvising my own answer to the 
pragmatist’s question.  Further, my preferred method of response would provide 
environmental advocates with a firm footing by pointing out certain ritual 
practices which people already participate and making clear to the ritual actors 
involved that their practices have direct implications for their posture towards the 
environment.  Accordingly, the task of the next chapter is to identify a 
subculture/community rooted in ritual practice, analyze the habits formed therein, 
and show how those habits can and do constitute a response to the challenge 
posed by climate change and the habits implicated therein.  Specifically, I will 
study the Christian ritual of Eucharistic practice.  The ritualization strategies 
implicit in this practice will be offered as a case study.  They will provide an 
example of the possibilities open to the environmental movement that can pique 
the imagination and hint at further creative community practices with the power 
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to produce “ritualized agents, persons who have an instructive knowledge of these 
schemes embedded in their bodies, in their sense of reality” (Bell 1992: 221).   
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Christian Rituals in a Green Age: Communicating Eucharist52 
 
“We cannot love God unless we love each other, and to love we must know each 
other. We know Him in the breaking of bread, and we know each other in the 
breaking of bread, and we are not alone any more.” 
Dorothy Day (1981: 285) 
 
“Everything in our lives that takes place at the Lord’s Table can, if we will, 
inform and shape our lives as we return to our kitchen tables.” 
Eugene Peterson (1999: 222) 
 
Christian Environmentalism? 
 The previous chapters have made a sustained case for the centrality of 
habit to the moral life, particularly with regard to (un)sustainable behavior, as 
well as for an understanding of habit formation as practice – social, bodily, and 
repetitious – that leads naturally to a study of ritual as a particular type of 
practice.  The basis for this contention is the acknowledged fact that more 
information does not (and has not) led noticeably to behavioral change.  Using an 
Aristotelian lens, I have noted that the force keeping Western society stuck in its 
unsustainable ways is the conservative power of habit, which basically constitutes 
an embedded knowledge, a bodily know-how not necessarily or always tied to 
cognition yet thoroughly active and formative.  I have claimed that any method in 
the communication of sustainability that seeks to be effective in meeting its goals 
must move past the preliminary discussion of information transference and 
concentrate its efforts on character formation by encouraging and instituting 
                                                
52 When used in a Christian context, “communicate” means to partake of the Eucharist, which is the ritualized 
consumption of the sacred elements of bread and wine.  I find it striking that Christians employ such a term to speak 
of ingesting the body and blood of Jesus (the consecrated bread and wine), while it also finds use in the context of the 
communication of sustainability.  I hope to show below why the Eucharist is a fitting subject of inquiry for the 
communication of sustainability.  Etymologically, to communicate is to make something common, to share something 
between the various parties involved, and this is precisely what the Eucharist (also known as Holy Communion) does.   
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different practices (of consumption, transportation, heating/cooling, etc.) that 
have the power to instill a more sustainable “knowledge in the hands.”  Formative 
practices frequently appear in the form of ritual, an activity that distinguishes 
itself from other social activities by its “blind” incorporation of bodies.  In other 
words, ritual does what it does without acknowledging how it does what it does.  
It is a practice whose normativity lies in the misrecognition of itself as practice.  
Ritual does not purport to be a practice; in fact, it does not purport to be anything 
but reality, the true state of the world.  In doing so, it functions to instill in 
participants a ritualized way of seeing and knowing the world.  Rather than 
proposing original, universal rituals designed specifically to ameliorate the 
environmental behavior of the Western world, I have instead set my task to be an 
environmental analysis of a pre-existing social body whose set ritualized actions 
offer a case study that can elucidate not only how rituals operate as powerful 
spheres of habit formation, but also how certain extant rituals presuppose certain 
environmental virtues and can therefore be understood as vehicles of sustainable 
change.53  The social body I proposed is the Christian church, with regard to the 
ritualized practice of the Eucharist.54  
At first glance, it may seem odd to some and possibly downright naïve or 
archaic to others to mention Christianity in the same breath as environmentalism, 
much less to propose its ritualized actions as a case study for a practical, 
embodied communication of sustainability.  Being thoroughly modern, many 
environmentalists have inherited modernity’s distrust of, even antipathy to, 
                                                
53 We must also come to terms with the fact that a communication (the making common) of sustainability based on 
practice cannot achieve instant success; the problem of habits requires a long-term, patient approach.  
54 I am not interested in tackling the question, “to which Christian church are you referring?”  For although 
Christianity is a partitioned religion consisting of many different creeds, confessions, denominations, and 
interpretations, the Eucharist is a ritual practiced by the majority of Christians across space and time.  This is not to 
say that the doctrinal and practical differences between churches are negligible, or that differences in Eucharistic 
practice do not exist, only that my reflections on the Eucharist and the environment are meant to be ecumenical and 
can theoretically be accessed by all Christians.  Of course, my own vision and interpretations of Christian practice is 
profoundly influenced by my own history growing up in the Free Methodist church, a denomination of Wesleyan 
descent.  John Wesley was an 18th century theologian and preacher in the Anglican tradition, which split off from the 
Roman Catholic Church, which resulted from the painful division in 1054 that separated it from the Orthodox Church.  
However, one’s own inevitable biases should never negate any attempt at contribution; they should rather induce a 
state of self-awareness and humility.  
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religion and anything else that does not conform to its understanding of 
rationality.  Christianity has often borne the brunt of environmental critiques, 
allegedly for being complicit in the worldview and practices that have led to and 
perpetuated adverse climate change.  Many credit Lynn White Jr., a 20th century 
American historian, with having established an airtight causal connection between 
Christian theology and climate change.  In a brief but scathing paper entitled “The 
Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis,” White lays out his argument that the 
Christian view of humankind in relation to nature, characterized by a divinely 
mandated relation of tyrannical dominion, has provided humans with the 
justification for wanton environmental abuse and objectification.  According to 
White, “Christianity, in absolute contrast to ancient paganism and Asia’s religions 
(except, perhaps, Zoroastrianism), not only established a dualism of man and 
nature but also insisted that it is God’s will that man exploit nature for his proper 
ends” (1967: 1205).  He asserts that because it presupposes an unflinching 
anthropocentrism, Christianity has stripped the physical world of spiritual 
significance, which has in turn opened the door for environmental 
commoditization and exploitation.  Thus, White views the problem of climate 
change as essentially a matter of religious beliefs that have given birth to certain 
destructive practices (1967: 1207).  Concerning the confluence of Christian 
theology and environmentalism, White’s legacy is monumental, as evidenced not 
only by the many convinced by his argumentation, but also by the sheer number 
of those not in agreement who have tacitly acknowledged the strength of his 
thesis through their varied attempts to refute it.  The spate of recent Christian 
books seeking to support theological concern for the environment can be seen in 
part as a rebuttal and response to White’s contentious thesis.  
 I am not convinced by White’s argument.  Instead, I find it a worthwhile 
critique of Christian theology gone wrong; in other words, it applies not so much 
to Christianity as it should be if it is to be faithful to itself and its Scriptures, but 
to a Christianity that has been co-opted by the insidious powers and ideologies of 
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the world.55  The latter kind of Christianity, the kind that has compromised its 
essence to make itself more palatable to its contemporaries, is pervasive; this 
Constantinian Christianity has traded in its faith for so-called relevance, bartered 
its God for capitalism and a few quick bucks, and generally lost its bearings as 
soon as it assumed any positions of governmental power.56  A Christian can act in 
many capacities, not all of them Christian, and not all Christian theology deserves 
the name.  Suffice to say, the ecological critiques of Christianity from individuals 
like Lynn White Jr. may well apply to Christianity as it has historically taken 
shape and been practiced; it is quite another thing though to stipulate that such a 
critique applies to its essence, the theological framework of Christianity.  The 
former critiques the historical form of Christianity, whereas the latter critiques its 
theological form. To put it differently, there is a critical distinction between 
Christianity as it is or has been and Christianity as it should and can be.  The 
Latin phrase “abusus non tollit usum” (the abuse of a thing does not bar its use) 
succinctly captures this distinction.  I am not implying that Christians have never 
succeeded in living out their ideals (for its history has witnessed scattered pockets 
of good and faithful servants of Christ), but to be epistemologically honest 
requires the recognition of repeated failure and detrimental compromise on the 
                                                
55 In the discipline of Christian theology, “world” refers to that part of creation that has chosen to live in rebellion 
against God.  It does not refer to the environment, the flora and fauna, or everything in the world, for the world in 
itself is not bad. Rather, it refers to those individuals, powers, and structures that do not recognize God’s kingship and 
do not follow the way of life as revealed in Christ Jesus.  Thus, “world” is often contrasted with “church.”  By church, 
I mean a storied group of people who form their lives around the gospel (good news) of Jesus Christ.  Church names 
the people who gather together “by reason of no affinity other than their common affinity to Christ” (Cavanaugh 2011: 
218).  Church of course is not a pure, static organization of people; it is inevitably mixed with the world and in 
constant flux between the dynamics of salvation and sin.  It may be more useful therefore to speak of church as a 
social body that is continually remade by the act of gathering and their ritualized life together.  In Christian terms, this 
is the liturgy, for liturgy literally means the work of the people, the actions “by which a group of people become 
something corporately which they had not been as a mere collection of individuals” (Cavanaugh 2011: 217, quoting 
Alexander Schmemann). The church is always the church becoming the church in its work together, an “enacted 
drama” of dynamic and repeated liturgical formation (Cavanaugh 2011: 220).  
56 To call this kind of Christianity “Constantinian” follows the work of Mennonite theologian John Howard Yoder and 
refers back to the 3rd and 4th centuries CE, when Christianity experienced a tumultuous shift in its identity following 
the baptism of Emperor Constantine. At the point of this Constantinian compromise, Christianity suddenly became 
tied to the Roman state and it became possible to assume that one’s Christian faith was commensurate with one’s 
Roman citizenship. Before this point, Christianity was a persecuted religion because its virtues, practices, and faith did 
not align with the virtues, practices, and civil religion of the empire.  Pre-Constantine, a Christian lived a precarious 
existence as a resident foreigner, one whose religious allegiances conflicted with and trumped the demands of Roman 
citizenship. Accordingly, Constantine is emblematic of the problematic shifts that occurred when Christianity became 
an imperial religion, and thus had to adapt itself to the demands of empire.  
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part of the church.  It is no great feat to take Christians to task for failing to live 
up to their own standards; indeed, one could produce a litany of events and 
actions perpetrated by Christians in a very un-Christian like way.  But this is 
precisely my point: we must ask in each and every case whether Christian agents 
are acting as Christians, that is to say Christianly, or whether they are acting out 
of some alternate, compromised capacity, say as a capitalist, nationalist, or 
warmonger.   
Because the history of Christianity is the history of certain (fallible) 
humans called Christians enmeshed in the machinations and turmoil of the world, 
it takes a theological endeavor to discern whether the actions of Christians reflect 
their commitment to Christ Jesus, or whether they pervert and tarnish that 
commitment.  To give a classic example, Christian agents perpetrated the Spanish 
Inquisition and the Crusades; but, I would contend, the violence and 
discrimination therein do not do justice to the Christian gospel.  The Crusades are 
not in any theological sense Christian, though they are historically Christian.  This 
does not absolve Christianity of guilt; rather it calls for humble recognition of 
past wrongs and repentance for the ways in which the church has not embodied 
the ethic of Jesus.  In a similar manner, to recognize that Christianity has aided 
and abetted the kind of practices and mindsets that have brought about climate 
change does not necessitate abandoning the faith; rather it requires Christians to 
inspect honestly and rigorously the ways in which they have been a force for evil 
rather than good, and seek to realign themselves with their Christian identity and 
the God they serve.  
However, to give a comprehensive defense of Christianity contra those 
who blame it for the myriad environmental problems of today’s world is beyond 
the scope of this project; others have taken it on with great success.57  This would 
require much more than the admission that Christians have erred substantially and 
                                                
57 See Steven Bouma-Prediger’s For the Beauty of the Earth: A Christian Vision for Creation Care (2001) for one 
such attempt.  
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would force us into a prolonged discussion regarding the specific nature of certain 
Christian doctrines.  Instead, I would like to call attention to an interesting 
assumption White (among others) makes, namely that Christianity is first and 
foremost a set of beliefs and that the ecological crisis is therefore a problem of 
religious beliefs.  This formulation looks eerily similar to the diagnosis given by 
the intellectualist model for the communication of sustainability; both assume that 
head knowledge is all-powerful and that human activity is a top-down, mental 
affair.  Yet, if there has been a single overriding claim in this thesis, it is that this 
model of behavior (and philosophical anthropology) has significant shortcomings.  
The problem of unsustainable habits (embodied knowledge) demands an 
embodied response; without the requisite habits that give cognition the footing 
and traction it needs to be effective, more knowledge does little good in the moral 
life.  Thus, I have identified rituals as a particularly potent means of habit 
formation by practice.  In this way, White is mistaken not only in his assumptions 
concerning the nature of Christian theology – a claim I shall not attempt to 
support here but maintain nonetheless – but also in his proposed solution (better 
and/or different kinds of beliefs about humankind and nature) since he 
misunderstands the relation between knowledge and action and reduces it to a 
simple unidirectional conduit from belief to behavior.   
If Christianity consists solely, or even just primarily, in a set of beliefs, a 
creedal exercise that addresses the human by way of cognition, then it surely 
cannot help remedy the ecological crisis, for it is a crisis of character and habits, 
not primarily a problem of principles and convictions.  Yet, what is notable for 
any who have attended a Christian church for a worship service, the epicenter of 
Christian life, is that they are not most obviously characterized by a concentration 
on head knowledge and information conveyance, but rather by certain social 
practices, like singing, kneeling, greeting, dancing, baptism, Scripture reading, 
prayer, and the Eucharist.  Christian worship is an embodied, practical affair 
replete with rituals.  Christian worship does typically involve certain components 
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that cater more to the mind than the body, such as preaching.  However, the 
information passed on does not stand alone but is couched in certain practices, 
like standing together to hear the gospel read or to recite a creed aloud in the 
company of believers.  The very existence of church, a group of people gathered 
together for the sole purpose of worship, is itself a profound social practice.  
Though Christianity has a rich theological and philosophical tradition and a 
wealth of intellectual resources, it is also more than that.  Right belief (orthodoxy) 
only encompasses a part of Christianity, for it is itself intertwined with and 
dependent on right practice (orthopraxy).   
Yet, it is nowadays quite popular to assert that the church is superfluous to 
the Christian life.  Slogans like “I love Christ, but not the church” seem to 
resonate with the general ethos among young adults who seek to separate 
themselves from the perceived backwardness and sinfulness of churches and 
tradition.  Even aside from the abuses that have wracked church history, many 
simply think of the church as a place where individual Christians come together 
with other individuals who already believe more or less the same things.  In this 
rendering, church is reduced to a social hour, a self-congratulatory support group, 
or a meeting place with strange, almost cultic practices that have little or no 
bearing on the constituents’ lives as Christians in the world.   
I believe that this reading of church radically misunderstands both the 
nature of church as well the nature of Christian life.  For one, the individualism 
implicit in this account belies its indebtedness to a peculiarly modern manner of 
thought, and, more importantly, it seems to imply that individuals divorced from 
the practices of Christian worship can sustain Christian belief.  This kind of faith 
is a mind-centric phenomenon, one that tragically eschews association with 
Christian tradition and practice.  It assumes that it is enough to believe the right 
things.  Consequently, lacking the character formation embedded in Christian 
practice, these Christians are woefully unequipped to counter the conscripting and 
sinister solicitations of modern life.  In other words, a churchless Christian can 
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end up with all the right beliefs, but will find himself conscripted by the formative 
practices of modern life that will eventually colonize the mind.  “That is, the 
visions of the good life embedded in these practices [of the mall and market] 
become surreptitiously embedded in us through our participation in the rituals and 
rhythms of these institutions.  These quasi-liturgies effect an education of desire, 
a pedagogy of the heart” (Smith 2009: 25).  This critique, however, requires some 
unpacking; to do so, I will go further into the distinct interrelation of practice and 
belief as held by Christian tradition. 
There is an ancient church saying in Latin “lex orandi lex credendi,” which 
roughly means the law/order of prayer is the law/order of belief.  The church 
developed this axiom around the time it began to canonize scripture, that is to 
take the disparate and discrete writings used by churches for the edification of 
their Christian life together and standardize them into a commonly accepted book 
(what we now call the Bible).  In the process, the church had to discern which 
writings (letters, gospels, prophecies) that had currency among the churches of 
the day to include in the canon and which to exclude.  Clearly, this was a question 
of truth and belief: which beliefs were to be the common doctrine of the church 
and which were false?58  The church developed an answer to this question: lex 
orandi lex credendi.  As the church has prayed and practiced in worship, so the 
church believes.  Belief must conform to, or at least not contradict, that which is 
experienced and learned in prayer.  To translate this into terms relevant to this 
discussion, the church affirmed (and still does) that it only knows what it believes 
because of what it practices and who (God) encounters it in those practices.  
Worship is the primary task of the church, and the beliefs the church professes as 
truth can only emanate from that foundation.  The practice of worship, then, 
cannot be dismissed as superfluous to Christianity, or as merely the reflection of 
prior beliefs; practice is the litmus test, the basis by which the church can affirm 
                                                
58 There was another category beside truth and falsity in this ancient discussion over canonization, for the question 
was not just over what was true, but also which truths should the church count as essential to the faith, and which were 
adiaphora.    
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its beliefs.  Essentially, what the church does when it comes together provides the 
starting point, the sustenance and substance for its faith (which is why it is 
difficult to sustain a Christian life as a solitary being).  
 Against Lynn White Jr., we must contest that Christianity is not only, or 
even primarily, a system of belief; it is first and foremost a devotion to God as 
revealed in Jesus Christ that is lived out, i.e. practiced in the church as worship 
and then in the world.  As sketched above, the doxa of Christianity is predicated 
upon its praxis.  This accords with the philosophical anthropology articulated in 
chapter 1: since we humans are bodily beings whose rationality stems out of that 
physicality (animality in Aristotle’s terms), we intend the world with our bodies, 
producing actions which coalesce into practices, followed by theories that try to 
make sense of those embodied experiences.   
However, I am not formally concerned here to vindicate Christianity from 
its cultured (i.e. “green”) despisers; I am no apologist and this would be a paltry 
apologetic.  Karl Barth is known to have said, “the best apologetics is a good 
dogmatics” (Barth 1963: 62).  I am suggesting a somewhat different formulation: 
“the best apologetics is good liturgy.”  Accordingly, I approach Christianity with 
a specific lens to see how its ritual practice can function as a means of 
communicating sustainability.  Accordingly, let us dive into the world of 
Christian ritual, immerse ourselves in the logic of practice, and undertake to 
understand not simply what the practice of the Eucharist means to the church, but 
also what it does in and to the church.  
 
The Eucharist: Origins and Ethics  
 Let us first be clear on what the Eucharist is, what it is not, and what it 
means to approach the Eucharist in the context of environmental communication.  
The term Eucharist comes from the Greek word “eucharistia” (meaning 
thanksgiving) and is one of many names (alongside Holy Communion, the Lord’s 
Supper, the breaking of bread, Mass, etc.) used by Christians to refer to the 
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central ritual of the faith.59  Eugene Peterson, a biblical scholar, calls the 
Eucharist “the definitive action practiced in the Christian community (…) the 
sacramental act that pulls us into actual material participation with Christ.”  
Elsewhere, he terms it the “focal practice” of Christian fellowship (1999: 203).  
The primary ritualized action consists in the congregation-wide consumption of a 
shared loaf of bread (or a variation like cracker or wafer) and a shared cup of 
wine (or a variation like grape juice); these are the Eucharistic elements 
understood to be the body and blood of Jesus Christ, which are consecrated before 
the ritual consumption.  Consecration of the elements usually involves the 
recitation of the institution narrative and words of blessing that serve to remind 
the congregation of the ritual significance.60  The institution narrative tells the 
story, found in varied form in the Synoptic gospels (Matthew, Mark, and Luke) 
and Paul’s first letter to the Corinthian church, in which Jesus first practiced the 
Eucharist “on the night he was betrayed” and instituted the ritual by commanding 
his followers to repeat the actions in remembrance of him.  This weaves the ritual 
into a foreshadowing of Jesus’ imminent crucifixion, death, and resurrection.   
However, the fourth gospel, John, does not contain any explicit institution 
narrative, nor does it make any overt reference to Eucharistic practice.  At the 
same point in his gospel narrative at which the Synoptic gospels describe the 
Eucharistic institution, John has Jesus wash the feet of his disciples.  However, 
some, most forcefully Paul Bradshaw, a liturgical scholar at Notre Dame, claim 
that not all early Christian records of Eucharistic practice, particularly those from 
the Didache, Justin Martyr, Ignatius of Antioch, and Irenaeus of Lyons, connect 
the ritual to a commemoration of Jesus’ sacrificial death.61  In fact, the gospel of 
John does contain a Eucharist of sorts in the miraculous feeding of the 5,000 
                                                
59 The vast majority of Christians across time and space have considered the Eucharist to be a sacrament of the church, 
that is, a ritual in which God is especially present.  There are some, however, who do not recognize the Eucharist as a 
sacrament, preferring instead to label it an ordinance.  To my knowledge, Quakers and those part of the Salvation 
Army are the only Christians who formally reject Eucharistic practice.   
60 This, however, is by no means universal, for like all aspects of Eucharistic practice, there is a diversity of 
interpretations due to the complexity of the ritual and the traditions out of which it grew.  
61 Bradshaw, Paul. “Did Jesus Institute the Eucharist at the Last Supper?” in Issues in Eucharistic Praying in East and 
West: Essays in Liturgical and Theological Analysis, ed. Maxwell Johnson, pp. 3-7 
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when Jesus refers to his flesh as the bread of life (Bradshaw 2010: 3).  In other 
words, the Johannine Eucharistic tradition connects the ritual meal to spiritual 
feeding on Jesus Christ, which varies from the more dominant tradition of 
connecting it to Jesus’ death and resurrection.  
Thus, we are dealing with a ritual of complex origins and diverse 
interpretations.  After all, early Christianity was not a uniform phenomenon (not 
surprising given its geographic dispersion), and was not characterized by 
liturgical stability or a single normative tradition that governed with undisputed 
authority.  Accordingly, the most charitable interpretation of Eucharistic history 
allows for diversity, a complex patchwork quilt of ritual practice.  One of the 
most notable controversies in the history of the Eucharist occurred as part of the 
Reformation, during which certain Protestants took issue with the Catholic 
doctrine of transubstantiation, which holds that the Eucharistic elements are 
mystically transformed into the real body and blood of Jesus Christ, though their 
outward form remains the same.  In contrast, some reformers disputed that 
although Christ is really present in the elements, the elements do not change 
substance, while others contended that the elements have only symbolic reality, as 
signs of Christ’s Body and blood.62  However, regardless of interpretive 
differences, the church catholic has consistently made the Eucharist an integral 
                                                
62 The reformers often drew on early church fathers who sometimes referred to the Eucharist as a symbol to provide 
backing for their case.  Yet, these same church fathers would often in the same work refer to the Eucharist in both 
realistic and symbolic terms.  This is because symbols were not understood to be separate realities from that which 
they symbolize, rather they must participate in the reality of that which is symbolized.  Accordingly, to say that 
Eucharist symbolizes the presence of Christ must mean that to some extent it effects that presence.  Some have wished 
to keep the language of Eucharistic presence merely at the metaphorical level, a safe distance away from any strange 
and powerful mysticism.  Yet, this unwittingly strips the Eucharist of substance, abandoning any power it had to do 
something in favor of the view that it points to something.  As Flannery O’Connor famously wrote in a 1955 letter, 
“Well, if it’s a symbol, to hell with it.” According to William Cavanaugh, “Christ’s Eucharistic body is both res et 
sacramentum, sign and reality. Christ does not lie behind the Eucharistic sign but saturates it. Christians do not simply 
read the sign but perform it. We become Christ’s body in the Eucharist” (1998: 14).  I do not doubt that for many, this 
pithy footnote does not even come close to solving the controversy surrounding Eucharistic presence, but I believe that 
Eucharistic practice makes significantly less sense and has significantly less power if it is rendered solely in symbolic 
terms.  Thus, like Cavanaugh I propose moving past this tired dilemma by holding that the Eucharist is not either 
reality or sign, but both simultaneously.  A ritualized sacrament is not only a symbol; it is the reality itself precisely 
because ritual is a social practice that moves bodies around and involves human interaction (this, however, is not to 
align myself with any theories as to how this works, like transubstantiation, but merely to proclaim the mystery that 
Christ is present in the breaking of bread.  Furthermore, this kind of Eucharistic theology corresponds well with Bell’s 
theory of ritual, for she also eschews merely symbolic talk of ritual, preferring instead to understand it as a social 
practice capable of effecting change.  
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part of its worship.  Indeed, many in 1st and 2nd century Roman society 
fallaciously thought the Christians among them were cannibals, for they only 
knew that Christians practiced eating someone’s flesh and drinking blood.63  This 
is not to say that all interpretations are right and practical differences do not 
matter – for clearly the Apostle Paul believes there are wrong ways to practice the 
Eucharist (1 Cor. 11:20-21).64  However, I find it telling that the Eucharist has 
enjoyed an enduring and esteemed presence in Christianity, despite the internal 
divisions, disputes, and doctrinal spats that have marred its long history.  Peterson 
agrees; “It is nothing less than astonishing, considering the conflicts and 
variations in practice that mark the Christian church across the continents and 
centuries, that this Supper has been eaten so consistently and similarly under 
Jesus’ command “do this…” (1999: 200).  It is difficult to dispute, therefore, the 
centrality of the Eucharist for Christian life.   
When theologians approach the Eucharist from the vantage point of social 
ethics (as is the case in this endeavor), the temptation is to use the Eucharist to 
symbolize some important ideas or key affirmations that can then be applied to 
the situation at hand.  This constitutes a well-intentioned, though misguided 
attempt to make the Eucharist ethically relevant by taking what one learns 
liturgically and transplanting it in the context of the “real world” (Cavanaugh 
1998: 11).  Well-intentioned though it may be, this approach presupposes that 
social ethics/politics and liturgy/ritual are incommensurable fields, and that if 
ritual is to command social authority or relevance, it must conform to the 
dominant conception of ethics.  In some ways, it may seem like the project I have 
proposed for myself in this chapter fits too easily into the characterization I have 
just condemned, for I come to see what Eucharistic ideas I can translate into the 
language of environmental ethics.   
                                                
63 This hilarious anecdote is found in Justin Martyr (2009), in his Second Apology.  
64 All biblical references come from the New Revised Standard Version (1989).  
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Yet, this is not a totally satisfactory description of the project in this 
chapter.  The goal is not build a bridge between Eucharist and ethics.  The 
Eucharist needs no help in cultivating an ethic of its own; it is a practice teeming 
with power to instill a sense of the ritual.  The task is to recognize what is already 
there in Eucharistic ethics (and the habits that inhere in it).  Just as there is no 
need to bridge the gap between Eucharist and ethics, no bridge building is 
necessary between Eucharistic and environmental ethics either.  As I will argue 
below, Eucharistic ethics is in part an environmental ethic.  As argued in the 
upcoming section, one of the crucial virtues espoused by the latter is upheld and 
practiced in the former.  Thus, instead of a philosophical search for ethical 
“diamonds” in the liturgical “rough,” the task is to understand Eucharist primarily 
as a socio-ethical reality and name how this ritual practice places the church in a 
favorable position – i.e. endowed with certain requisite habits and oriented to 
certain virtues – from which it can more readily assume sustainable behavior.   
To avoid reducing the Eucharist to an environmental tool, I will analyze 
not what the Eucharist means for social ethics (as if the practice could be reduced 
to relevant or irrelevant ideas) but rather what it does to, in, and for the church, 
which is itself a social arena.  I will not attempt to translate Eucharistic principles 
into a language foreign to the church; instead I intend to show how the Eucharist 
constitutes, among other things, a ritual of Christian environmentalism that 
teaches Christians by force of habit what it means to be Christian, and in doing 
so, implicitly instructs them in the practical logic of environmental stewardship.   
Two words of caution to the reader: I do not intend to explicate all aspects 
of Eucharistic practice and theology; to do so would enlarge the scope of this 
chapter beyond its carrying capacity.  This is not a comprehensive analysis of the 
Eucharist and all its myriad interpretations; rather, this is a concerted effort to 
highlight one aspect of Eucharistic practice that trains Christians in an 
environmentally virtuous habit.  However, though I will not and cannot 
comprehensively cover all that the Eucharist means and does, the Eucharistic 
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theme evoked is not a mere side note in the Christian life.  Rather, it holds a 
central position in the church’s understanding of its identity and its practice, and 
thus constitutes neither an anecdote in Christian tradition nor an obscure or 
unemployed interpretation of the ritualized breaking of bread.  
 Lastly, when espousing a liturgical ethic, there are two dangers that lie on 
opposite extremes. The first is intellectualism, which understands the important 
ethical realities to be communicated through the mind and worship to be primarily 
a matter of the intellect.  I have hitherto sought to deconstruct this method in 
order to reveal its inherent reductionisms.  The second danger I will call 
magicalism; for in its reaction to the intellectualist model, it overcompensates by 
stipulating that the liturgy realizes its ends without reference to the mind, working 
as if by magic to instill in the body a certain understanding.  Magicalism assumes 
that the liturgy is supposed to work solely on the body, instilling its vision and 
habits in the body without engaging the intellect at al.  Not only has the preceding 
discussion of ritualization dispelled the merits of this approach (Bell claims that 
ritual power is ambiguous and cannot function like magic), but also Christian 
tradition itself has rejected magicalism.  The church has long recognized that 
Christian practice is not sufficient in itself as pedagogy and that it must operate in 
conjunction with catechesis if the church is to raise up good young Christians.  
Catechesis is discursive instruction in the mysteries of the faith, in which 
catechumens learn what it means to take the Eucharist, to be baptized, to live as a 
Christian in the world.  This reaches back to the discussion of mind-body, for 
though I have focused on how we know the world as bodies, we also know the 
world through the mind.  Body and mind are interconnected so that bodily 
knowing implicates the mind and vice versa.  In other words, it is not an either/or 
situation (either mind or body); this way of construing the matter leads to either 
intellectualism or magicalism.  Rather, the reality of the human is that we are a 
both/and; we are both mind and body for they are interpenetrating realities.  
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Moral education, therefore, works primarily in and through the body, but 
catechesis to a certain extent informs that education.  
 Accordingly, in this chapter I do not claim that because of the Eucharist, 
Christians are already great environmentalists. One could call upon myriad 
examples to disprove such a claim.  There are indeed some Christians who are 
attuned to the needs of their ecosystem and have exhorted each other to strive for 
environmental virtue because they believe environmental ethics to be a vital part 
of their Christian faith.  Some have found in the Eucharist the warrant and 
resources to commit themselves to the care of the earth (Johnsen 2006, Wirzba 
2011).  However, many more believe in a Christianity in which God does not care 
for that which is not human and intends to destroy the earth in the end of days; 
naturally their actions reflect their peculiar theologies.65  I do not argue from a 
historical case that Christians on the whole are environmentally virtuous, for two 
reasons: 1) I doubt that this kind of argument is supported by the facts; and 2) 
such a claim does not actually matter for my argument.  Instead, I believe that a 
seed of environmental virtue lies dormant in Eucharistic practice, ready to be 
unearthed and evoked.  The resources for an environmental training of the body 
are present within Christian tradition, but they must be excavated and triggered if 
they are to take effect.  To mine environmental resources, as I will attempt, 
constitutes a catechetical effort, an approach that sheds light on the logic of 
Christian practice in order to expose themes and ideas that while present, may not 
always be operative.  
 
The Body of Christ as a Unity 
                                                
65 Though I take issue with this kind of theology and any that does not support a robust environmental ethic as a 
misunderstanding of God’s creative and redemptive purposes as made manifest in Christ, I have concerned myself 
with the Eucharist to show how the ethical logic practiced in the ritual by necessity extends its sphere of influence into 
matters environmental.  Environmental ethics, in my estimation, is indelibly linked to Eucharistic ethics insofar as the 
habits and virtues necessary for the former figure heavily into the practice of the latter.  In doing so, I have made the 
somewhat counterintuitive argument (with words) that practice says and does much more than words; it can even 
communicate things that words cannot.  
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 In the language of theological ethics, the Eucharist is all about moral 
formation; more precisely, it concerns the formation of a certain people into the 
Body of Christ, which is a poignant name Christians have historically used to 
speak of the church.  By partaking of this particular meal, Christians learn to 
receive in practice the virtues necessary to be Christ on earth.  In this section, I 
maintain that one such Eucharistic habit learned therein is also an environmental 
virtue, and thus, by practicing the Eucharist, Christians are equipped with a 
resource (habit) necessary to live sustainably both as a part of the Body of Christ 
as well as a part of the earth’s ecological systems.   
Interestingly, the ritual meal consists of consecrated elements believed to 
be the body and blood of Christ, yet the church also speaks of itself in those 
terms.  Furthermore, how does Jesus, the human being of flesh and blood who 
hailed from Nazareth, figure into this scheme?  In Pauline and Patristic theology, 
there are three referents to the phrase “Body of Christ:” “the historical body” or 
Jesus the man who lived and died in Roman-occupied 1st century Israel, “the 
sacramental body” or the Eucharistic elements, and “the ecclesial body” or the 
church (Cavanaugh 1998: 212).  Traditionally, the ecclesial body has been 
understood as the corpus verum, the true Body of Christ in light of the absence of 
the historical body, and the sacramental body as the corpus mysticum.66  In the 
Eucharist, the corpus mysticum connects with the corpus verum so that the 
sacramental and ecclesial bodies together compose the historical body in the 
present (Cavanaugh 1998: 212).  Accordingly, these three separate entities are 
interpenetrating in Eucharistic theology, for the church becomes Christ in the 
taking of the sacrament.67  The turn of phrase “you are what you eat” expresses a 
                                                
66 To call the sacraments the mystical body of Christ does not contradict an understanding of the real presence of 
Christ in Eucharist, for the mysticism refers to the mystery of Christ’s presence in the elements.  
67 To some, this is an absurd statement, not merely due to the “superstition” involved in claiming such transformation, 
but in the fact that the church cannot be the Body of Christ because the church is an imperfect, and notably flawed 
institution. Some think “church” is synonymous with “sinful” or “evil” because of its history. It is hard, and unwise, to 
dispute such accusations, but the critique does not actually contradict anything the church has to say about itself. For 
the church has long recognized its inability to live up to the perfection of Jesus Christ, yet it still claims that somehow 
it is engaged in Eucharistic process of becoming the Body of Christ.  Cavanaugh explains it this way: “In the Eucharist 
the church is always called to become what it eschatologically is” (1998: 206). The church, thus, is a not a static entity 
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similar sentiment, for Christians believe that consumption entails formation.  Yet, 
unlike the normal process of consumption, “the body does not become assimilated 
into our bodies, but vice versa” (Cavanaugh 1998: 232).  Put differently, 
Christians, by eating the Body of Christ, are incorporated into the true Body of 
Christ.  In Peterson’s words, “We become what we receive. Christ is, we are. In 
receiving the Eucharist we re-affirm our identity, ‘Christ in you [me!], the hope of 
glory’ (Col. 1:27)” (1999: 200).   
Thus, there is a theological and material relationship, or a dialectic tension, 
between the sacramental and ecclesial bodies, so much so that Paul in his first 
letter to the church in Corinth reprimands them because they practice the 
Eucharist without giving any thought or aid to their fellow Christians who are 
poor and downtrodden.  As Paul writes,  
 
I hear there are divisions among you; and to some extent I believe it (…) 
When you come together, it is not really to eat the Lord’ Supper. For when 
the time comes to eat, each of you goes ahead with your own supper, one 
goes hungry and another becomes drunk. What! Do you not have homes to 
eat and drink in? Or do you show contempt for the church of God and 
humiliate those who have nothing? (1 Cor. 11:18-22).   
 
As Paul makes clear, any individualism and disunities that characterize the church 
body make it impossible to partake of the sacramental body; ecclesial disunity 
prohibits sacramental unity, for ecclesial disunities are unfit and unworthy of 
incorporation into the one true Body of Christ.  If the church is to be who it is 
supposed to be, it must practice the Eucharist, but it cannot truly practice the 
Eucharist if it does not display the kind of unity predicated on care for others that 
befits Christ’s Body.  To quote Paul again, “The bread that we break, is it not a 
                                                
that can claim a certain status of perfection, but rather a drama, a process of formation that cleaves ever closely to 
Christ, yet ever aware of the effects of human sin. The Eucharist allows the church to glimpse and practice what it 
means to be the Body, for in the ritual that Body is realized then and there. This is why the church practices the 
Eucharist every week, for every week it must realign itself, and re-member what is to conform to Christ. 
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sharing in the body of Christ? Because there is one bread, we who are many are 
one body, for we all partake of the one bread” (1 Cor. 10:16-17).  
 The Eucharist, therefore, not only displays the unity of the church by 
making it visible in the acting of eating together, it requires unity and demands 
that congregants must share in each other’s lives if they are to eat and become the 
Body of Christ.  In many churches, this belief lives on and takes practical form in 
worship during what is called “the kiss of peace” or alternatively “the passing of 
the peace.”  During this time, congregants greet their fellow Christians in the 
name and peace of Christ before entering into the liturgy of the Eucharist.  The 
peace of Christ, however, does not gloss over church disunity; this is a time for 
reconciliation, a space where grievances are acknowledged, wrongdoings 
penitently confessed, and forgiveness offered to each other in the love of Christ.  
According to Cavanaugh, “from the earliest times, Christians have exchanged the 
kiss of peace before the Eucharist as a sign that the Eucharist requires 
reconciliation and forgiveness” (1998: 238).  To pass the peace, then, is to prepare 
for Eucharist by making amends within the Body of Christ, knitting back together 
its members into communion with each other, in order that they may partake of 
the Lord’s body and blood in all honesty and love.  The Didache, one of the 
earliest church documents in Christian history, stipulates that whoever “has a 
difference with his fellow is not to take part with you [in the offering of the 
Eucharist] until they have been reconciled, so as to avoid profanation of your 
sacrifice” (quoted in Cavanaugh 1998: 238, brackets added).  Nothing less than 
the church’s existence as the unified Body of Christ is at stake in the Eucharistic 
ritual.   
In this light, the alternate name “Holy Communion” seems especially apt, 
given that the communion68 under question is twofold: 1) the individual believer 
coming together with God in the Eucharist, and 2) the individual believer coming 
                                                
68The prefix -com comes from the Latin cum meaning “with” and union comes from the Latin unus, meaning “one;” 
thus communion means “one with each other” or “together as one.” 
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together with her fellow congregants under God in the Eucharist.  Christians 
believe that both facets of communion are important; moreover they believe that 
their ability to commune with the divine depends upon the communion they keep 
with their brothers and sisters in Christ.  In this regard, the language of 
remembrance has figured strongly into most Eucharistic liturgies throughout time, 
following Jesus’ command to “do this in remembrance of me” (Luke 22:19).69 
The command to remember (anamnēsis in Greek)70 is a literal exhortation to re-
member Jesus, to reconstitute the Body of Christ, broken on the cross and broken 
as sacramental bread, yet gathered together as the members of churches around 
the world in past, present, and future.  Ecclesial unity is important because it is 
the unity of Christ, a unity found within Christ, as a part of him. For if the church 
is not unified, whose body are they re-membering? 
 
Eucharistic Unity: Gifts, Equality, and Christian Altruism   
 Unity, however, is not a good in itself, for unity can be achieved by 
nefarious measures and turned to vicious ends.  Totalitarian states succeed 
precisely as they foster a certain kind of unity, oriented to a particular end 
(usually some form of repression or evil) but usually this kind of unity is built by 
demolishing diversity and forcing the group to conform to a certain standard. 
Fascist nations, particularly Nazi Germany, have shown themselves to be 
especially adroit at creating and maintaining group unity by dismantling otherness 
and creating strong group boundaries between those permitted inside (due to 
some commonality) and those outside.  One need only mention the name 
“Jonestown” to realize 1) that unity can be dangerous thing indeed, and 2) that 
                                                
69 Cf. 1 Corinthians 11: 23-26 
70 Anamnesis means a “remembrance [that] is not just a mental act, however, but a public performance that gathers 
people into a particular kind of community, the Body of Christ” (Cavanaugh 2011: 217).  This kind of perfomative 
remembering does not conform to a chronological view of time, for it views the past and the future as entirely present 
in the now. Thus, by remembering in the present, Christians participate meaningfully in the past events of Christ’s life, 
death, and resurrection which inaugurated God’s Kingdom on earth and anticipate the coming of the fullness of that 
Kingdom.  Cavanaugh also remarks, “the liturgy is a real foretaste of the Kingdom, and the Eucharist calls us to be 
now what we will be perfectly later: the Body of Christ” (2011: 217). In another work, he writes, “At the Eucharist the 
feast of the last day irrupts into earthly time, and the future breaks into the present” (1998: 224).  
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American social life and politics are no less susceptible to the corruption of 
solidarity into a repressive and coercive oligarchy than Nazi Germany.  
Accordingly, we must approach Christian unity predicated on Eucharistic practice 
with skeptical lens and ask if its unity is a constructive force, or one that abhors 
difference. For surely it would be futile to recommend Eucharistic unity as a 
means of communicating sustainability if church unity constitutes a thin disguise 
for pusillanimous (or vicious) conformity.  
 Let us, therefore, return to analyze in depth one of the church’s primary 
names, the Body of Christ, to delve further into the nature of ecclesial unity.  As 
hinted at above, the church must perform certain acts of repentance and learn to 
forgive each other before partaking of, and thereby becoming, the Body of Christ 
together.  Paul develops the language of “body of Christ” in his first epistle to the 
church in Corinth, which is worth quoting at length. 
 
For just as the body is one and has many members, and all the members of 
the body, though many, are one body, so it is with Christ.  For in the one 
Spirit we were all baptized into one body – Jews or Greeks, slaves or free – 
and we were all made to drink of one Spirit. (…) If the foot would say, 
“Because I am not a hand, I do not belong to the body,” that would not 
make it any less a part of the body. (…) If the whole body were hearing, 
where would the sense of smell be? (…) On the contrary, the members of 
the body that seem to be weaker are indispensable (…) God has so 
arranged the body, giving the greater honor to the inferior member, that 
there may be no dissension within the body, but the members may have the 
same care for another. If one member suffers, all suffer together with it; if 
one member is honored, all rejoice together with it (1 Cor. 12: 12-26). 
 
Significantly, Paul uses baptism to introduce the subject of body, indicating the 
use of the ritual as an initiation ceremony into a community defined by its 
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allegiance to Christ.71  In that community, the members are diverse and varied, 
each with his/her own distinct function that contributes to the overall health and 
ability of the body as a whole.  John Howard Yoder, a Mennonite theologian, 
prefers another Pauline term “the fullness of Christ” to describe the same reality.  
“Paul’s metaphor (…) accentuates reciprocal accountability and interdependence”  
(1992: 47). This is a body that prizes those normally considered weak, one that 
values diversity and resists the conformity of one part to another.  Like a physical 
body, Christ’s re-membered body experiences and feels as a unit; this is a body 
committed to learning how to celebrate and grieve together according to the 
various fates of its parts.  In other epistles, particularly Romans, Paul goes on to 
connect his talk of the church body with a discussion of spiritual gifts.  After 
repeating his reminder to the Corinthians that the church is a multifaceted body, 
Paul writes to the Romans, “We have gifts that differ according to the grace given 
to us: prophecy, in proportion to faith; ministry, in ministering; the teacher, in 
teaching; the exhorter, in exhortation; the giver, in generosity; the leader, in 
diligence; the compassionate, in cheerfulness” (Romans 12: 6-8).  Elsewhere, he 
goes on to identify more gifts operative in the context of Christian community, 
including gifts of healing, wisdom, discernment of spirits, speaking in tongues 
(which must be accompanied by someone who can interpret such cryptic 
utterances), and working miracles (1 Cor. 12:4-11).   
Though some of these gifts may strike us moderns as absurd, I mention the 
diversity of gifts to indicate the extent to which Eucharistic unity encourages a 
plurality of members whose flourishing, whose diversity, and whose varied 
talents are integral to the flourishing of the church body.  This is not a mere 
toleration of others and their peculiarities, a stand-offish practice in which 
                                                
71 In many ways, it is a myopic approach to treat Eucharist without also taking on the subject of baptism, for baptism 
is what makes the church.  Baptism is the ritual by which individuals renounce other convictions and commitments 
and instead commit themselves to Christ and their church body.  “There is a new inter-ethnic social reality into which 
the individual is inducted rather than the social reality being the sum of the individuals” (Yoder 1992: 30).  The 
baptismal commitment relativizes all other commitments, for it constitutes a pledge of ultimate allegiance.  Thus, 
through baptism, God makes God’s church, and the Eucharist sustains the baptismal reality by making that church 
visible (if only briefly) as Christ’s Body each time members break bread together and consume that which 
incorporates them (Cavanaugh 1998: 234).  
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another’s oddities are endured so long as they do not encroach on my rights; this 
kind of logic characteristic of modern politics makes no sense in a Eucharistic 
setting.  Instead, the gathered people made into a church by the Eucharist rejoices 
at the gifts each individual brings, recognizing in them God’s creative provision 
for the church.  This means that Christians learn to see their wellbeing as 
cooperative with the flourishing of other members, instead of thinking that one 
must compete with others to secure the best goods for one’s self.  
Furthermore, unlike other rituals that gather individuals together, the 
Eucharist makes it difficult to speak of individuals per se.  Instead, the church 
proclaims that in the Eucharist a person has undergone a transformation from 
single individual into a member of Christ’s Body.  This is not simply the coming 
together of individuals to realize every week anew that they are connected; rather, 
it is a gathering where the individual learns to no longer think of himself as an 
individual qua individual, but learns instead to situate and understand himself 
corporately.  The individual still exists (it would be hard to classify a ritual that 
obliterates individuality as good news), but only insofar as it is a member of the 
larger entity; one’s individuality becomes re-situated into the more primary reality 
of Christ’s Body.  I will refer to this as the Eucharistic displacement of the 
individual. 
Furthermore, the body metaphor lends itself to egalitarianism, for though 
Christians are members of the same body, some with more notable functions than 
others, all are subordinate to Christ.  Paul uses the body metaphor with the 
understanding that Christ, not the pastor or priest, is the head.  In doing so, he 
“relativizes hierarchy” within the church body (Yoder 1992: 53).  Eucharistic 
unity, therefore, levels the playing field, for it is a unification of diverse peoples 
under Christ, who are all concomitantly part of Christ.  This “unity is constituted 
by our inability to tell our stories without one another’s stories. (…) Such a 
conformation does not obliterate our story but rather it shapes how the story is 
told, so that it may contribute to the upbuilding of Christ’s body” (Hauerwas 
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1995: 41).  The Eucharist provides the ritualized pedagogy through which one 
learns to care for each other by seeing other members as inextricably tied together 
and woven into the fabric of one’s life.   
In the early church, Eucharistic care for the other manifested itself in the 
mutual sharing of possessions.  According to one of the earliest records of the 
first Christians, “All who believed were together and had all things in common; 
they would sell their possessions and goods and distribute the proceeds to all, as 
any had need. Day by day, (…) they broke bread at home and ate their food with 
glad and generous hearts” (Acts 2: 44-46).  Though some believe that Luke, the 
author of Acts, here gives an idealized account of the situation, it is clear that he 
associates the breaking of bread72 with the peculiar economics practiced (see also 
Acts 2:42).  To understand the economic nature of breaking bread, we must 
appreciate the 1st and 2nd century context of the biblical writing, for in that world 
“bread is daily sustenance” (Yoder 1992: 20).  Bread is one of the most basic 
goods, that which everyone requires to survive.  Thus, the Eucharist does not 
merely symbolize a new economic reality; it is an “economic act” in which 
“people actually were sharing with one another their ordinary day-to-day material 
sustenance” (Yoder 1992: 20-21).  Eucharistic unity is not some pie-in-the-sky 
feeling predicated on otherworldly beliefs; it is unity sustained by active 
economic care for others in which the needy find provision and relief in the Body 
of Christ.  According to Martin Luther’s theology of the Eucharist, “receiving 
bread and wine, the body and blood of Christ, signifies the creation or 
confirmation of a community that receives ‘gifts’ and consequently bears 
responsibility to respond in mutual assistance to each other” (Torvend 2008: 94).  
Luther himself construed the ethical nature of the Eucharist in bold and 
suggestive terms.  “By means of this sacrament, all self-seeking love is rooted out 
                                                
72 Paul Bradshaw and others take the “breaking of bread” to be synonymous with early Eucharist practices, precisely 
because early Eucharists often involved full meals.  Andrew McGowan in particular argues that the Eucharist, the 
agape meal, and the breaking of bread all correspond to the same ritual celebration.  See especially Bradshaw (2004) 
pp. 26-32; and McGowan (1997).  
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and gives place to that which seeks the common good of all; and through the 
change wrought by love there is one bread, one drink, one body, one community” 
(quoted in Torvend 2008: 95).  The love fostered by the Eucharist necessarily 
reaches outside of one’s self to attend to others; it inculcates the virtue of 
selflessness by requiring the church to think about itself as an intricate and 
multidimensional body, rather than as a haphazard collection of individuals.  
Conversely, Christian neglect of the Eucharist leaves the church bereft of 
practice-oriented resources to instill love for the other.73  “It was not uncommon, 
therefore, for the ancient church to connect failure to recognize Christ in the 
consecrated bread and wine with failure to treat others as brothers and sisters in 
Christ” (Cavanaugh 1998: 231).  A person unable to discern Christ’s Body, and 
consequently who cannot see his own participation in that body alongside others, 
is likely to practice neglect of those who suffer and need care.  This allows for the 
possibility that one can take the Eucharist without really taking the Eucharist, that 
one can go through the physical actions without participating in the reality of the 
ritual.  This is because rituals are never merely physical, they always implicate 
the corresponding inner states of those involved.  
Christians believe that the Eucharist is Christ’s Body, a commemoration of 
his death and brutal crucifixion, broken yet somehow turned to good so that all 
may be fed.  By consuming it, the church becomes part of that same broken body, 
which can only mean that they too must lay down their possessions, their pride, 
their very lives, so that others can receive Christ’s sustenance through them.  
                                                
73 There are some who have eschewed the Eucharist for other ritualized practices, like footwashing, a service Jesus 
practiced with his disciples (John 13: 1-20).  Like the Eucharist, this practice encourages in its actions, and thereby 
practices, the virtue of selfless attention to the other.  Though these Christians assume a ritual with similar virtues 
embedded in the physical practice, there is a strong sense that by foregoing Eucharistic practice, they are missing 
something crucial to the Christian life.  One aspect not included in footwashing practice is the tangible emphasis on 
the unity of the sacramental body and, derivatively, of the ecclesial body.  Footwashing practices love for the other, 
but it does not goes as far as the Eucharist does in stipulating that the self has been incorporated into a new reality that 
subsumes and displaces the self.  To put it in a stark and almost absurd manner, in a way there is no love for the Other 
in the reality of the Eucharist, for the Other is always already part of who I am as I am part of Christ’s Body.  Thus, a 
“Eucharistized” self can no longer conceive of himself as a single entity; instead, he is now irreducibly bonded to the 
others in the Body to the extent that to tell his personal story fully requires telling the stories of those connected to 
him.  As Luther wrote, “Offer to others your strength, as if it were their own, just as Christ does for you in the 
sacrament. This is what it means to be changed into one another through love, out of many particles to become one 
bread and drink” (quoted in Torvend 2008: 95, emphasis added).  
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There is a circular Christological logic at play in the Eucharist: the Eucharist 
gives life and wholeness to the church so that they too may be broken for the 
sustenance and wholeness of others.  The sacrifice of Christ reproduces itself in 
the church precisely because it is the corpus verum and must cleave to the life 
(and death) of Christ.  The Eucharist does not enliven the church so that the 
church may simply go on living its former life; rather, a Eucharistic church is one 
that follows Christ’s self-offering by humbling itself in self-emptying service to 
others.  When Jesus says “if any want to become my followers, let them deny 
themselves and take up their cross and follow me” (Matthew 16:24) there is a 
very real sense in which Christians are called to eschew any fear of death, for in 
the person of Jesus Christ who died and was resurrected, they see that death does 
not have the last word.  This, however, does not warrant any nonchalance about 
death, especially when it comes to the deaths of others (notice that the example 
Christians follow is Jesus who rejected the way of the sword, the violent option to 
institute the Kingdom of God by forcing death on others, and instead gave himself 
up to the cross to suffer death so that there may be life abundant for those who 
choose to follow him).74  
Let us pause to rehearse the argument.  The Eucharist is a ritual of ecclesial 
formation to the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ.  It teaches the church 
to come together as an egalitarian body replete with diverse gifts under the 
headship of Christ.  It trains the church to consider itself first as a group in which 
the “dignity of the individual is his or her uniqueness as a specific member of that 
body” (Yoder 1994: 371).  The Eucharist ushers Christians into a new reality in 
which economic goods are shared freely with one another in the manner of 
Christ’s self-giving, characterized by selfless care for one’s fellow members of 
the Body.  The Eucharist effects ecclesial unity by offering life through the 
                                                
74 “Assimilation to Christ’s sacrifice is not the continuation of the violence and rivalry needed to sustain a certain 
conception of society, but the gathering of a new social body in which the only sacrifice is the mutual self-offering of 
Christian charity.”  Thus, the Eucharist aims “not to create new victims but rather martyrs, witnesses to the end of 
victimization” (Cavanaugh 1998: 232).  
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brokenness of Christ’s death; according to theologian Raniero Cantalamessa, “the 
Eucharist makes the Church by making the Church Eucharist!” (quoted in 
Cavanaugh 1998: 232).  In re-membering the church, the Eucharist practices 
selfless and care-full group-ness, and produces members who habitually attend to 
their life together and recognize that its unity is at stake in their every action and 
interaction.  Put differently, the Eucharist gives Christians extended and 
embodied practice in thinking and acting beyond the parameters of the self; in 
fact, the Eucharist trains Christians to relocate the self, i.e. to remove it from the 
center of one’s reality and reposition it as part of a group whose reality is more 
primary than that of the individual.  In this sense, the use of “altruism” to describe 
Eucharistic love falls well short of the reality, since the Eucharist challenges the 
self/other distinction that undergirds the concept of altruism (altruism comes from 
the Latin alteri huic meaning “to this other”).  Whereas altruism reaches outside 
of the self to embrace somebody else, the Eucharist welcomes the other into such 
intimacy with the self that it blurs the lines that separate people.  This is why 
“Eucharistic worship is the primary context for reconciliation (…) in the Christian 
life” (Berkman 2011: 97), for if one member holds a grievance against another, he 
is estranged from that part of himself in which the other co-abides and must seek 
to make amends if unity of self and the social body is to be achieved.  In short, 
Christians learn to care for others (e.g. prizing the concerns and problems of 
another as one’s own, sharing economic goods) in the Eucharist by discovering 
that they together re-member the broken Body of Christ as they consume it.  
  
Caritas: An Environmental Virtue 
Although such an emphasis on ecclesial unity that encourages diversity 
while demanding reconciliation is surely commendable, it may not yet be 
immediately obvious how this practice of ritual unity can respond constructively 
and sustainably to the challenge posed by the ensconced habits of climate change.  
The rest of this chapter will therefore enumerate how one moral habit formed in 
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Eucharistic practice can sustain a life capable of consistent and countercultural 
environmentally responsible behavior.  
 One of the more remarkable elements of Eucharistic unity is the force with 
which it disallows any kind of celebrated individualism.  Yet, the individual is not 
so much eliminated as it is displaced, removed from the center and resituated as a 
member, a part of the overall group.   
 
In short, in gathering, the ekklesia75 learns to receive its true identity as the 
Body of Christ.  In doing so, the ekklesia confesses that there is no “I” 
apart from that body: that every person receives his or her truest identity as 
a part of the Body of Christ.  This is why gathering is neither secondary 
nor incidental, for in so doing, vital and life-giving connections are 
nurtured and sustained (Kenneson 2011: 65).   
 
Recalling the imagery used by the Apostle Paul in his letters to Corinth and 
Rome, Christians learn to see themselves symbolically – though no less actually – 
as a member in Christ’s Body: a leg, arm, nose, or finger, etc.  This stands in 
direct opposition to the modern (and unsustainable) habit of considering an 
individual as autonomous, discrete, and solitary.  Such a perspective inordinately 
prizes the individual to the extent that he learns to believe the lie that he can do or 
possess whatever he desires whenever he desires it.  Methodological 
individualism believes that a social body is always reducible to its parts since it 
treats individuals as the most basic ontological unit.  In this world, the individual 
recognizes neither higher authority nor membership in any sort of organizations, 
ecosystem, or group that has morally binding obligations.  Complete moral 
autonomy does not serve the environmental movement, since a large part of its 
platform rests on the presumption that we must care for something (nature in 
general, this polluted lake or stream, etc.) other than ourselves, a move that 
individualism undercuts.  Thus, methodological individualism ultimately destroys 
                                                
75 Ekklesia is a Greek term from which we get the English word “church.”  Etymologically, it means those who are 
called out (ek – meaning “out” or “from” and kaleo meaning “to call”). 
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life precisely because it cannot justify, support, or encourage any moral attention 
given to others, humans or more-than-human beings.  To some extent, therefore, 
the blame for climate change falls at the feet of an insistent and narrow-sighted 
individualism.  After all, how can one care about one’s natural surroundings if 
one has not learned to care for other humans?  The love required for the latter is 
the same love demanded by the former, stretched and extended.  
 In contrast, the Eucharist practices a different logic, a communitarian logic 
that demands attention to the other in order for true ritualized celebration to occur.  
Neglect for others within the community constitutes a failure to participate fully 
in the rite.  In the Eucharist, therefore, Christians have training in selfless love 
and group-mindedness.  In theological terms, they are equipped with the habits of 
caritas, the love of (and for) Christ that indwells a person and extends itself 
outwards in love for others.76  Unlike altruism, caritas does not presuppose 
individualism but instead draws people together in love by drawing them all 
closer together in the unity of Christ.  Where we discern unity, altruism is no 
longer necessary; in its place stands caritas.  This is the love of and for the Body 
of Christ, which extends outwards by drawing Christians towards Christ.  The 
Eucharist, therefore, has the resources to provide the moral basis for the 
environmentalists’ insistence that we must take more than ourselves into account 
when we engage in practices that affect the health of the environment.  
 Another provocative similarity between Eucharistic and environmental 
ethics is the extent to which both emphasize the interconnected and holistic nature 
of their respective systems.  Christians, of course, refer to the church and its 
corporate life, whereas environmentalists speak of the unity of an ecosystem.  
One could use the Christian language of the Body with respect to an ecosystem, 
                                                
76 Caritas, for Aquinas, is the form of all other virtues for it is “more excellent than faith or hope [the other two 
theological virtues], and, consequently, than all the other virtues, just as prudence, which by itself attains reason, is 
more excellent than the other moral virtues” (Summa Theologica, Q.23 Article 6).  Aquinas claims that just as 
prudence (practical wisdom) is required for the exercise of all other virtues, so too is caritas a prerequisite for the 
virtues since no one would call a person virtuous if they acted out of virtue but not out of love.  A courageous man 
does not rashly thrown himself into the heat of battle for little reason; rather, he acts courageously out of love for a 
fellow soldier, his wife, his country, or another other objects of his love whom he desires to protect.  Caritas gives 
shape to all other virtues.  
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as the body image resonates with the intricate and complex web of relations that 
make up a particular ecosystem.  Each (animate or inanimate) member of an 
ecosystem possesses an irreducible and distinctive function that contributes to the 
symbiotic health of the overall system.  This harmonizes with the church’s 
understanding of itself as the Body of Christ.  Ecologically speaking, everything 
is connected to everything else, so that an alteration of a seemingly insignificant 
facet of an ecosystem affects the whole.  In the words of Sir Albert Howard, to 
see ecologically is to see “the whole problem of health in soil, plant, animal and 
man as one great subject” (1947: 11).   
This is the basis for the common ecological maxim, “it is impossible to do 
just one thing in nature.”  The unexpected death of an old tree will send ripples 
throughout the neighborhood’s flora and fauna.  The pollution of a river will hurt 
those animals that live in or near the water, and by extension, all those other 
animals, plants, trees, and humans connected and dependent on the normal 
functions of water-based fauna.  Because bees are a crucial member of an 
ecosystem’s web and play a crucial role in pollination, nectar collection, and 
honey production, the decimation of the bee population worldwide is a nightmare 
situation.  As Wendell Berry eloquently writes, 
 
For some time now ecologists have been documenting the principle that 
“you can’t do one thing” – which means that in a natural system whatever 
affects one thing ultimately affects everything. Everything in the Creation 
is related to everything else and dependent on everything else. The 
Creation is one: it is a uni-verse, a whole, the parts of which are all ‘turned 
into one” (1977: 46). 
 
According to Berry, agriculture, if it is to succeed, must follow the logic of the 
uni-verse and realize that “simple” industrial fixes and “progress” are not benign 
developments, but cannonballs that sends tidal waves through an ecosystem and 
the human economy built up around that environment.  “The definitive 
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relationships in the universe are thus not competitive but interdependent” (Berry 
1977: 47).  To understand this cooperative reality is to tread lightly, to care for the 
effects of one’s actions that reach beyond one’s self.  Conversely, to ignore or 
misunderstand the unity of reality, the more commonly taken option, is to burn 
through the world’s natural systems as resources, taking only humankind – or 
more likely, only the interests of an exclusive few – into estimation.  Thus, the 
ability to discern (and attend to) the unity of nature constitutes a paramount virtue 
in environmental ethics.  
On a smaller scale, the church operates according to a similar logic as they 
gather together not as individuals, but as members in Body of Christ.  In this 
body, one’s actions are never completely one’s own because one is embedded in a 
web that connects to all other members.  Should one member act out in disdain 
for the larger community, or neglect to care for a downtrodden member and 
thereby fail to discern the Body, the ecclesial body feels the effects.  The 
Eucharist weaves together the disparate strands of the church into a coherent and 
functional whole so that the members learn to extend the boundaries of their 
individual selves to include the Other – to love “your neighbor as yourself” (Luke 
10:27).  In the incorporation of the self into the Body, the member learns to 
conceive of his own happiness and fate as tied up in the flourishing of others.  
Without clear demarcations that separate the self from the Body, it thus becomes 
natural to act out of consideration for others, for such other-oriented love is really 
just an enlarged selfishness.  Because the Eucharist pronounces that the group has 
displaced the self by subsuming into its benevolent Body, I can no longer pursue 
my own aims without taking into account the welfare of those tied to me.  Thus, 
the Eucharist creates a unity that teems with moral significance, a ritually 
practiced union that demands care and caritas from its constituents.  By requiring 
certain practices, the Eucharist instills in the church body the habits necessary to 
sustain the Body and to maintain its unity.  I have pinpointed one such habit as 
selfless love, or caritas, which takes form in the passing of peace and the sharing 
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of bread and wine with one another.  An early name for the Eucharist, the agape 
meal77, captures perfectly the virtue of selfless care, for those Christians who 
partook of the Eucharistic meal understood it as the primary practice of their love 
for one another.  Not only does it constitute a means of showing love to others, 
the Eucharist also constitutes a means of rehearsing the actions of love for others 
and thus coming to love those previously thought to be unlovable.  The Eucharist 
is caritas, Christ’s love for all people made manifest in the giving of himself and 
that same love embodied in the church by which it is drawn together under Christ 
and sustained. 
Of course, Christians are not perfect and often cast aside Eucharistic unity 
in favor of disunity and disparities, but this is precisely why the ritual is practiced 
weekly, sometimes daily in certain communities.  The Eucharist functions to call 
the church to be the church and to cease pretending to be anything but Christ 
incarnate.  It serves to gather and repeatedly re-member the Body of Christ, to 
teach and untiringly inculcate in Christians a sense for what it means to be a part 
of this particular group, and to practice internal reconciliation, forgiveness, and 
incorporation.   
 
Addressing Objections: Humanity, Nature, and the Virtues 
At this point it is necessary to confront a roadblock in this argument.  The 
environmentalist is concerned primarily with extending human love to that which 
is more-than-human.  The fact that the Eucharist trains people in the habit of 
selfless love towards other humans, then, seems a starkly limited solution.  Due to 
its focus on the human, it appears to lack the resources to command love towards 
the environment.  However, this objection ultimately possesses a pernicious 
dualism and backwards moral logic.  This critique presumes an unflinching 
dichotomy between humanity and nature, which assumes that learning to love 
                                                
77 Agape is the Greek word for compassionate love, as distinct from erotic love or brotherly love.  Caritas is the Latin 
word used to name the same phenomenon.  
 - 124 - 
humans cannot pertain to loving nature due to the inestimable difference between 
the two.  Because of this disjunction between the human and the natural, this 
assumption ultimately concludes that humans are unnatural and that the survival 
of nature demands the eradication of humanity.   
I eschew this dualism and hold that there is no ontological distinction 
between the human and the natural, between culture and nature as if culture was 
not natural.  Humans are beings born of nature and inseparable from it (recall 
Aristotle’s appellation for humankind: rational animals).  To accept this holistic 
perspective makes it impossible to maintain that what we do in human matters has 
no relevance for what we do in nature; indeed, intra-human interactions have 
everything to do with our relationship to the environment because we are a part of 
the environment.  What we do and who we are in the human world carries 
profound environmental import because the natural world subsumes the human 
world.  As Marilynne Robinson keenly contends, “Every environmental problem 
is a human problem” (1998: 253).   
What is at stake in how we treat our human neighbors is our moral 
character.  For in those interactions, we develop the habits of virtue and vice that 
predispose us towards particular actions and ends.  Our actions towards humans 
do not happen in a vacuum; to assume so requires an anemic moral logic that 
disregards the primacy of character in ethics.  Instead, my relations with other 
humans shape me into an individual of a certain moral character whose sphere of 
influence transcends human boundaries.  In other words, habit often operates 
without respect for distinctions between species.  My care, affection and love for 
others are likely to pervade my relationship with nature; equally, should I 
habitually comport myself to other humans with hate and ill will, I become the 
kind of person who can justify with good conscience the same malevolence 
directed to the more-than-human realm.  “Unless we can re-establish peace and 
order as values, and learn to see our own well-being in our neighbor’s prosperity, 
we can do nothing at all for the rain forests and the koala bears” (Robinson 1998: 
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253).  There is an inescapable connection between human virtue and 
environmental virtue; training in one can readily lend itself towards realization of 
the other.  Our inability to care for nature, even against our better knowledge, 
reflects our inability to care for each other; likewise, the more we learn to love 
those humans who appear so different from ourselves, the more ably we can 
practice love to the ailing ecosystems of the world.  The love required for 
environmental care is the same love operative in the human realm.  
This, then, is the primary connection I draw between Eucharistic ethics and 
environmental advocacy: the ritual practices a unity that presupposes selfless love 
and thus trains the constituents in the practical measures necessary for group 
membership.  “The body politic of the church is, then, centered on a practice of 
table fellowship: where sharing is an enactment of participation or co-belonging 
with one another, humanity with creation, and the whole of creation with God” 
(Méndez Montoya 2009: 151).  The Eucharist ritually inscribes love for the other 
in a tangible practice while also expanding the boundaries of the self by 
displacing it within a body, so that members learn to love the other as themselves.  
“Christians need each other if they are to be able to experience the gift of the 
body of Christ in the food and of the Eucharist” (Hauerwas and Wells 2011: 20).  
Unlike the ethic of individualism, a Eucharistic ethic has the resources to sustain 
the health and wellbeing of a system simply by shaping ritualized bodies attuned 
(tangibly and cognitively) to the needs, interests, and presence of others.  In short, 
the interconnection of ecosystems resembles that of the church, so that Christians, 
by practicing what it means pragmatically to be the church, are equipped with the 
moral foundation – the habits and predispositions to favor that which is virtuous – 
required to mount a resistance to climate change practices.   
This ritual works primarily below the level of ratiocination, focusing first 
on bodily practices like the sharing of hugs, kisses, or handshakes in the passing 
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of the peace.78  Catechetical instruction, however, makes people aware of the 
significance of what they are doing with their bodies.  Practice does not 
communicate unambiguously and bodily movement is not sufficient to form a 
habit; it is possible to go through the motions and still miss the poignancy of the 
ritual.  Because the practice must have currency in a social body, that nexus of 
contextual meaning, habit formation requires an agreed upon understanding of 
what is going on and what it does. This is why it is possible for Paul to rebuke the 
Corinthians for their inequitable Eucharistic practice and explicate what the 
Eucharist demands of the church (1 Cor. 11:17-22).  Paul contends that what is 
believed to be effected in the Eucharist (the re-membering of Christ’s Body) 
actually takes place and that therefore any outstanding disunity within the social 
body must be reconciled.  What I have done emulates Paul’s tactic: I am drawing 
on a certain understanding of the ritual to contend that a Eucharistic ethic must 
resemble a habitual disposition to selfless love for one another and that this virtue 
prepares Christians to respond sustainably to the climate change that afflicts our 
uni-verse.79  In writing this, I am not only describing Eucharistic ethics, but also 
prescribing (or excavating) an ethical reality part of a Eucharistic ethic.  The fact 
that many who partake of the Eucharist do not act with love to the environment 
does not undercut my argument.  Unless the connection between caritas and 
ecology is underlined as I have tried to do, the ethical kernel dormant in the ritual 
practice will not have the chance to germinate and take hold.   
 
Conclusion: The Eucharist as Pedagogic Starting Point 
 I have proposed that the Eucharist constitutes a practice capable of 
challenging the habits of individualism that undergird unsustainable behavior.  
This is because the Eucharist does not primarily convey certain information 
                                                
78 In the passing of the peace, “the very concept of ‘stranger’ is being challenged and redefined from a radically 
Christian perspective” (Katongole 2011: 80).  
79 To partake of the Eucharist “is to commit to an economy and a politics in which the care of each other is our all-
consuming desire” (Wirzba 2011: 178). 
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teeming with environmental implications.  Rather, the Eucharist forms and 
reforms a people characterized by the life and death of Christ, that is a people 
who practice with their bodies the selfless love and that sustains the unity of 
Christ’s Body.  I have argued that the Eucharist practices a specific habit (re-
membering the Body of Christ) that in its very nature resists the individualistic 
logic at play in unsustainable behavior and promotes instead a communitarian 
logic that extends love beyond the self to embrace the Other.  If triggered, this 
Eucharistic habit can be put to environmental ends by practicing the virtue of 
caritas within the unity of the universe’s ecological systems.  This habit can 
create a firm foundation upon which an environmental ethic can be built.  
Environmental virtue, accordingly, finds substantial realization in the realm of 
Christian virtue and performance in the Eucharistic ritual.   
I am not suggesting that the repetitious gathering of a group of strangers to 
partake of a single loaf of bread and drink a common cup will form the habitual 
resources to ground a more sustainable life.  This is not to say that eating together 
is bad, or anything less than formative – no doubt eating together has myriad 
positive environmental impacts.  However, I am not prescribing the Eucharist to 
the secular environmental community in hopes that they will adopt it and be 
better off for it.  Such a move would be meaningless precisely because the 
Eucharist is what it is (and does what it does) only as it is embedded in the 
context of beliefs, tradition, and people that make it intelligible.  Divorced from 
that preexisting context, Eucharistic practice would be a hollow shell, a form 
without meaning, and simply another name for eating together.  Instead, in this 
chapter I have adopted the lens of an anthropologist, committed to studying the 
particularities and peculiarities of a certain subculture in order to understand how 
its ritual practice founds and sustains its ethics and whether that habits learned 
therein can have any bearing on its environmental behavior.  I have made 
Christian Eucharistic practice into a case study reflective of the diagnosis in the 
previous two chapters, a test case designed to show the viability of a habit-
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oriented, practice-based communication of sustainability.  This does not mean 
that the Eucharist practices the virtues of every kernel of environmental wisdom, 
but rather that it provides a starting point to ground environmental information 
and the moral propulsion (habits) necessary to direct that information towards 
sustainable action.    
As a social practice with normative power to educate the body, the 
Eucharist makes the church a single body and institutes Christ at its head.  In 
doing so it privileges and prioritizes the virtue of caritas – selfless love for one 
another – by displacing the self from the center of reality and muddling the 
boundaries between self and others.   
 
Self and other, the human and divine, spiritual and material, the individual 
parts and the whole, do not collapse into one another, but, rather, they 
coexist or mutually indwell in and through this metaxu, the in-betweenness 
that is the Body of Christ.  Difference is not eliminated, but it is brought 
into a new harmonious and excessive unity (Christ’s Body) that opens up 
an infinite space for relations of affinity, mutual care (mutual nurturing), 
and reciprocity (Méndez Montoya 2009: 140).   
 
Christians who partake of the Eucharist practice love and so learn what is 
necessary to sustain the unity of the Body.  Thus, the Eucharist trains Christians 
to carry their love beyond themselves, and counters the mantra of modern 
individualism which only considers the self to be worthy of moral attention.  This 
kind of other-directed love orients the individual towards the wellbeing of the 
group, and creates individuals who practice love, that is who have the habit of 
other-attentiveness.  “To join Christ’s body is to begin a patient, affectionate, and 
responsible commitment to others so that the memberships of creation and 
community that feed us are strengthened to form a more integrated and healthy 
whole” (Wirzba 2011: 159).  Since sustainability requires an attention to the 
wellbeing of the more-than-human ecosystem, the Eucharist concerns the main 
 - 129 - 
moral habit of environmentalism required to care about the more-than-human 
world.  The Eucharist prepares Christians to value that which is other than 
themselves, to take on “this ethos (which) accepts the Other unconditionally, 
practices unlimited forgiveness, and confirms all the relations that contribute to 
another’s identity” (Wirzba 2011: 169).  Essentially, the Eucharist draws humans 
closer together and closer to God’s creation as they participate in what is a truly 
“cosmic liturgy” (Wirzba 2011: 169).   
This test case develops a ritual-based communication of sustainability by 
evoking a fundamental ethical reality at play in the Eucharist and elucidating its 
natural connection to environmental ethics.  In other words, Eucharistic virtue 
realizes and constitutes environmental virtue.  With the habit of caritas, 
Christians have the moral platform to begin to heed the information disseminated 
by environmentalists.  While I have not relegated information and head 
knowledge to superfluity, I have attempted to displace it from primary importance 
and situate it in its proper place as secondary to the habits integral to moral life.  
To formulate a constructive response to climate change, I have drawn on the 
moral logic implicit in a specific habit already ritualized in certain social bodies 
and made evident the relevance that habit holds for humankind’s relationship to 
the environment.  Thus, the project of this chapter has been to understand the 
Eucharist environmentally, to extend the moral logic of the Eucharist to its 
natural conclusion by excavating a latent, though potent, ritual motif.  Put simply, 
the Eucharist offers a unique arena where a certain virtue is extolled and its 
constitutive habits are formed that have the ability to resist the practices that 
perpetrate and perpetuate climate change.  Eucharistic habits, therefore, compose 
a hint of the moral character society needs to sustain environmentally responsible 
behavior.  
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